316. Despatch From the Chargé in Vietnam (Anderson) to the Department of State1
REF
- Embdesp 274 of Feb 21 and 306 of March 17, 19562
SUBJECT
- Vietnamese Elections: The Political Campaigns
In the two despatches under reference the Embassy had discussed the methods used by the Vietnamese Government to bring about the greatest possible public participation in the March 4 elections to the National Assembly, the scope of these activities, and some of their potential effects on the outcome of the voting. This despatch will treat solely with some general aspects of the political campaigns of the candidates and their parties as influenced by the electoral regulations and the implementation thereof.
[Page 663]The official Election Propaganda Committees described in Embassy despatch No. 306 of March 19 [17], 1956, which had as their function the execution of the government’s “get out the vote” drive have been confused in foreign press reports with the Candidates’ Campaign Committees, which, as their name indicates, were charged in each constituency with the conduct of the political campaigns of the approximately 405 candidates. Under the provisions of Ordinance 9 of January 23, 1956, these committees were composed of a representative of each political party running candidates and a representative of all independent candidates per district. The committees’ responsibilities included the selection and printing of posters; the determination of places where they might be displayed; the regulation of the number, size, and types of handbills to be distributed; the organization of public meetings; the apportionment of sound truck and radio time where such facilities exist, etc.
In order to insure equal treatment for all candidates, the electoral laws forbade the use of private funds or materials and provided instead that campaign expenses should be paid out of the national budget on the basis of one piaster per voter. While this appears to have been an honest attempt to insure fairness, the result was that the apportionment of funds (i.e., materials) was completely divorced from any relationship to the amount of campaigning that needed to be done or the size of the opposition to overcome, for it is obvious that in two constituencies of equal size a candidate with only one opponent would receive five times as much in the way of supplies as one opposed by nine others. Since the average number of contenders per district was somewhat larger in Saigon than elsewhere, the per capita expenditure per candidate was also lower and ranged from a low of .083 piasters (U.S. $0.0237) in Ward 6 (45,902 voters, 12 candidates) to a high of .25 piasters (U.S. $0.0714) in Ward 5 (36,614 voters, 4 candidates).
It must be admitted, however, that the electoral laws did remove almost all question of private means from the campaigns. Furthermore, since the required deposit of 2,000 P would be forfeited only by those who received less than 5% of the votes cast in their district, the element of financial risk was quite small.
By American standards the campaigns themselves were exceedingly dull. Slated to begin on February 20 for a twelve day period, no activity was noticeable in Saigon until February 25, although the local press had carried a few pictures and biographic notices before that date. Even during the few days that marked the peak of political activities, the most visible and audible signs that an election was about to take place were those which constituted part of the government’s propaganda drive (Embassy’s despatch 306 of March 17). Such attempts as there were by candidates to make themselves seen or [Page 664] heard seemed by comparison to be unimportant, and the public remained largely uninterested. The political campaigns themselves consisted of the display of posters; the distribution of handbills; publication of pictures, biographies, and programs of action, if any, in the newspapers; attendance and talks at meetings; personal house to house calls; and a limited number of radio speeches. Forbidden were entertainments, promises, favors such as transportation on election day, threats, bribery, and coercion.
Although the campaign regulations as set forth in the electoral laws claimed a basis of complete equality for all candidates, in actual practice those who were unofficially favored by the Vietnamese government, its party, the National Revolutionary Movement, or any of the latter’s affiliates, had many advantages. For example, when it came to the printing and distribution of posters and documents, a candidate whom the government or the NRM did not want to win might find that his posters were the last to be printed and therefore might not be available until just before the election. Or, once posted, they might be torn down by “goon squads”, as occasionally happened. As will be seen below, there were other ways by which special advantages went to preferred individuals.
The use of press facilities for the exposition of platforms, etc., was not covered in the electoral ordinances, and they were by no means shared equally. It is estimated that of the 400-odd candidates, less than 100 received any mention at all—incidental, derogatory, or otherwise, and the number of those who actually had their pictures, programs, and biographies printed probably did not exceed 50. Of this number the most prominent figures, i.e., Mr. and Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu; [name and title deleted]; Delegate for South Vietnam Tran Van Lam; Secretary of Youth and Information Tran Chanh Thanh, etc., appeared repeatedly in most papers.
