126. Telegram 594 from Geneva1
594. From Johnson.
Comments on 10th meeting.
1. Text handed Wang differed only as follows from Deptel 599:
- (A)
- Phrase “and the Government UK may also do so” restored in order avoid wording Wang could object to as “unequal”.
- (B)
- Word “residing” deleted accordance Deptel 602.
- (C)
- Full names of Ambassadors given in paragraph two.
- (D)
- Phrase “make investigation of” in paragraph two (A) both sections changed to “investigate”.
2. I assume requirement that “understanding” be public is applicable only to type referred to paragraph 4 Deptel 602 and that “oral understanding” along lines paragraph 3 same telegram would not necessarily have to be made public unless breached. Acting on authority Secretary’s 569 I had previously told Wang such understanding could be private.
3. Wang showed no inclination retreat from position that he could not state definite time limit within which all Americans could be released, since this would amount to submitting to coercion. Made only the slight concession of assuring me that number Americans to be released immediately “not small” and that cases of remainder could be considered favorably and quickly. However latter part of assurance questionable value since settlement remaining American cases linked to “improvement of relations [Facsimile Page 2] between two countries”. This enables Peiping halt release of Americans whenever they feel we not “cooperating” sufficiently to improve relations. I will continue press Wang hard for firm commitment regarding time but foresee no early change in his attitude.
4. See no reason change assessment in my 457 that only with great difficulty and much time could we budge Wang from his position. Nevertheless, I believe it still worthwhile hammering at him one or two more meetings, even though each of us has already reached a position from which it will become increasingly difficult to back down, should that become necessary to avoid complete deadlock. My tactics will be to hold a very firm line while watching carefully for any hint of compromise on his part. We should be fully aware, however, that these tactics are risky, for they may result only in a corresponding stiffening of [Typeset Page 159] Peiping’s position which will make it that much more difficult to find compromise solution should we decide that is necessary.
5. If no progress is made in next meeting or two we will face very serious decision. Wang’s most recent statements suggest strongly that more than half of detained Americans might be released immediately upon our reaching agreement. Fairly early action can probably be expected on a number of others. How long are we justified in delaying and possibly even jeopardizing release of these persons in effort to obtain commitment for release of all within definite time?
6. However logical and justified, difference in language para one two sections is going greatly increase difficulty obtaining substantive agreement we desire. I feel it was worth putting forward as bargaining tactic but would like have authority at time I would consider desirable make language para one US section identical with language of para one Chinese section, of text Deptel 599. In case of US “further appropriate measures” would be understood to refer to acceptance of third-party arrangement. In case of Chinese, would be understood to include also review of “unfinished civil and criminal cases” involving Americans. Thus, texts two sections would be identical and Chinese could not object to “unequal treatment” to which they hyper-sensitive.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2355. Confidential; Priority.↩