Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

339. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 63–56

Washington, July 17, 1956.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM THROUGH MID-1957²

The Problem

To analyze the current political, economic, and military situation in North and South Vietnam and to estimate probable developments through mid-1957.

Conclusions

1. We believe that the Communist “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRV) will not attempt an open invasion of South Vietnam or a large scale guerrilla warfare effort during the period of this estimate because of the danger of US or possibly SEATO counteraction and because such action would prejudice Bloc emphasis on peaceful coexistence elsewhere. The Communist regime will almost certainly remain in firm political control throughout the period of this estimate, despite some passive resistance and serious economic difficulties. It will require continued large scale Bloc aid to make even limited progress toward developing a self-supporting economy. The DRV army will retain the capability of defeating the total forces of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (Paras. 7–11, 13–16, 18–21, 64–68)

2. In South Vietnam, the trend toward political stability and popular confidence in the government will probably continue, barring a DRV invasion, large scale guerrilla action, or the death of Diem. Nevertheless, such contingent developments as intensified Bloc support for DRV objectives or reduction in Diem’s international support could stimulate greater Communist subversive pressure, weaken the South Vietnam government’s confidence, cause some loss of its public support, and revive opposition efforts for reconciliation with the north. (Paras. 35–39, 69–72)

3. Progress toward resolving basic economic problems will probably continue slow, but economic conditions in South Vietnam are not likely to have serious adverse political effects during the next year, as rice production, rubber exports, and large scale US aid provide reasonable living standards. (Paras. 40–46)

4. All significant sect resistance in South Vietnam has been eliminated, but some 8,000–10,000 armed Communists and a Communist political network scattered through the villages continue to pose a serious internal security problem. The effectiveness of the South Vietnam army will probably improve gradually as more units are released from security missions for training, but by mid–1957 it will still be unable to contain a DRV attack for a prolonged period. (Paras. 47–56)

[Here follows the discussion section; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pages 1068–1081.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, the following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: CIA; the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee—with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction—concurred in the estimate on July 17.