62. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
3906. 1. I called on Diem 14th to discuss current troubles with sects to ask his opinion as to what we could do to be helpful. Diem said he had asked Ely to make declaration that sects should now follow government’s lead and that any French intervening on behalf of sects as against government would be acting contrary to French [Page 126] policy. I replied that I doubted Ely could made [make] such statement since it would be tacit admission French officers were aiding sects, which I did not believe is the case. I added that we have under study with French plan to aid troops discharged from sect forces. Diem replied that Ely had said he might have 5 million piasters available for this purpose. He added this is not very much considering number of troops to be accommodated. He said further that rather than attempt to work discharged sect troops into resettlement scheme, it would be desirable help them re-establish selves in own villages through payment of monthly subsidy of 300 piasters for 3 or 4 months. In addition, certain numbers of dischargees might be enrolled in labor battalions, as proposed by Trinh Minh The and Hoa Hao Colonel Hue.
2. I remarked that these are only temporary measures designed help sect leaders favorable to Diem, and do not solve the problem of how to deal with the sect opposition led by Generals Soai and Bay Vien. Diem said that Soai resists effort to demobilize his forces on ground that they must be prepared to meet Communist threat. Cao Dai General Phuong says that he fears attack by Ba Cut and wants Diem to integrate 3,000 more of his troops, making total of 6,000, in National Army. I asked Diem what approach could be made to sects to stop situation from getting worse. He said that the crux of the problem is the Binh Xuyen. Many of his advisers, including some Cao Dai, have told him he should remove police control from Binh Xuyen at once. Diem said he had hesitated to do this, waiting for the army to get into shape and take up appropriate positions. I asked Diem if he had authority to oust Binh Xuyen from police control. He replied emphatically that he did and that such a move would be the least of his prerogatives from legal viewpoint. I said I understood Bao Dai had given police control to Binh Xuyen. Diem replied that Buu Loc had done so. I asked whether Bao Dai would oppose change in police control. He said he did not think so, although if Diem made abortive attempt to remove Binh Xuyen, Bao Dai would complain that he had acted clumsily. In any case he reaffirmed he had full power to dispose of police control.
3. I asked Diem if he was aware that certain sects had recently sent emissaries to Bao Dai.2 Diem replied that he had heard through Vietnamese High Commissariat at Paris that Bao Dai had told emissaries he did not want Cannes to become a meeting place, especially in international eyes, of parties opposed to Diem government which is his (Bao Dai’s) government.
4. With reference to specific situation of sects, Diem said Cao Dai Pope is vexed because of his loss of influence over Cao Dai [Page 127] forces to Generals The and Phuong. Latter, he said, has grown in stature owing to his participation in government. Soai feels his own Hoa Hao forces are falling away from him. Bay Vien, whose primary interest is money, has been losing in his various ventures since Grand Monde concession ended, as his enterprises were all based on gambling. While Hinh was Chief of Staff Binh Xuyen did not need fear army. Now that army is under national government control, fear of it, together with financial losses, has caused Bay Vien join with Cao Dai Pope and General Soai to oppose government.
I remarked that these sect leaders are still strong and ruthless and asked how they could be controlled. Diem said that first thing to do was to take police control from Binh Xuyen and give it to the army. He feels that Bay Vien may be restrained from attempting action against government through fear of losing his wealth, which is considerable. I told Diem I hoped he would discuss this matter in detail with Defense Minister Minh before taking action. He said that he had asked Minh to study problem as long ago as January 20 with a view to disposing army troops for takeover. Minh has delayed, perhaps because he does not wish to get in trouble with Binh Xuyen. Last week Minh sent General Ty with a plan of action which Diem found difficult to understand. I recommended that plan be personally discussed with Minh and Ty and thereafter with few selected ministers before implementation. I asked Diem again what I could do to be of help. He replied that I could give technical assistance in studying plan for army disposition. I said that I would assign General O’Daniel to consider plan. I asked if Diem thought it would be useful if I talked to sect leaders or any emissaries of Bao Dai. He replied that he thought it would not be desirable during next few days. He has invited Bay Vien to call on him but Bay Vien has advanced pretext of an accident to delay accepting. Diem said that when he saw Bay Vien he would tell him that government would be glad to assist him in carrying out any legitimate commercial venture not harmful to the state.
6. I asked Diem whether General Ty’s terms of reference as Inspector General had been signed. He replied that following Cabinet approval 12th, they were signed. Cabinet objected to provision that Ty would be Commander in Chief in case of military operations and this provision was stricken. Decree is now being prepared for publication in official journal. Diem indicated that he still has doubts about Ty whom he considers not “safe” politically, lacking in courage and deficient in judgment.
7. In private conversation to which he invited Colonel Lansdale 13th, Diem seemed pessimistic and depressed in discussing sect problem.3 [Page 128] During my conversation 14th, however, Diem appeared quite self-possessed and determined.
8. In my judgment government will soon have to take some definite steps to resolve situation created by sect action. Incidents such as yesterday morning’s attempted assassination of Tran Van Lam, the government delegate (governor) of South Vietnam, could lead to popular loss of confidence in government’s ability to maintain law and order. We will continue to advise Diem to seek political solution, but this will be difficult without bowing to continuations sects’ special privileges which run counter Diem government’s programs. Meanwhile, I have directed O’Daniel quietly review National Army plans for action in event Diem decides to take over police powers with army troops.