Press treatment of the political campaigns was allegedly facilitated by the suspension on February 20 of censorship controls over the Vietnamese press then in existence. However, this relaxation was more than counteracted by the signature of a new decree that same day providing heavy penalties for the “distribution or reproduction by any means whatsoever of tendentious news or commentaries favorable to communist or anti-national activities”. Being more invidious, the new law was effective in making journalists much more careful about what they printed than had been the case under censorship, where responsibility for the deletion of contentious points rested with the censors. It is little surprising, then, that the role of the press in the electoral campaigns was a noncontroversial one.
Like the newspaper columns, public rallies were used to bring candidates before their constituencies. At such meetings all candidates were assembled together and each in turn was given an opportunity [Page 665] to outline “his biography, his political past, and his course of action” and to answer such questions as might be posed. In many cases the speakers took occasion to praise their opponents, especially if they included a well known figure, and all candidates were dutifully and politely applauded. As an example of the effectiveness of such gatherings might be cited one that took place in Saigon, where, before an audience composed almost entirely of government workers, Mr. Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State at the Presidency, spoke for some forty-five minutes—longer than all other speakers combined. In the next day’s official Vietnam Presse he received a page and a half as against the brief paragraph allotted all his opponents.
Radio (in the form of the Vietnamese National Broadcasting Company) was also used as a campaign medium, but the limited facilities permitted only a small number of candidates to make use of them. Sound trucks and public address devices were also sometimes available, but most of them were taken up by the Ministry of Information’s own election-boosting efforts.
The only field left to individual initiative and energy was “door-bell ringing”. So long as one did not violate the electoral regulations, he or his supporters could visit as many households and talk to as many voters as desired.
Comment: From the foregoing it will be seen that the recently concluded political campaigns in Vietnam were quite unfamiliar to observers acquainted with current American practices. It is equally clear that the effect of the regulations on the campaigns was to reduce the importance of individual efforts. The brief campaign period, further curtailed by a late start, the unrealistic basis for the apportionment of funds and materials, the restrictions on personal activities, and the limited public forums available all tended to decrease the effect of each personal campaign and to give an advantage to well known candidates or to those with an organized political following. All of this, of course, at the expense of really independent or relatively unknown contenders.
This effect was heightened by the mildness of the campaigns themselves. Despite the fact that the elections were for a Constituent Assembly, the forthcoming constitution was rarely mentioned. In an atmosphere of almost complete lack of issues, platforms varied from wholehearted support of the Diem Government to no platform at all, as was the case in one Saigon district where the individual confessed that he was only running because his friends persuaded him to. Indeed, a large number of candidates filed for office in order to withdraw at the last minute and throw their support to a colleague. Most programs were almost completely and mutually identical in major points: anti-communist; anti-colonialist; and pro-Diem. Candidates promised to work for the good of the country, for national reconstruction, [Page 666] for democracy, etc. (See Embassy despatch 284 of March 1.3) Had any possible contentious points been contained in the programs submitted to the campaign committees, it is probable that either the authors would have been disqualified or the undesirable points deleted. The lack of issues prevented unwanted criticism of official policies or prominent figures, i.e., government officials or those close to the official family, and thereby limited the stature of their opponents.
Considering, then, the care with which candidates were screened in the first place (Embassy despatch No. 285 of March 14) and the campaign regulations and procedures that tended to favor those most closely associated with or in the favor of the government and its political organizations, it is not surprising that a substantial majority of well known Diem supporters was elected to the National Assembly.
Action requested: Department may wish to pass copies of this despatch to London, Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, and Phnom Penh.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–2356. Confidential. Drafted by Robert E. Barbour, Second Secretary of Embassy.↩
- Both cited in Document 308.↩
- Cited ibid.↩
- Cited ibid.↩