82. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
4230. 1. I called on Diem noon 30th at his request. I told him I believed Binh Xuyen were responsible for outbreak of hostilities and expressed regret this action had occurred. Diem said Binh Xuyen had been prepared act against govt for some time. Now that Binh Xuyen have taken to arms he saw no alternative except to remove control national police and sûreté from Chief Sang soonest. Ely had cautioned him against precipitate action but at 0330 30th in discussing action Ely might take if Ely assumed overall command, Ely declined say specifically whether or not he would remove Sang.2 When Ely called again on Diem at 0830, PriMin said Ely had indicated he thought Diem did not wish him assume command. Diem said he had replied he was not opposed in principle but wanted to know Ely’s plan of action. Ely said that he would move to restore order by separating hostile elements. Diem complained to Ely that latter was putting govt and sects on same plane. Moreover Ely’s plan did not provide for neutralization Binh Xuyen headquarters (on southern outskirts Cholon) from which attacks could be launched on city at any time. Ely also informed Diem that he did not know how the fight had begun. I reminded Diem that Ely at that time had had no intelligence briefing on night’s happenings.
2. Diem said that Ely had proposed (at my suggestion) that General Gambiez arbitrate between govt and sects. Diem had complained to Ely this implied equality between two parties. Moreover govt in his view should rely on its own forces and could not escape its responsibilities. Diem said that he had told Ely Binh Xuyen would have to be disarmed or wiped out and that according to recent memo from DefMin Minh and Chief of Staff Ty, Vietnamese Army had enough potential in city to handle any situation.
3. I asked Diem where he stood at that moment. He said he was still determined to destroy or drive out Binh Xuyen, since it was better latter should be in Maquis rather than constitute threat in city. Cabinet morning 30th had been advised of all steps taken and had approved any additional steps needed to restore order. All ministers except sects representatives and Minister for Plan, absent from country, were present. Diem said that he would ask Ely to lend him all possible assistance saying that if French and govt could not handle [Page 165] sects’ threat there was no use in Diem’s attempting to carry on. He added that if Binh Xuyen renew attack night of 30–31 they will meet artillery fire.
4. Diem said he had received support from Generals Phuong and The who said they expected govt attack Binh Xuyen headquarters and offered to carry out operation. Chief of Staff Ty had said army had been attacked and must react. Wintrebert had said Jacquot was agreeably surprised by discipline and high morale shown by National Army troops. I told Diem that in my view everything possible should be done to prevent further fighting. I suggested General Gambiez serve not as an arbitrator but as a mediator. I went on to say that if Diem had tried as planned afternoon 29th to take National Police Headquarters by force a fire fight would have resulted. He had been well advised accept counsel given by Ely and me since it now appears certain Binh Xuyen launched last night’s attack, which gives him political and psychological advantage. I advised Diem to attempt negotiations rather than continue open fighting but be fully prepared to act if Binh Xuyen should move again.
5. Cao Dai General Phuong has asked Diem to integrate 8,000 of his troops, of whom 3,000 are already integrated, into National Army. These troops would be transferred to National Army training center and all ties with Cao Dai sect cut. I told Diem that he must make decision but I should point out this would affect demobilization plans and perhaps force more rapid demobilization toward end of year. Diem said he had warned Phuong that some of his forces would have to be discharged later. He added to me that he was most reluctant to take this step but felt he had no alternative.
6. I told Diem I hoped it would be possible to find some means of preserving peace for next few days, and thought that some solution might be worked out if Binh Xuyen were removed from city. Diem replied that he knew there were serious risks involved but if he did not move rapidly Binh Xuyen might combine against him with other sects. I said it would be worth deal to gain time enough to force sects to accept political solution.
World press now seems to be with Diem. I agreed however, that he would have to remove National Police Chief Sang and suggested French might help clear out Central Sûreté Headquarters near Cathedral by peaceful means.
7. Diem said Minh had attended morning’s Cabinet meeting as observer and that his resignation had taken effect. I said I hoped it would be possible for Minh to remain in office. Diem said there were too many differences of opinion between him and Minh for this to be possible. I urged Diem to proceed rapidly with plans for reorganization his Cabinet.
