394. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
261. Reference: Embtel 236, August 3.2
- 1.
- On 3d Diem brought up question aid for 60,000 Self Defense Corps along line similar to Chau’s arguments3 (viz. there had been unavoidable delays in setting up SDC; use of SDC at full 60,000 strength plus Civil Guard would release army from internal security duties; GVN would have to change its central budget plans unless we provided funds for 60,000). Diem added (1) unfortunately Civil Guard not developing satisfactorily, (2) he therefore had relieved General Soai from Civil Guard command, (3) unfortunately dissident groups led or encouraged by Vietminh becoming more active many parts of the country, particularly along Cambodian border, (4) he had been led to believe on basis original discussion aid for SDC we would support effort for two full years regardless of when implementation started.
- 2.
- He pointed out GVN had for reasons beyond its control not been able implement SDC organization as soon as hoped and he realized we had made it clear aid would be given only to those actually on duty SDC. He then pled for “full amount promised” arguing this important due difficulties effectively organizing Civil Guard and increased Vietminh-inspired terrorism. His plans for increased internal security would be seriously affected if money not forthcoming.
I told him after conversation with Chau matter being studied but based on preliminary evaluation I believed it would be difficult justify aid for more than 30,000 effectives since (1) it had been made clear our SDC aid was temporary, (2) money allocated FY 56 had not been utilized due slow organization SDC, (3) under our fiscal system funds not obligated reverted to Treasury at end fiscal year and (4) it had been our understanding SDC costs would be assumed by provincial and municipal budgets within one or two years after Corps established. Therefore the recommendation had been made to give aid during CY 58 for only 30,000 effectives which seemed sufficient to tide them over until provincial and municipal budgets could handle the situation. I added that if he felt strongly we should continue to give aid for more than 30,000 we would probably have to take those funds from other aid projects he also interested in. Worthwhile report he twice stated in passing decision to cut SDC aid probably is indication there will be serious reduction in over-all GVN aid FY 58. [Page 840] I replied while there may be cuts we have no indication what they will be, if any. President urged we reconsider decision in view necessity step up counter-subversive activities.
Comment: In absence of more definite information regarding GVN’s plans for SDC and of an evaluation of SDCV effectiveness against subversive activities, it difficult at this juncture to comment intelligently on Diem’s plea. As pointed out in Embtel 236 SDC never reached full 60,000 strength and has been gradually reduced since March 1957 to 49,783 as of July 27. I have accordingly asked elements of country team concerned to re-study question so that we may have a better idea whether a larger SDC could make effective contribution to internal security under present conditions.