346. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State1
938. 1. When Admiral Stump called on President Diem 14th latter said there were several projects he wished particularly to call to CINCPAC’s attention and concerning which General Williams could fully inform him of President’s views. These were 1) strategic and economic importance of construction lateral roads into PMS, 2) need [Page 738] to augment VN force level from 150,000 to 170,000, and 3) logistical shortcomings of VN armed forces which had been spelled out in VN general staff paper passed to General Williams.2 In urging ambitional [additional] support for VN military establishment Diem developed at some length thesis that in present state of country problems of internal security, resettlement of refugees, development and settlement of abandoned lands, and effectiveness of military establishment were all inseparably connected.
2. Diem described his current anti-Vietminh operations being carried out by military and other forces which he admitted were more of psychological and police character than truly military. They were proceeding satisfactorily but would require some months for completion. Despite progress achieved, sight must not be lost of fact that internal Vietminh capability was still significant and much remained to be done.
3. Diem announced that agreement with French on Saigon arsenal had been signed 13th. This had entailed tedious negotiation and he had finally agreed to pay 319 million francs for certain French equipment. He had, however, insisted French accord him utmost liberality re terms of payment which remained undefined. He said Vietnam would need technical assistance in operation of arsenal, which he hoped could become self-supporting and capable of meeting VN construction requirements for junks and other small craft. Diem said he expected issue of French military missions to be satisfactorily resolved in a matter of days. Resolution of Seno Base arrangements would have to await return of Souvanna Phouma.3
4. With respect to Laos Diem expressed grave concern at Souvanna’s policy of neutrality. Although conceding Souvanna’s personal anti-Communism he felt Laotian Prime Minister underestimated and probably did not understand difficulties and dangers inherent in assimilation of Pathet Lao international community. He remarked that in contrast to Cambodians, Lao were nice people who did not seek to make trouble. He hoped new VN Legation in Vientiane could be helpful to Lao in problem of dealing with Vietminh and thought there might be other ways GVN could be of assistance as in economic field. He was sympathetic to Souvanna’s desire that Tourane become an established outlet for Lao trade. This could be useful to both countries. It would also be logical and shortest route to supply [Page 739] Seno Base. He again reiterated his desire to obtain some written commitment from Souvanna that base would be available for “defense of free world” (he is quite stubborn on this point, which I will, raise with him again when I next see him).
5. Diem stressed his belief that basis of present Lao attitude and policy of neutrality was fear—fear of Vietminh and Chinese, but also a measure of uncertainty regarding Thais. What troubled Souvanna most he felt was thought that, should Laos be invaded it would be matter of two or three weeks before effective foreign aid would arrive on scene. Diem reiterated several times conviction that most important thing U.S. could do at this juncture to help situation in Laos was to give RLG assurances of prompt support in event of aggression.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/9–1756. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Paris, and Bangkok and passed to CINCPAC.↩
- Not found.↩
- According to telegram 863 from Saigon, September 11 (which described the results of the September 8–9 official visit of Souvanna Phouma to Saigon), Laos had agreed in principle to retain the Seno base and airfield because of the American request that it be kept for strategic reasons. Language on the Vietnamese-Lao base agreement was not yet agreed upon. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J51G/9–1156)↩