50. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Secto 50. Secretary, Ambassador Collins and others met this a.m. with Diem.2 Following is summary of principal subjects discussed.
(1) French Policy in North Vietnam.
Diem began conversation by expressing his great concern over French policy with respect to Viet Minh. He said French were trying safeguard their economic and cultural interests in North Vietnam in accordance with Geneva Accord. However, he feared they were also [Page 100] using this as pretext establish political relationship with Viet Minh. Diem strongly disapproved of French policy under Sainteny because would affect position of Government of Free Vietnam in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. He said his government wishes establish close and friendly relations with countries Southeast Asia—mentioned Burma, India, Indonesia—and to gain their support. While appreciating aid from US, Diem said Vietnam should not depend on US alone but should also have support of neighbors of Vietnam in Southeast Asia. If French policy of developing political relationship with Viet Minh is pursued, it will raise prestige and strengthen position of Viet Minh regime on one hand, lower position and prestige of Government of Free Vietnam. This in turn will make it more difficult for him develop kind of relationship with Vietnam’s neighbors in Southeast Asia. He then read public statement issued by Dufours, head of Tramways in Hanoi, that only obstacle good relations between French and Viet Minh is US. Diem inquired of Secretary as to views of US on French policy in North Vietnam.
Secretary replied that in Bangkok, he had expressed strong objections to Bonnet regarding French proposal of turning over 60 percent interest to Viet Minh in French economic establishments.3 Secretary said he told Bonnet this would give Communists good opportunity to blackmail French on French policy in South Vietnam. Bonnet had asked Secretary if elimination French governmental interests in new arrangements for these joint companies would make proposal more acceptable to US. Secretary told Bonnet that having solely private French interests would make proposal less bad, but would still be objectionable from US point of view since French companies could still exert great pressure upon French Government.
Secretary said did not know how this matter would turn out, but French Government was fully informed on our view.
Foreign Minister Do expressed his personal view that real intention of French in North Vietnam is to develop trade with south China by means of their relationship with Viet Minh. French believe South Vietnam is lost, and even if it is not, their concessions in South Vietnam are disappearing. Therefore, they have nothing to develop here. If Communists take all Vietnam, French concessions will be lost anyway, and they will have no position here whatsoever. Therefore, in Foreign Minister’s view French are trying to establish base in North Vietnam for developing trade with provinces in south China. He compared French concept to British position in Hong Kong.
[Page 101](2) Internal Security.
Most of discussion this morning concerned difficulties created by sects. Diem outlined situation in some detail and returned to it number of times during conversation. He pointed out control of Binh Xuyen in Saigon–Cholon area and its control over Saigon police. Also described control of Hoa Hao in southwest provinces. Cao Dai did not seem bother him too much at this stage. Diem said he was very much concerned over intrigues between Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao, for he fears they may be plotting some kind combined action against government. He said will take about two months for him to build up National Army to point where Binh Xuyen would not dare take overt action against government. Said it was indispensable that French cease providing munitions and other support to sects. He suspects that French elements in lower echelons are encouraging some of sect leaders into anti-governmental action. Ambassador Collins told Diem he should provide him with any information and names on specific instances such encouragement and support. Ambassador said so far he had not received reliable evidence to back up Diem’s charge. Later in conversation Diem said local units French naval forces with small craft are stationed in southwest province in Hoa Hao territory. Because National Army units know French are there, they hesitate move into this area for fear of difficulties with these French units. Ambassador Collins said he would speak to General Ely immediately about this situation. Diem said it is essential National Army be assured sufficient ammunition and logistic support to restore security, and was equally essential that supply of ammunition to sects be stopped. Ambassador Collins replied Diem could be assured of logistic support from US for National Army and of equipment. He also said he had assurances from Ely that no ammunition was being supplied sect armies.
Diem said he hoped transfer of few remaining territorial commands from French to National Army could be completed in next few weeks. This was important because it would give Vietnamese Government and National Army responsibility for security throughout Vietnam and eliminate confusion or duplication between French and Vietnamese.
(3) Resettlement of Refugees.
Secretary asked whether this program was in good shape or not. Diem replied that, thanks to US, funds were available to maintain these refugees as they arrived for their day-to-day subsistence. Government Vietnam had calculated necessary amount of money in terms approximately 450,000 refugees. Now there appeared would be many more and there would not be enough money. Ambassador Collins [Page 102] said he had raised possibility in Washington that more funds would be required for additional refugees.
As to permanent resettlement of refugees, Diem pointed out program depended upon restoring security in rich rice areas in south-west. This is area controlled by Hoa Hao. Collins frankly told Diem program not moving fast enough and should be accelerated to meet May rice crop planting.
(4) United States Support for Diem and Free Vietnam.
Secretary expressed satisfaction that Diem’s position is much more secure and favorable in country. Secretary told Diem that US Government—President and himself—had great stake in him and in Vietnam. US had through its efforts and aid and moral support contributed to Diem’s present position of security in country. Therefore, it is essential he take those actions necessary to strengthen his government. Since he is now secure, he can afford to bring into his government other men who might otherwise be his political opponents. In time of national crisis, differing elements must work together. Therefore, Secretary said he hoped Diem would realize what he does in Vietnam is important to US in cause of freedom throughout world. Internally, Congress and American public opinion have come accept decisions of US support for Diem and Free Vietnam. Policies his Government will largely determine continuation this support. Internationally position Diem government also important because if there is failure here, US prestige will be gravely affected. Secretary also told Prime Minister that French Government now gives evidence of supporting him and not seeking to change him. Secretary explained that during past few months French Foreign Minister has always wanted to discuss what we were to do if Diem failed. They have now dropped that subject from the list.
Diem’s response to Secretary’s statement regarding necessity for bringing highly qualified people into his government was to repeat what he had said about problem of security and difficulties with sects. He stressed again that people of Vietnam must have feeling of security and guarantee of such security was most important task facing him and his government.