Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

411. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of the Republic of Vietnam (Diem) and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams), Saigon, December 20, 1957¹

Saigon, December 20, 1957

1. Following the Kontum–Mo Duc Road Project meeting at the palace 20 Dec 57, which many people attended the President asked Gen Williams to remain after the others had departed for a private talk. All the others departed and the conversation started at 1010. Lt Col Foster acted as interpreter.

2. The President started by referring to their visit the previous day (18–19 Dec) to Ban Me Thuot area. That from a map, you can see that the resettlement centers are each a nucleus of security. That at Pleiku and Kontum the centers are more remote and are near the border of Laos. That these centers near Laos are located in very fertile soil and therefore US civilian advisors did not raise the usual objections.

3. He said that what we had seen in the resettlement centers had taken 6 months to achieve. That it wasn’t something improvised. That Mr Durbrow had suspected it was improvised. But that it was the result of 6 months work. That he (the President) had profited from the advice of VN and French experts who had studied the problem for years. That there were some sincere and honest Frenchmen who had studied it for a long time.

4. He said that after dinner at Ban Me Thuot the representative of the French embassy, M. Wintrebert, had spoken with the President, Mr Durbrow and Mr. Parkes (British Ambassador) about the strategic importance of the High Plateau. That M. Wintrebert said exactly the same thing the President has been saying. That M. Wintrebert told them that if the 17th parallel, Pleiku and Kontum were lost, there would be no need to try to hold Ban Me Thuot because the whole central country would be lost. That the first line of defense should be the mountain passes between city of Vinh and Laos, but that this line is outside VN territory. That the second best defense line is Savannaket–Dong Hoi (Highway 9), but it is too near the 17th parallel and is too flat to offer a natural defensive position. That as a consequence, the best defensive line for VN is the line Kontum–Plateau of Boloven–Pak Se, which runs through very rough terrain and offers excellent natural obstacles. Gen Williams agreed.

5. The President said Mr Durbrow was very much impressed to hear this from a Frenchman. That M. Wintrebert had said this without any prior discussion with the President. That M. Wintrebert was one of the best types of French officials who had served in Indo-China. That he had been born in Hanoi and lived most of his life in Vietnam. That Mr Durbrow had been saying that the President was stubborn and hard-headed, but now he is impressed.

6. He said that M. Wintrebert referred to the loss of Dien Bien Phu as minor compared to the loss of the High Plateau and said that the French had brought their best legions—crack units—from Korea only to have them wiped out in the High Plateau. (This is an exaggeration—the French Bn I saw in Korea that came here in 52 or 53 could not be classed as a “crack unit.” STW)²

7. The President said that Mr Durbrow was beginning to learn what he had always told him.

8. Gen Williams said that Gen Brown, Chief of PEO in Vientiane, Laos, was in Saigon this week and had told him that the Chief of Staff of the Army in Laos had ordered Engineer units into Pak Se in order to start repairing the road toward Kontum.

9. The President said that Laos wants to explain its position in Washington. That the President, Souvanna,³ and his Foreign Minister⁴ are coming through Saigon the 4th or 5th of January. That the Foreign Minister is coming along to try to keep Souvanna in line. That the Foreign Minister will then return to Laos while Souvanna goes to Paris to seek French advice before going to the US. That Souvanna speaks glibly about anti-communism; but that Americans ought to transact all their business with him in writing.

10. Gen Williams indicated surprise and interest.

11. The President said Laos wants very much to make a good impression in the US.

12. He said. “In any case, we (GVN) are making progress.” Gen Williams agreed.

13. Referring to his approaching visit to Burma, the President said that Mr & Mrs Nhu left for Burma that morning (20 Dec) for a 4 day visit and added “I am doing the US diplomats’ work for them.”

14. The President said that people ought to appreciate the help he is giving them and that is why the reduction in US aid makes him “really angry.”

15. He said that without US aid, VN will make no progress. That he had hoped in five years VN would be self-sufficient and even able to support most of its defense budget. But that the reduction in US aid paralyzes progress. That VN will have to depend on the US indefinitely.

16. He said Korea and Formosa have limited economic possibilities and no one knows when they will become self-sufficient. That to rely on US aid indefinitely is bad. That in 5 years, VN with increased US aid could become self-sufficient, even for the defense budget, except for some loans.