[Page 166]8. Minh called on me 1300 30th to say he was gravely perturbed that news of his resignation, which he did not release, might have precipitated armed action. He feared Binh Xuyen had taken resignation as signal government intended move against them and so seized initiative. Minh said he intended issue an Order of the Day 30th explaining reasons for his resignation. I persuaded Minh that an Order of the Day would be contrary to national interest and secured his agreement not to issue. Beyond that, Minh agreed only to remain in caretaker capacity until relieved by Diem.
9. I met with Ely at 1500 30th to review with him my latest conversation with Diem. I told Ely I was sure Diem intended remove Sang and I saw no alternative. Ely said this was contrary to advice he had given to Diem. I said I had given no advice in this respect but still saw no alternative.
10. I mentioned my conversation with Minh and Ely said he agreed with Minh’s point of view and considered latter’s resignation serious blow to government. He said he disapproved entirely of Diem’s policy with respect to sects. Ely said that he entirely disagreed with Diem’s point of view and that he believed Diem could not maintain order. Diem, he said, had wanted him take over command in order conduct operations against Binh Xuyen. Ely said it would be “criminal”3 for the French to get mixed up in civil war. Ely would agree accept command only in order separate opposing forces. He went on to say that he had had long interview with Diem morning 30th and had been very badly impressed. He believed Diem was concerned with saving his personal face and honor, and not with serving national interest. He said Diem was suffering “hallucinations” and had not just appreciation of limits of his means. I replied that Diem is in very difficult position and that his government is faced with rebellion. I for one have no sympathy whatever for Binh Xuyen. Ely said it was not question of having sympathy for Binh Xuyen but of judging Diem’s policies which had put US into present predicament. I objected that any Prime Minister would have had to face sect problem sooner or later or else knuckle under and let sects maintain their feudal systems. Ely said there were other possible policies. Minh for example had resigned in protest against Diem’s course of action. I said that nevertheless to my knowledge no one had been able to suggest a constructive substitute for Diem’s policies.
11. I suggested to Ely that we accept fact that Diem would remove Sang. I added that some means should be found to isolate police headquarters and cut off its utilities. Otherwise Diem would be tempted to storm it. I regretted that was the only constructive suggestion I had to make. I added that I believed he would not move [Page 167] against Binh Xuyen headquarters except in response to Binh Xuyen attack. (In case of such attack, I would sympathize with any action government might take but would not advise Diem to seize initiative in attacking.) I felt that Binh Xuyen had resorted to violence in order to demonstrate that Diem could not control country. If Diem did not fight back government was lost. I repeated my earlier suggestion that if Ely wished to avoid renewal hostilities he warn Binh Xuyen they could not be reinforced from outside. Ely said that no reinforcements had been received 29th. Moreover, there are many “troubling factors” in the situation and he is not certain that Binh Xuyen actually attacked first. For example he said Binh Xuyen forces engaged were outnumbered by government troops by one to two, or possibly three. I said that simultaneous shelling of Palace and attack on police commissariat indicated to me that Binh Xuyen were responsible. Ely said that Diem planned two operations yesterday according to his information, one of which was scheduled for 1330 to seize police headquarters and another scheduled for midnight. He said that same National Army battalion commander who participated in midnight operation had been scheduled to conduct earlier operation. I said that this did not constitute proof in my view. I added that situation was no doubt grave and that I earnestly hoped there would be no fighting night of 30/31. I said however that if Diem moved against police headquarters I thought he would move at same time against Binh Xuyen headquarters. Since Binh Xuyen have no artillery I believed National Army, with proper attack, could destroy Binh Xuyen headquarters. I said also that if Ely took over command that would be the end politically for Diem since sects would be able to claim they had won and that this was true. Ely said he would not, of course, take command unless Diem wishes. He had offered to do so only in order to save Diem. I said his taking command might prevent bloodshed but would not save Diem. I asked if Ely would attempt to have Binh Xuyen evacuate police headquarters peaceably. He said he would try but was doubtful of success. I asked if he would suggest to Diem that police headquarters be isolated rather than attacked and if he would assist in cutting off services to this building. Ely said that he would see what could be done. I concluded conversation by saying I did not know whether Diem would or would not accept my advice to move forcibly against Binh Xuyen.
12. My conversations with Ely convinced me French are not shocked, as are we, by suggestion that government and rebellious sects be treated as on a par. I noted also that Ely is not convinced that Binh Xuyen were responsible for opening hostilities against government.