Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

67. Telegram From the Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 21, 1955—8 p.m.

4019. This is joint Embassy–USOM/F message. Reference: Deptel 4049 to Saigon, repeated 3270 to Paris, March 18.²

1. Re second paragraph reference telegram, we reported in Embtel 3926, March 16, repeated Saigon 569,³ that we had heard nothing further from French as of that time re FY 1955 aid for FEC. One factor making for delay has been Delouvrier’s departure from post Secretary General Interministerial Committee to join staff Coal-Steel Community. In discussion with Embassy officers on March 19, Roux (Foreign Office) referred to question FY 1955 aid to FEC but he added no details as to present French thinking this matter.

2. We will be interested in Saigon’s comments re size FEC force level that could be financed by a 60 billion franc ($170 million) French budgetary contribution and 35 billion francs ($100 million) of US aid.⁴ Washington will recall that last December (Embtel 2582, repeated Saigon 380, December 17, 1954⁵) French were using figures showing that minimum cost during CY 1955 of a force level falling progressively throughout the year to an estimated 20,000–30,000 men by end 1955 was in neighborhood 130 billion francs, i.e., leaving a gap of 35 billion francs (130 minus 95). Would appear that maintenance force level of 75,000 men throughout year would cost at least as much as 130 billion francs, making original French cost estimate reasonably accurate.

3. From tactical point of view we do not believe it would be advisable for US to take initiative at this time to “confirm” $100 million offer of aid for FEC for CY 1955. Any approach now by US should, we feel, be limited to warning to French, as suggested in Embtel 3926, repeated Saigon 569, March 16, that in view restrictions imposed by Section 108 Appropriations Act 1955 and short time remaining before end fiscal year $100 million offer cannot be held open beyond some designated date—e.g., April 30, 1955, and that if agreement is to be reached on granting such aid, it is absolutely essential that French present their plans for CY 1955 as a whole to US in sufficient time before deadline to permit consideration on US side and negotiation of formal agreement. Re Roux’s suggestion (Embtel 3997⁶) that FY 1955 aid be added to agenda proposed Indochina talks if matter not settled by that time, if US agrees to this suggestion we do not believe French should be allowed to interpret our assent as meaning we willing see question remain in suspense until latter part April.

4. Question of relationship between our finally agreeing to FY 1955 aid program for FEC and level of forces which French decide maintain in Indochina during current year is extremely delicate one. Even though considerable time has elapsed since last Franco-US discussion of plans for FEC in FY 1955, situation is, if anything, more confused than ever. On the one hand, in informal conversations with us, French officials have continued to maintain that if US aid not increased above $100 million, lack of adequate financial resources will make necessary sizable reduction FEC below 75,000 level during second half-year. Worsening of 1955 budget situation in other areas does not augur well for possible increases in FEC appropriations. On the other hand, there are some indications (see Embassy despatch 1969, March 17, and Embtel 4003, repeated Saigon 582, March 21⁷) of pressures on French Government to raise its own financial contribution in order support force recommended by French military opinion as necessary to protect French interests, lives and property in Indochina. We note and concur in Washington position that $100 million offer should not be raised. Question from our point of view is therefore whether conditioning our $100 million aid offer on maintenance given force level would lead French to decide upon higher force level if they were not otherwise prepared to do so. We do not believe that it would. At same time, such conditioning might have adverse political and psychological consequences. Thus we would think it undesirable both in France and in Indochina, to have it known (and the news would undoubtedly leak) that US was exerting financial pressure on France to maintain a specified FEC troop strength. We feel that to attach to our aid offer a condition re troop strength would present French with irresistible invitation in turn to apply pressure to US for increase in offer and to put blame on us if increase fails materialize, French refuse to close gap, and force level has to be lowered.

5. To summarize:

(a) In present circumstances there appears to us to be almost no possibility that $100 million aid offer could be used to insure that French maintain a 75,000-man FEC. Aid amount, large as it is in absolute terms, is small in terms French budgetary needs.

(b) On contrary, there is real possibility that even with $100 million in US aid French Government will plead it unable finance cost of a 75,000-man FEC.

(c) Washington should bear in mind, however, French will undoubtedly have to finance some additional costs themselves above 95 billion francs (assuming that US aid does not amount to more than $100 million), even if FEC force level is brought down to 20,000–30,000 men by end CY 1955.

Therefore, at this juncture we inclined believe best posture for US to maintain $100 million offer along lines described paragraph 3 above, i.e., attempt have French disclose to us soonest what they intend do re force level. Situation can then be reviewed in light their intentions.

Achilles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/3–2155. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information priority to Saigon.
2. In this telegram the Department asked for information on the French Government’s intentions on its budget for the FEC. (Ibid., 751G.00/3–1055)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–1655)
4. In telegram 4046 from Saigon, March 23, Collins reported that MAAG Vietnam estimated that $270 million would be sufficient to maintain 75,000 troops of the FEC in Vietnam. Furthermore, he did not recommend increasing the U.S. offer of aid above $100 million as the French would not repatriate troops fast enough to reduce the FEC much below the 75,000 level by the end of 1955. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–2355)
5. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2387.
6. Dated March 19, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/3–1955)
7. Neither printed. (Ibid., 851.10/3–1755 and 751G.00/3–2155, respectively)