Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, China

226. Telegram 770 from Geneva¹

Geneva, September 23, 1955, 5 p.m.

770. From Johnson.

1. Believe today’s meeting very useful in bringing home to PRC depth our dissatisfaction on implementation agreed announcement and making it unmistakably clear we continue expect prompt action on remaining 19.

2. As of today Wang is somewhat in doubt as to what exactly we intend to do with respect item two. Last meeting I dealt with something they had raised under item two, today I refused to deal at all with item two, and my remarks have been sufficiently ambiguous that they are now not entirely clear as to whether our intent is flatly to refuse discuss item two until all remaining Americans are released or something short of that. However it cannot but be perfectly clear to them that we expect additional performance. I did not feel that I could today debate, however lightly, his reply to my statement at last meeting on higher level talks without weakening impression I was attempting create.

3. Do not believe I could state our position any more forcefully than I did today without going to next step of flatly refusing enter any substantive discussion item two until every American released. In present atmosphere I would have to quickly reveal whether or not we prepared maintain such position up to point of break.

4. Although he today avoided word “break” this was somewhat implied in his threat make public statement if we continue through next meeting our refusal discuss item two. Do not believe their impatience is feigned and it would not be possible keep talks going solely on today’s note useful and important though I feel it has been.

5. Question is what we do if by time of next meeting there has been no additional performance on their part. Believe that some sort additional reply to his statement today on higher level meeting and line in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745 would with some difficulty carry me though next meeting or two but problem will be where we go from there. With our having already rejected one of his two items and we apparently having only two items there is not going to be much scope for an agenda argument. It would, under these circumstances seem to me to be our best tactic to attempt to focus on a substantive exchange on “no force” for as long as we could keeping their item of trade embargo on ice for as long as we could.

6. It occurs to me that we may raise problems by attempting to arrive at any formal agenda agreement on item two. For example, our rejection of a higher level meeting as a suitable agenda item but our acceptance of trade embargo may carry with it implication that we are prepared to do something, however conditional, with respect to latter. This implication might be avoided if no [omission in the original—attempt?] was made to establish formal agenda. They in turn will probably reject our item on persons missing from Korean War, or accept it if we accept their item on higher level meeting. With respect to missing personnel from Korean War I find it difficult to formulate it as an agenda item but am very clear that I could easily present simply as a list of names and asking for a categorical yes or no as whether any are alive in territory under their control.

7. With reference para 6 Deptel 766 I am doubtful desirability letter from myself to Wang. I would prefer make presentation on missing servicemen entirely informal and oral. With respect renunciation force believe oral statement in meeting best form but could accordance our standing arrangement give him copy my remarks this regard.

8. Depending upon nature my instructions for next meeting we should be prepared for possibility Wang may implement his threat issue public statement on our “stalling” on discussion item two. I will submit draft for Department’s approval.

Shillock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.