Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

367. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1957¹

Washington, April 5, 1957

SUBJECT

• Military Aid for Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Ngo Dinh Nhu, Political Adviser to President of Viet-Nam
• His Excellency Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam
• The Honorable Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Captain Berton A. Robbins, Jr., U.S.N., OSD:ISA
• Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Evans, U.S.A., OSD:ISA
• Thomas J. Corcoran, SEA

After the usual exchange of amenities Mr. Nhu said he proposed to discuss military aid to Viet-Nam under two general aspects, the political and the technical. He found that since December 1956 when the Communist Party Congress took place in Peiping, Communist techniques in the Far East had changed. The Moscow 20th Party Congress had stressed the parliamentary struggle for the spread of Communism. However, Mao Tse Tung had reconsidered Communist strategy and tactics. He gave stress to the following three ideas: (1) Communist orthodoxy; (2) dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) the necessity to establish this dictatorship by violent means. The Vietnamese Communists (Lao Dong party) conform to the Chinese view in this regard.

Mr. Sprague asked how many members there were in the Vietnamese Communist Party. Mr. Nhu replied that, although the Communists probably claimed a great many, the total membership of the Lao Party was probably between 300,000 and 400,000.

Mr. Sprague asked if there was any considerable refugee movement from north to south in Viet-Nam. Mr. Nhu replied that there was still a remarkably strong desire among people in the north to go south. The Vietnamese Government had under study a secret project which it hoped to put into effect at some time in the future after it had succeeded in consolidating the south politically, economically, and militarily. This plan would call for provoking within a few weeks a massive exodus of up to two million refugees from the north to the south.

Mr. Nhu said that the current Asian Communist line was affected strongly by a certain dynamism among the Asian masses. These masses wanted an improvement in their lot and they wanted it quickly. The Chinese Communists recognized the existence of this ferment and hoped to capture the leadership of it rather than to be swept along by it. Therefore the time factor is most important now. The Communists hoped to outstrip the West in the race for control of the Asian masses by taking advantage of the slowness of the democratic countries.

It is against this Asian background that the Vietnamese regard the technical aspect of their military problem. In general their role as envisaged by SEATO is to delay any massive military attack by the Vietnamese Communists. The Vietnamese Communists have 380,000 men organized into heavy divisions and equipped in accordance with Chinese and Russian practice with a strong artillery. Free Viet-Nam has only 150,000 men, most of whom are organized in light divisions. In addition to all this, recent developments in Laos and Cambodia indicating a general trend toward increased Communist influence in those countries make it necessary for the Vietnamese to concern themselves with a much larger area of possible operations than had been anticipated. In order to fill their responsibilities under the framework of SEATO the Vietnamese must have sufficient forces to resist for from two weeks to a month the shock of Communist forces which will be determined to crush them as rapidly as possible. Therefore, from the technical point of view they need sufficient troops to form two army corps, sufficient troops to organize their army into divisions and sufficient troops to carry on training without diminishing the operational capacity of their army. In response to a question from Mr. Sprague, Mr. Nhu estimated the average Vietnamese light division at 6,000 men and the average Vietnamese Communist division at about 12,000 men. Captain Robbins agreed with this estimate. For all of the foregoing reasons, said Mr. Nhu, President Ngo Dinh Diem asked 20,000 to 30,000 more men so that he could carry on training and maintain two army corps at the same time. The Vietnamese did not view their mission simply as a delaying one, but felt that after resisting the initial shock they must counterattack quickly. There were compelling political reasons for this. It would not be desirable, either from the American point of view or from the Vietnamese point of view, to send American troops into Viet-Nam since this would be, after all, a civil war.

Vietnamese troops would have to be the ones to attack the Viet Minh. The Vietnamese must think in terms of organizing landings and attacking the enemy in the region of Hanoi itself. So, it is Vietnamese troops that will have to carry the load. For the moment, Thailand and the Philippines, the only countries that could help Viet-Nam with troops, have none to spare. Thailand, particularly, has the dangerous right bank of the Mekong to watch. Therefore, the Vietnamese national army must be made adequate to meet the current situation.

Mr. Sprague asked Mr. Nhu whether or not the Vietnamese army had made any progress. Mr. Nhu replied that the Vietnamese army had made much progress in the past two years, both technically and in morale. Its main weaknesses are in equipment, especially in transportation, in which it is very backward. Its trucks and jeeps are left over from the last war and are very worn. To remedy their main deficiencies they must concentrate on training and equipment.

Mr. Sprague asked how the economic situation was in Viet-Nam. Mr. Nhu said it was bad because of 15 years of war and destruction. The Government was now devoting its main attention to economic recovery. They realized that economically also they were in competition with the Communists, that there was in fact a race between the Communist world and the free world for the Asian masses.

Mr. Sprague asked what the population of Free Viet-Nam was. Mr. Nhu estimated it at about 12,000,000 as compared to about 14,000,000 in the Communist Zone but said that the Government of Viet-Nam could reverse this situation in about two or three weeks by implementing at an appropriate time the secret plan he had earlier mentioned. Mr. Nhu remarked, semi-humorously, that under such circumstances, having the population advantage, Free Viet-Nam could readily accept the idea of free elections throughout the country. Mr. Sprague asked under what circumstances free elections could be possible throughout Free Viet-Nam. Mr. Nhu remarked that it was not possible to have free elections under a Communist regime and that the Communists didn’t even dare to have elections under their own auspices because people were so dissatisfied. Mr. Chuong agreed that free elections would never be possible under a Communist regime and pointed out that in 1945 even with a Chinese Nationalist army present in North Viet-Nam the Communists had been able to carry out rigged elections.

Mr. Sprague asked when the next elections would be held for Free Viet-Nam. Mr. Nhu said in about four years, that is, there would be parliamentary elections every four years and presidential elections every five years. This was why the Vietnamese attached such importance to their five-year plan. President Diem’s idea was to leave his successor a simplified situation with which he would be able to cope. Mr. Diem was against the idea of having a president eligible for reelection since this might result in the acceptance of a president who was too old to cope with the difficult problems which Viet-Nam would always have because of her geographical position. But the National Assembly overruled Mr. Diem and provided that a president could serve two terms. In Vietnamese tradition there is no cult of personality such as that which surrounded Stalin, for example, and no hereditary nobility. Even the emperors of Annam did not have personal authority but had to act only with the advice of the government. In the old times the Government of Viet-Nam was a government of the average man, a system which has both advantages and disadvantages.

Mr. Sprague said that the people and the Government of the United States were very impressed by the job which the people and the Government of Viet-Nam had done. We tried to understand Viet-Nam’s problems and were anxious to do all we could to help. Mr. Nhu replied that the Vietnamese saw their problems within the framework of all Southeast Asia and that if they had had some success to date it was thanks to American aid and to their own broad concept of their problems. Mr. Sprague said that Mr. Nhu could be sure that we would listen sympathetically to the Vietnamese Government’s presentation of its military aid problems.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/4–557. Confidential. Drafted by Corcoran.