112. Letter 6 from McConaughy to Johnson1
The pouch service may be less frequent from now on. If there is going to be only one a week, we cannot depend very heavily upon the official-informal letter channel. I hope we can find some means of exchanging letters at least twice a week.
The deadlock seems pretty tight following the August 18 meeting. We thought, on the basis of your 520, that the Wang Paragraph 1 proposal might give some hope of progress, but your 537 affords less ground for optimism. The Secretary’s telegram 569 of last night gives you as much negotiating leeway as is possible under present [Typeset Page 141] circumstances without compromising the essential principle. This telegram gives the Chinese Communists an easy way out if they are willing to take it, for it means in effect that we would accept their promise as to Americans who would not be released immediately and the understanding on the remaining Americans would not have to be publicized at present. This is going a pretty long way. If we went any further to meet their demands, we would not even have a Communist promise in exchange for U.S. performance. We would indeed be “buying a pig in a poke”.
The August 20 meeting might be fairly decisive. The added negotiating latitude given you in the Secretary’s 569 probably will enable you to ascertain whether Chou’s July 30 statement which you [Facsimile Page 2] have hammered so hard, really means anything. If there is no affirmative action from Wang, the deadlock on Item 1 is indeed a tight one.
Ed Martin arrived here on Wednesday the 17th and gave us very full and illuminating reports over a period of several hours. He saw the Secretary for over half an hour in the afternoon and conveyed a clear picture of the atmosphere of the negotiations and the nuances of the give-and-take which cannot be obtained from the telegrams. We have a better grasp of what you are up against and a better visualization of the general environment of the talks.
The head of Foreign Assets Control of Treasury Department gave the Secretary a full briefing on the 17th regarding the relationship of Foreign Assets Control Regulations to possible travel of American citizens to Communist China. This was in relation to the Secretary’s 526 to you. He made it clear that the licensing procedures under the Regulations are flexible and Treasury will of course readily accept foreign policy guidance from State.
We have informed Cooper on August 17 of the general nature of the impasse we have encountered and he has informed the Indian Government of the failure, as we see it, of Wang Ping-nan to live up to Chou En-lai’s July 30 statement. Cooper has informed the Indian Government that Chinese nationals in the U.S. who wish to return to Communist China are free to do so and that the Chinese Communists have entirely failed to match this position. Cooper was authorized to inform the Indians that we were not prepared to go on to discuss other matters until the agreed first item was disposed of. Bohlen in Moscow has also been informed. It is conceivable that the Indians or the Soviets or both may [unclear—exert?] some influence on Peiping to moderate its position, although we have carefully avoided a request of any intervention by either Government. If they do anything it will be on their own initiative and responsibility.
[Typeset Page 142]There is nothing but admiration for the ingenuity, resolution and patience you are showing in holding Wang to the basic issue through these seemingly interminable exchanges.
I hope you were not disappointed when no telephone call came through last Sunday. You will understand it was not as a result of any lack of desire to talk, but solely because we are apprehensive about possible monitoring and the difficulty of having a meaningful conversation which does not skirt on sensitive matters.
All the best and sincere regards,
Sincerely
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