Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

391. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 26, 1957—8 p.m.

191. Re: Embtel 173.² Diem asked me to call July 25 and held forth for hour and half on India.

1. He opened by saying he had been thinking over carefully suggestions made by Kaul which he had discussed with me the other day (reference telegram). After warning I should keep this information strictly confidential he said that last year a high Indian official had approached him with following proposal: A. India thought it could obtain from ChiComs solemn declaration of non-aggression against unified Vietnam.

B. ChiComs would no longer endeavor exert any influence North Vietnam provided Americans pulled out of South Vietnam.

C. On this basis India felt confident it could bring about unification of country.

Diem informed Indian he could not accept proposal because: A. Could not trust word of ChiComs.

B. Viet Minh army many times larger than GVN’s.

C. If Americans withdrew military and other support GVN could not maintain defense forces and so would become easy victim of north even if Chinese remained “neutral”.

Diem then said he believed Kaul proposal another version of last year’s approach but baited with story of deep discontent in north and assurances all people would vote for south in controlled free elections.

2. Diem attributed these approaches to unrealistic mystic attitude of Indians who hoped to play big role in Asia but according Diem their policy has basically failed and India now only fully neutralist country Southeast Asia. He convinced Burma waivering as neutralist, admitted Ceylon paid lip service to neutralism and Sukarno was running into serious opposition from majority of Indonesians because of neutralist attitude. Therefore Diem has impression neutralism has lost much of its appeal in Asia since Bandung conference. He said he now believed friendly Indian attitude toward GVN due primarily to fact that through its alliance with western bloc and American, Australian and British aid and support, country is succeeding. This success Diem believes had influenced most other Commonwealth countries to look askance at Indian neutralism. Although realizing its previous policies have not worked India still hopes play prominent role in Asia. Therefore while it will remain neutralist in order to gain time to build up its economy, India basically impressed by progress GVN which contrary to initial Indian belief has shown it could stop Communist advance in SEA. For this reason and despite its neutralist attitude India would continue to be more friendly toward GVN.

3. When I asked Diem if he thought it would be possible for anyone to change basic Indian policy and philosophy he said he had discussed subject with his brother Bishop Thuc. Both thought Indians were too mystic, unrealistic and timid as a people to adopt any other policy than the timid one of neutralism and “goodwill”. While Nehru had held India together he was an aristocrat with no feeling for the masses and no spiritual dynamism that would permit him to lead his country in a war to maintain its independence.

4. Diem next discussed visit of Indian Vice President due here September 18. I asked whether he thought Indians would try to use visit for any substantive purpose. He replied they might but it would be merely effort exert Indian influence here which would fall on deaf ears if they persisted in trying to make Vietnam move in neutralist direction.

5. I referred to announced visit of Ho Chi Minh to Delhi in future and he replied it was his understanding Ho would visit Delhi next spring. He then laughed and said since Vietminh had heard about his own visit to Delhi from November 4 to 8 they also desired to go and the Indians of course had to accept to keep pretense of neutrality.

6. I told Diem I had heard a year or so ago in confidence from Indian officials that in their hearts they were pleased SEATO existed because it formed barrier to communist flood. Diem replied this was probably true because SEATO was getting more organized and effective and GVN with American and other free world assistance had shown that even small country like Vietnam could not only maintain its independence but make steady progress.

7. On several occasions Diem said it was probable China and Russia were now asking themselves what they were getting out of friendship with India now that it had not only failed to enlarge neutralist bloc but this bloc was diminishing in effectiveness. I questioned the latter point by reminding him that Cambodia, Laos and as far as I knew Burma and Ceylon were still essentially neutralist. Diem replied he was convinced India regretted having induced Cambodia to be neutralist and urged Laos in same direction because all this had done was increase ChiCom penetration in those countries. He also reiterated his conviction neutralism in Burma and Ceylon was weakening. He attributed this in part at least to example of Vietnam which had increased in stability and progressed very well through its close association with free world.

8. Comment: From this long discussion of Indian history, philosophy, religion, lack of real spiritual values it seems to me Diem has been thinking about problem of India’s position for long time and has apparently decided not much could be done to influence Indians although he still hopes they will be more friendly toward GVN.

I purposely introduced the subject of SEATO and from Diem’s reaction do not believe we should pin our hopes on his asking for closer relations with that organization at this time.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–2657. Secret; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Repeated for information to New Delhi, London, Ottawa, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh.
2. In this telegram, July 26, the Embassy reported on a conversation with Diem in which he recounted a July 23 conversation with T.N. Kaul, the Indian Chairman of the ICC. Kaul informed Diem that the time was ripe to hold elections to unify Vietnam because, if properly supervised, elections would result in a pro-Diem majority in the North. Kaul did pose the question, however, whether or not Diem could count on a majority in the South. Diem argued that China would never allow unification except under Communist rule and questioned how he could disband and render ineffective “600,000 Viet Minh troops.” Furthermore, a unified Vietnam would have to be neutralist and Diem was unprepared to accept neutralism. (Ibid., 751G.00/7–2457)