17. He said US policy is short-sighted and makes his programs drag on and on. That it is not economical in the long run.

18. The President said he would like to send 1 or 2 Public Works experts to look at any Engineer equipment in the depots to see if they can expedite spare parts supply. Gen Williams agreed it was a good idea to get their recommendations if they had any to make.

19. The President said it takes too long to get spare parts for machinery through USOM channels. That he was considering using some of his foreign exchange to buy critical spare parts abroad.

20. Gen Williams said this should not be necessary for military equipment. That he had been severely criticized recently by a visiting inspection team for requisitioning some medical supplies which turned out later to be already on hand in VN. That he told the inspection team that this is true and that it is quite possible he is doing the same thing in respect to spare parts for machinery. That in fact, all the tech services may be doing it. But that he is having an inventory made as quickly as possible to avoid just this condition. The TERM has been working along those lines now for over a year.

21. Gen Williams said the VN officers are not entirely to blame for the situation. That when the French left, they dumped case afer case of spare parts out in the open exposed to the rain. That the labels had been washed off the cases and no one knew what was inside. That in any event, the cases were often full of assorted spare parts which the French had dumped into them carelessly. That the VN officers who received this equipment were utterly untrained in how to classify and store it, because the French had never permitted them to take responsibility, nor had ever taught them how to operate logistical installations.

22. The President asked whether the Korean Army Corps of Engineers is well advanced.

23. Gen Williams answered that from his past observation he would say they are excellent. That they had been advised by US officers for many years. That they had progressed so fast and had taken over so much responsibility that, he understood in 1953 it became necessary to stop and draw back a little because evidence of dishonesty and corruption had appeared. That he remembered when you could by radio parts in blackmarket on the streets of Seoul more easily than you could draw them from the depots.

24. Gen Williams added that he believed such a condition would be impossible in VN because US advisors watch every operation too closely and because of Pres Diem’s well known intolerance of dishonesty. He said there might be isolated instances of petty graft; but large scale black marketing of military equipment is impossible.

25. The President said he wants the Kontum–Mo Duc road completed on time.

26. Gen William said the meeting that morning (20 Dec) would energize it. That many little things could be done at once as a result of the meeting. That the case of the Philco technicians was an example. That his Engineers together with Assistant CO, 12th Light Div had tried to find quarters in Kontum for the Philco technicians, but the VN wouldn’t rent quarters. That these technicians are available and could be in Kontum helping the road project; but they can’t go until there is a place for them to live. That the President’s personal interest in the project as expressed at the meeting should give the project a push and energize it.

27. Gen Williams reminded him that the US Engineers had said the road could be completed in 1958 provided it received adequate support from Saigon.

28. The President said the High Plateau was unknown territory to most people until the attempted assassination of the President in Ban Me Thuot last February. That this attracted their attention to the area and now they know more about it.

29. Gen Williams asked whether any army troops had been employed on security during the President’s visit to Ban Me Thuot 19–20 Dec.

30. The President said very few. (Actually I saw none.)

31. Gen Williams said he asked because he had not seen any soldiers guarding the roads.

32. The President said again that before the February assassination attempt, the area was not well known. That now you get the impression that it has been settled for 50 years. That this obvious progress gives everyone a sense of confidence.

33. The President said he wants to accelerate the Kontum–Mo Duc road project by having the Dept of Public Works construct 20 or 30 km of road starting from Mo Duc on the Coast. This is appropriate because this section of the road is in the province of Quang Nai and not in the High Plateau. That he wants them to get something accomplished before the rainy season.

34. Gen Williams agreed, saying that they ought at least to start widening the right of way.

35. The President said it will give the people in the Hue–Tourane area confidence to know that they can get to the High Plateau quickly and vice versa. That this uplift of spirit is contagious and will animate the whole area. That possibly its effects will be felt across the 17th parallel.

36. Gen Williams said the road offers every advantage, both military and economic.

37. The President said that the last priority on the road is clearing and grading the right of way and getting the bridges in.

38. Gen Williams emphasized the importance of clearing so that the sun can get to the road and dry it.

39. The President said that corrections and refinements can come in 1959. That crushed rock can be stock piled along the road for these corrections in 1959.

40. Gen Williams said one of the most important things is to get the steel bridging materials. That the most important thing is a sense of urgency. That the President had certainly imparted a sense of urgency to the people at the meeting that morning.

