37. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
3328. 1. Following my return Saigon 9th2 I called on Ely and Diem. Ely told me he had received from Paris texts of letters he would address to Diem on organization Vietnamese armed forces and to me, on full responsibility of MAAG Chief for training of Vietnamese forces, as well as text of joint recommendation he and I would make to Diem on organization of Vietnamese armed forces. He said he would make his texts available to me at once (which he subsequently did), and that as soon as we had compared versions approved by Paris and Washington, we could have documents prepared in final form for signature. This should be accomplished 10th or 11th.
2. I showed Ely Washington drafts of proposed exchange of notes with Vietnam on direct forces support, proposed exchange of notes with Vietnam on return of military equipment, and draft letter [Page 82] from me to Diem stating U.S. intent to support military program for calendar year 1955 and economic programs for U.S. fiscal year 1955.3 Ely sought and received assurance that these notes had no effect of modifying arrangements made between Ely and me; otherwise he offered no comment.
3. Ely said he was concerned that Diem govt was taking strong line against ICC and inspiring propaganda effort against it. Ely says ICC has been not unuseful and fears that if govt openly blocks its work in South either Poles or Canadians may withdraw, former to add to confusion and increase difficulties of non-Communist side, and latter feeling they can no longer play useful part here. Diem govt has strongly opposed ICC proposal to accept Colonel Ha Van Lau as Viet Minh liaison when Commission has next session in Saigon. Ely hopes both Diem and ICC will agree to substitute for Ha Van Lau. I told Ely I agreed government would be ill advised openly oppose ICC, and would so inform Diem.
4. In reply to my query about evacuation of Charbonnages equipment, Ely said one large mechanical tool was scheduled for shipment that day and that arrangements were being made to evacuate remaining equipment directly from Charbonnages mines rather than from port. He reiterated his earlier statement that he hopes equipment can be moved out. I told him of interest in this matter I had found in Washington and of importance U.S. Govt attaches to its removal.
5. Ely brought up subject of Cambodia, asking if my authority extended to that country. When I replied in negative, Ely said he would like to inform me of problem on personal basis and ask my help. He said French intent and desire in Cambodia procure arrangement with respect to armed forces training analogous to that obtaining in Vietnam with difference that French would have primary responsibility. In defense of this argument, he said French are making financial effort in Cambodia relatively greater than that they are making in Vietnam. He believed agreement in principle had been reached on this matter when he and Lachambre were in Washington last September; at least French claim had not been contradicted. Ely said French do not wish McClintock to urge Cambodians to ask U.S. to take over training responsibility. Ely said he had had great trouble with French Govt over this issue and hoped that I could help him. I replied only that I had no responsibility for Cambodia.
6. Ely at no time during conversation suggested that fall of Mendes govt had altered his terms of reference or should be cause for delay in implementing our several agreements. He made no mention whatever of reevaluation situation and prospects of Diem govt.
[Page 83]7. Conversation with Diem hinged entirely on take-over of Camau peninsula from Viet Minh and current status of sect problem. Evacuation of Camau has gone well and he expects visit city early next week. Present effort of govt is directed against Ba Cut and to lesser extent against Binh Xuyen. Diem has told General Soai that when Prime Minister next goes abroad he wishes take Soai and wife with him. Diem told me he believed with Soai absent Hoa Hao would disintegrate, partly as result of internal squabbles; nevertheless General Soai was flattered by offer and indicated he would accept.
8. Diem said Binh Xuyen had been moving “shock troops” into police posts about periphery of Saigon, with apparent intent take action against govt. Diem told General Gambiez he wishes military control of metropolitan region transferred from French to National Army by fifteenth so that army can take necessary measures against Binh Xuyen. Military control of Hoa Hao region is now being passed to National Army without incident following stern threat to reduce General Soai’s headquarters by artillery fire if Hoa Hao forces resisted National Army take-over.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/2–1055. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris and Phnom Penh.↩
- Diem in a letter to Eisenhower, January 23, specifically asked that Collins return to Vietnam and continue his mission “through the spring”. Text of the letter is in telegram 2927 from Saigon, January 25. (Ibid., 751G.13/1–2555) Eisenhower responded in a letter of February 3, that he was assigning Collins to Vietnam for “about two months”. (Ibid., FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 266, Miscellaneous Memos)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 31.↩