132. Letter 5 from Johnson to McConaughy1
I have received your letter of August 19th, and I am writing this to go out by tomorrow’s pouch. I would hope that you would be able to work out something so that we could have an exchange at least twice a week.
As you can see from my messages, the deadlock is now certainly very tight. I am sorry that I apparently misled you a little in my first flash telegram on the August 18th meeting by not including enough. However, I thought that my statements that I had made no progress, result was complete deadlock, made it clear that I had not in fact got any place.
I believe that I have included in my two telegrams on the subject everything of significance that passed at the dinner I gave for Wang, although it is hard to condense four and a half hours of conversation. As I said in my telegram, he was making a tremendous effort to go as far as he could within his obviously very limited instructions to assure me that everything was going to be all right. I thought you might be interested in exactly what he said, which I had termed as “an involved and tortuous explanation” in paragraph two of my 585. Ekvall and I reconstructed it immediately upon our return as follows: “There is no comparison to be made of the advantages which those who are left will have over those who have been released during the past one year. For there are three favoring factors which will make it clear quickly and easily for them to be released. The three factors are (a) favorable effect release of the others will have on people still there; (b) circumstances of the case itself; and (c) state of our relations.” [Facsimile Page 2] I prodded and poked at this from every conceivable angle and was just unable to obtain any [Typeset Page 165] further explanation. His conversation otherwise was very rational and sensible and the only explanation I have for that he had been rigidly instructed to say absolutely nothing more on this subject. The phrasing, to my mind, very much carries the marks of Chou.
I asked him to dinner at the end of our meeting on Saturday, and he replied that he would let me know at 8 o’clock Sunday morning. This seemed a very short time to make an inquiry and get a reply from Peiping, but I suppose that he was able to do so. In any event, his interpreter telephoned Ekvall promptly at 8 o’clock to accept. I had the dinner out at the little pension-type of place on the outskirts of Geneva where Clough and Forman are living. In accordance with my suggestion, he came in a car other than the one he usually uses and without a flag. (Incidentally, he is normally driven around town in a big Zim, while I am using a Chevrolet.) We had drinks down in the garden before dinner. After dinner we retired to the sitting room the boys use. I am satisfied that it was carried off without any leak to the press and don’t believe that he will say anything. However, if it did come out, I would simply take the line that I am leaving no stone unturned in making every possible effort to reach agreement on getting our people out. I should think that this would probably be well accepted by everybody except possibly Taipei.
I feel that the dinner was a good idea and that now was exactly the right time to do it. They are, I am convinced, extremely sensitive on the subject of social ostracism and were particularly sensitive at our rejection of their little overtures at last year’s conference here. I think that Wang’s mention of Bedell Smith’s little gesture towards Chou towards the end of the meetings last year particularly significant in indicating their sensitivity to such little things. My having taken the initiative this year represents a major departure, and I believe that it gives me a subtle, though distinct, advantage.
Thanks very much for the information on what we have done with the Indians, as well as today’s telegram giving me the text of the Secretary’s letter to U Nu. I think it was excellent and presented the situation exactly right. I will, of course, be extremely interested and hope I can promptly receive anything from any source on what the Chinese may tell the Indians or the Burmese in Peiping.
I greatly appreciate the Department’s affirmation in 603 [Facsimile Page 3] of the line that I had taken on “sovereignty and jurisdiction”. I had done this entirely ad lib in give and take during a meeting and was a little concerned that the Department may have felt I had gone too far.
We will keep plugging away but I fear that it is going to largely be a matter of saying the same thing over again as I have pretty much run out of ideas on new ways to say things.
[Typeset Page 166]I am really going to need help and guidance if and when it comes to a discussion of “no force”. In this regard, I note from recent Taipei Weekas the Nationalists are still carrying out attacks on shipping and various other minor actions, as well as over-flying the mainland. Frankly I just don’t see what my reply is going to be when after I raise the question of no force they raise the question of these Nationalist actions carried out with equipment we have supplied them. Also when I raise our treaty and supplementary understandings with the Nationalists on offensive action, I do not see what I say when they allege this simply goes to prove that these Nationalist actions are being taken with our approval. I hope you all will have some good ideas for me.
Sincerely,
American Ambassador
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”↩