Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

255. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Anderson) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 20, 1955—8 p.m.

1350. Reference: Deptel 937 sent London unnumbered, New Delhi 629, pouched London.²

1. Embassy fully recognizes difficulty of finding effective new approach to Diem to influence him enter into indirect consultations with Viet Minh which would not be commitment regarding elections, yet would provide minimum satisfaction to GOI, Geneva co-chairmen, French, Viet Minh and meet with approval of Diem’s supporters.

2. Best solution we can propose how is to give convincing impression Vietnamese Government has not rejected possibility of consultations in near future. This might be done by using need for prior creation of National Assembly as a peg for Diem’s reply to Dong’s message to co-chairman.³ Diem could announce date for National Assembly elections and State Assembly would speak for people on question of election consultations. Idea is not new as Diem used it at time of Bandung Conference as reason for delaying consultations. We also suggested (without success) he use it more explicitly at time he was preparing his August 9 reply to Dong’s July 19 message. However, it is a tactic we might now concentrate on for following reasons:

(a) In our opinion it is device which appears have good chance of satisfying all elements referred to in (1) above, which [with?] possible exception of Viet Minh. Latter, however, would find it difficult take strong public exception to what Diem could easily present as democratic procedure to permit free expression of national will on issue of primary concern to the people.

(b) If Diem agrees use Assembly device to meet requirements on international scene, he would be further committed to fulfill government’s long-standing promise on national scene.

(c) Diem’s reply to Viet Minh could use to good propaganda advantage fact that Dong, quoting article seven of final declarationin message to co-chairmen, conspicuously omitted very pertinent passage: “In order to ensure that sufficient progress in restoration of peace has been made, and that all necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will . . . .”⁴

3. Using Assembly as peg for Diem’s reply will, of course, succeed only if reasonably early, yet realistic, date is set for Assembly and if that date is subsequently adhered to by Diem.

4. Concerning suitable channel for reply to Dong’s message, it is possible Diem will be willing answer in form of reply to UK after latter has officially transmitted Dong’s message to Vietnamese Government. In response our inquiry, UK Counselor Etherington-Smith told us his government has in the past exchanged correspondence with Vietnamese Government on matters for which UK responsible as co-chairman of Geneva conference (e.g., sharing costs of ICC, reports of ICC to co-chairman), and Vietnamese Government has never shown reluctance reply to UK despite fact matters dealt with Geneva agreement. Counselor emphasized, however, that while his government might be willing facilitate initial steps in consultations, he believes it would not wish become continuing channel of communication between Viet Minh and Vietnamese.

5. If Department agrees we should urge Diem answer Viet Minh via letter to UK, question then remains what, if any, pressure we can or should use on Diem to obtain result desired. Although our ability exert pressure is apparently great because of govemment’s dependence on US support, in actual fact, if we wish our efforts to be effective we can do little more than use ardent persuasion, basing our arguments exclusively on Vietnam’s self-interest.

6. We have reason to believe that possibility Russia may raise election issue at Geneva in October raises hope rather than fear among many Vietnamese Government officials because they anticipate Russia may also insist on subsequent 9-power conference. We suspect Vietnamese Government would like nothing better than to appear as sovereign nation in such a forum to present its own case in hope of getting sympathetic world audience and possible backing for postponement of general elections under UN supervision. They also count on US protection to shield them from possible Viet Minh military reaction to their intransigence.

7. Informal comments from British and French colleagues during past week indicate they consider use of need for National Assembly as possible peg for Diem’s reply.

8. French Counselor Hessel seems to be thinking along more rigid lines. He suggests Diem might announce a time-table which would specify dates for creation National Assembly, for Assembly discussion of general election issue, and possibly for holding general elections. (We feel it would be inadvisable even to suggest to Diem he mention a date for general elections because he would immediately suspect Western powers of attempting gradually push him into actual elections.)

9. Hessel also seems to be considering possibility of gaining time for Vietnam by having Diem propose UN commission conduct pre-electoral investigation to determine whether conditions exist for free elections. We see dangers in this approach.

Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/9–2055. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.
2. In this telegram, September 17, the Department of State asked for the Embassy’s estimate of how far the United States could go in pressing Diem to enter into indirect consultation with the Viet Minh which would not give any commitments regarding elections, but might constitute a minimum response to the Viet Minh. (Ibid., 751G.00/9–1655)
3. The reference is to a note by Pham Van Dong of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, September 20, to the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina complaining of delay in implementing reunification of Vietnam through free elections as provided for in the Geneva Accords. Text of the note is in despatch 668 from London, September 22. (Ibid., 751G.00/9–2255)
4. Ellipsis in the source text.