41. The President said the French had made great efforts in the High Plateau. That the situation in the High Plateau in Laos had hurt them seriously—much more than Dien Bien Phu.

42. Gen William agreed saying that Dien Bien Phu was only the last of several defeats but it probably caused the signing of the Armistice.

43. The President said VN must hold the High Plateau or lose the entire central country.

44. Gen Williams said US military officers had known this for a long time.

45. The President quoted M. Wintrebert as saying that the visibility for aircraft in the High Plateau is not just poor, it doesn’t exist. The President said that this was the first time he had heard a Frenchman say this.

46. The President said he is putting most of his road building effort toward the north. That others like Capital Engineering and Johnson Drake & Piper chose easier routes. Gen Williams agreed that road building in the North–Central section was a great importance.

47. The President said he wants to have a route from Dak To to Hue reconnoitered. That he would have a better feeling of security with such a road. (This is extension of Highway 14 north of Kontum.)

48. He said there are so many difficulties that most people don’t even want to think about them.⁵

49. The President said that north of Kontum he is establishing Montagnard resettlement centers. That the streams in that area flow into Laos and the Montagnards believe their interests lie in the direction where the water flows. That the Communists (in Laos) are trying to attract the Montagnards to their side and many have moved over. That he is anxious to draw them back and get them settled in the centers. That USOM aid takes too long and he has started the project by himself.

50. The President said he had set up an air strip for L–19 aircraft in the forest 30 km from Hue in the direction of Laos. That this area is a possible invasion route and it has no communications. That now there is an air bridge to it and it is less isolated. That he had told Gen Don (CG, I Corps)⁶ to build a bicycle trail from Hue to the air strip. That in case of war, if the VN defenses along the 17th parallel are strong, the Viet Cong will try to outflank them through this area even though they must violate the neutral territory of Laos to do it.

51. Gen William remarked that it was obvious the President surely studies the terrain of his country and thinks of these things.

52. The President said he has lots of ideas because he has studied these problems closely for many years.

53. The President said he wants to move ahead and get some things done very quickly, so he can study other problems. That he must arouse the people.

54. The President said that some people (i.e. foreigners) say he is thinking in the clouds and is not a realist. That they will understand in 5 years time—or earlier if there is an invasion. That on the trips to Ca Mau and Ban Me Thuot last week they saw that his feet are planted on solid ground. (Note: Pres had taken several ambassadors on these trips within last few days.)

55. He said that he built the resettlement centers at Ca Mau and USOM didn’t care to see them until after everything was installed. That in planning for development here, you must take Asian conditions into account.

56. Gen Williams said conditions in every country are peculiar to that country.

57. The President said the US developed in peace for hundreds of years; but VN is practically in a state of war.

58. Gen Williams said yes, GVN must consider they are in an armistice period.

59. Gen Williams and Lt Col Foster departed 1200.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 16 Sep 57–28 Dec 57. Secret. Drafter not indicated. The source text is an attachment to a letter dated December 23 from Williams to Stump marked “Personal and Confidential”, which reads as follows: “I feel much of the attached should be for your eyes alone. The underlined part of paragraph 9 [printed here as italics] has been reported to the Ambassador. Also paragraphs 28–32 and 49. Other parts if revealed would only cause dissension.” Williams’ report to Durbrow of the same date is also attached to the source text but not printed.
2. Samuel Tankersley Williams.
3. Prince Souvanna Phouma had become Prime Minister of Laos in March 1956.
4. Phoui Sananikone.

5. The following exchange occurred during the conversation between Diem and Williams held December 13:

   “104. The President said that if he could spend two months concentrating on the Army to the exclusion of everything else, then the Army would run more smoothly. That everytime the Army wants to spend money, he asks why, that he tells them over and over that they must accomplish things with the smallest expenditure possible. That what he needs is several good administrators.

   “105. Gen Williams said he feels sure Vietnam will have them someday.

   “106. The President paused, looked down, and then said, ‘if we don’t accomplish something strong and vigorous in 1958, I fear the future.’

   “107. Gen Williams said he should never say anything like that. Someone might think he was despondent.

   “108. The President said, ‘I say that only to you.’

   “109. Gen Williams said, I am sure you will win in the long run.’” (Memorandum of conversation; Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 16 Sep 57–28 Dec 57; drafter not indicated)

6. Tran Van Don.