44. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
3537. 1. For some time I have wanted to discuss privately with Diem some problems which we have not yet explored. Sunday evening, 20 February 1955, he came alone to Embassy residence at my invitation. As cover for visit, I arranged informal supper with members my mission, who came somewhat later than President.
2. There were three principal subjects which I wished to discuss with Diem.
- a.
- Ultimate form of government which he visualized for Vietnam.
- b.
- Possible reaction of Bao Dai in event that a republic should be recommended by constituent assembly.
- c.
- Whether Vietnamese Government planned to participate in electoral discussions commencing July, 1955 under terms of Geneva Accord.
3. It was exceedingly difficult, as usual, to hold President to discussion these three points, which I took up one at a time. As usual, his tendency was to wander off into problems involving sects, Dai Viet Party, and Army. However, I was able to glean his views as follows:
4. A. The President feels that family of Bao Dai is so discredited with people of Vietnam that neither Bao Dai nor any member of family would be accepted as constitutional monarch. He believes that the form of government should be a republic along the lines of either United States or Turkey. It was not possible to pin down any details in this regard.
B. In arriving at this conclusion, the President had indicated, as he has done before, his instinctive resistance to any political views contrary to his own. Perhaps anticipating that I would speak of possible position for Dr. Quat in his government, he introduced alleged machinations of Dai Viet Party, of which Quat is member. He said that there are two branches of this party today. The old Dai Viets, and the new, or younger, branch of party. He said Dai Viets were in opposition to government and had tentacles within the sects, particularly the Cao Dai, and within Army. He charged that Dai Viets favored a more vigorous anti-French attitude and a more direct anti-Communist [Page 92] program. According to Diem, this latter program would be designed primarily for others personal aggrandizement.
C. I suggested to President that it would be well for him to accommodate himself to opposition parties since, when a constituent assembly was formed, there were bound to be such parties.
D. I asked him how many parties he thought there would be in constituent assembly. He said there would be many. Probably each sect would have its own party, and there would be others.
E. I asked if he had party of his own. He said no, and that he had no intention of forming one. I pointed out that his opponents have said that he is forming a Catholic Party. This he vigorously denied, stating that his real source of strength came from fact that he was not restricted to any one party, but had a broad appeal to all of the common people. He said Dai Viets and sects, lacking real basis for opposition to government, were seizing on fact both he and I are Catholics to raise religious issue.
F. I pointed out to him how difficult it was to manage a republic with many parties in assembly, as is the case in France. He agreed, but reiterated opposition to constitutional monarchy since he felt Bao Dai and family would not be accepted again by the people, particularly since Bao Dai had abdicated in 1945. I explored possibility of Bao Long (son of Bao Dai) heading monarchy, but Diem again stated that Bao Dai’s immediate family was finished in Vietnam.
G. I asked President when he thought constitutional assembly should be formed. He said it could not be delayed much longer than six months. The provisional assembly would meet in a month or six weeks. Sects would press at once for election of constituent assembly. They felt—and he tacitly accepted truth of this—that present government under Diem would more and more reduce the special privileges of sects. Sects felt that through representation in constituent assembly they would be able to counter this tendency. Diem added that many intellectuals would join in pressure for an early election of constituent assembly.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.02/2–2355. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Bangkok through Kidder to Dulles, who was in Bangkok for the first session of SEACDT (later to become SEATO) Council meetings, February 23–25.↩