Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

114. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva¹

Washington, December 6, 1955—8:06 p.m.

1353. Deptel 1352,² paragraph 4. Following are Department’s views on renunciation of force for presentation as appropriate at meeting subsequent to December 8.

1. Renunciation of Force. While Wang’s new draft represents retreat from original language calling for conference on Foreign Minister level, it still evades clearcut renunciation of force both generally and specifically with respect to Taiwan area, leaving Communists free to use force against GRC and Taiwan. Any subsequent defensive reaction by US forces in compliance with treaty obligation could be claimed as violation by US of commitment not to use force against Communists and as rendering null and void Communists’ commitment not to use force against US or Taiwan.

2. In order prevent Communists from claiming later that their announcement does not cover use of force against GRC and Taiwan, we must insist on inclusion geographical concept contained US draft. Department has therefore inserted appropriate language into Communist draft to cover this point (Deptel [1354]).³

3. You will note that our amendment separates renunciation of force in Taiwan area from declaration that US and Communists will settle disputes between them peacefully. We have sought to avoid implication that US will negotiate with Communists on such subjects as status of Taiwan or our relations with GRC. We cannot of course agree to any wording which would bind us to negotiate on subjects involving rights and interests of GRC. At an appropriate time you should state that US will not negotiate such subjects in absence of GRC. You should also at all appropriate times make clear US not recognizing Communist regime.

4. While it is true, as stated paragraph 8 your 1241,⁴ that agreement on Communists December 1 draft and publication thereof would tend to increase difficulty of Communists’ future resort to force, it probably would not constitute much if any greater deterrent than their continued participation in negotiations along present lines. Furthermore, declaration would be widely considered concession by Communists, although it would have cost them nothing, and pressure would be placed on US to make return concession.

5. There is danger, as pointed out paragraph 3 your 1241, that Communists may go to public with December 1 draft. If they do, we will counter by pointing out as clearly and simply as possible fundamental defect in Communist draft and their refusal to accept our amendment which proves Communists’ intention to be free to use force against Taiwan. In effect, it would leave Communists free to attack Taiwan and the GRC, while preventing US from fulfilling its treaty commitment to go to aid of that government and to use force in individual and collective self defense. We believe this would be strong position, as failure accept our amendment is tantamount to Communists declaring they will use force if they decide to do so.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–655. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Cleared in draft by the Secretary and in substance by Phleger, and approved for transmission by Robertson. The source text lists as drafters Phleger, McConaughy, Clough, and Sebald.
2. Supra.

3. Telegram 1354 to Geneva, December 6, transmitted to Johnson a proposed revision of Wang’s December 1 draft; the only portion which differed from Wang’s draft was paragraph B which reads as follows:

   “The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between them through peaceful negotiations without resort to the threat or use of force; and they renounce the use of force in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, except in individual and collective self defense.”

   The telegram further states that the Department had decided not to object to the form of a joint announcement “so that if Communists should break off talks they could not utilize dispute over form of announcement to obscure real issue.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–655)

4. Document 111.