Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

159. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 30, 1955—midnight.

4956. Ref Deptel 4810.² This is Country Team message.

A. Composition proposed new Cabinet.

1. Diem informed Chargé afternoon April 30 that political events of previous day had changed Diem’s plans concerning announcement new Cabinet (Embtel 4951³). These events were decision of Cao Dai Generals Phoung and Trinh Minh The, Hoa Hao General Nguyen Giac Ngo and leaders various political groups to:

A. Constitute themselves into new political front;

B. Denounce and repudiate Bao Dai as Chief of State;

C. Call for dissolution Diem govt on grounds it had been appointed by Bao Dai; and

D. Call on Diem constitute provisional govt leading to general elections and National Assembly which would set up new govt. We had earlier understood Diem intended announced new Cabinet April 30. He now feels list is not sufficiently representative and says he will revise it.

2. Previous tentative Cabinet list (Embtel 4955⁴) gives us helpful indication, however, lines of thinking being followed by Diem, and we can comment tentatively and in general terms on that.

3. Proposed Cabinet list, now presumably discarded, indicated Diem’s appreciation of necessity balance his own apparent desire create technician Cabinet whose members would be non-political and in harmony with his own views, with political requirement he give recognition in form of Cabinet posts to representatives groups supporting him. Posts of Information, Labor, Agriculture and Veterans Affairs among those reserved for Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and National Resistance Front. Technicians, many of whom are known to us, were in general technically competent and devoted nationalists. Fact that these men would accept posts in Diem govt at this time instead of seeking or retaining secure and renumerative positions speaks well for them as being devoted to their country. They are generally men of worth and not opportunists.

4. Specific comment on new Cabinet will have to await availability revised list.

B. Loyalty army to government and effect of Bao Dai’s naming Vy.

1. General Staff and senior Vietnamese Army commanders currently confused over legalities of situation. However, army is and will remain loyal to legal government unless forced to make political choices. If Bao Dai appointment of Vy becomes effective, even with Ty as Chief of Staff, army will be dragged into political arena. Army solidarity depends on retention of status quo or quiet Diem acceptance of dismissal should that eventuate. Worst possible development would be return May 2 of General Hinh as planned by Bao Dai.

2. There is reluctance certain high officers and various sections National Army continue hostilities. Of principal officers in Army at present time we know General Vy is opposed to continuing use of force. We believe Col. Minh, Commander First Military Region, holds same view. Gen. Ty, Chief of Staff, is currently carrying out orders of government and presumably will continue do so as long as question of legal authority is not raised. Col. Don of General Staff represents majority thinking in army which believes job must be finished.

C. Military situation Saigon–Cholon and countryside.

Vietnamese Army in control Saigon–Cholon and remainder of country generally except for sect areas and localities to which national government authority does not extend. No indication any popular support for Binh Xuyen. Army as four battalions resting from recent fighting and six additional battalions guarding installations in Cholon. Only important Binh Xuyen elements in Saigon remain in French security area. French have reinforced military units and posted numerous armed guards at all critical points around area.

D. Binh Xuyen forces whereabouts, strength and supplies.

1. Binh Xuyen are still disposed immediately south of Arroyo Chinois. Currently low on ammunition and down to strength of approximately 2,000. Binh Xuyen are believed tired and nearly ready to quit. Some evidence exists of serious dissension within Binh Xuyen ranks. Binh Xuyen may find means to improve supply situation.

E. Government political position.

1. Political position Diem govt had been deteriorating steadily dining past weeks. In addition disillusionment many members Diem’s Cabinet as to his working methods, deterioration also due largely to apparent inability or unwillingness govt take firm action against defiance its authority by Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao. Had Diem, however, precipitated violence by initiating use of force against Binh Xuyen, we believe there would have been popular reaction against govt by peace-hungry population.

2. Fact that Binh Xuyen transformed local incident April 28 into major challenge authority of govt by heavily shelling Presidential Palace, however, has given new aspect to situation. As far as we are able to judge, Saigon–Cholon population in general, although lacking enthusiasm either for Diem or for Binh Xuyen, is aware govt must strike back and crush rebels. There seems to be wide-spread hope issue will be settled once and for all.

3. By reacting with force, we believe govt has chosen only feasible course open to it. Wide-spread property destruction and loss of life may eventually cause grievances against govt, but for the moment prestige of govt has taken upturn which will be maintained only if govt presses issue to successful conclusion.

4. Diem’s efforts take over police force by transferring Municipal Police to control Prefect Saigon–Cholon March 26, and his subsequent dismissal Binh Xuyen Director General National Police and appointment Colonel Le to that post, were generally regarded as paper efforts, and popular reaction was one of cynical “wait and see”. Diem’s April 23 appeal met energetic response. By refraining from initiating use of force, however, but by responding vigorously when attacked. Diem has, by force of circumstance, improved his political position, at least for time being. He presently benefits from fact he is attacking unpopular Binh Xuyen and opinion is wide-spread that in so doing he is defying “colonialist” French. This is giving him at least a temporary strength.

5. Bao Dai’s instructions April 28 for Diem to come to Paris with General Ty and to leave General Vy with full military powers, have introduced completely new element in picture. At present moment. Diem is still real head of legal govt of Free Vietnam. As such his action against Binh Xuyen rebels is increasing prestige and strength his govt despite, and perhaps in part because of, French opposition. Should he be dismissed by Bao Dai, however, and choose to refuse dismissal, we believe picture would be completely changed. Bao Dai’s new appointee would then be legal head of legal govt of Free Vietnam, and Diem, should he resist, would clearly be in rebellion. We believe he could not count on support more than part of army and population, and there would undoubtedly ensue a civil conflict which would imperil remaining hope saving Free Vietnam.

6. Two further factors which we believe important in current swiftly changing picture are rapidly mounting anti-French feeling on part Vietnamese population on one hand and determined and unreasoning emotional opposition of French to Diem on the other. These factors, considered in connection with appearance in streets within last 24 hours of increasing numbers of French troops in close proximity Vietnamese forces, create dangerous and explosive situation which could easily be exploited by Viet Minh agents.

F. Supply position National Army.

Vietnamese Army reports supply situation satisfactory.

G. Any rallying or defections either side.

Vietnamese Army morale is up as result successful operations. Binh Xuyen reported to have suffered several hundred desertions plus 400 defectors who rallied to govt. Except for 200 “captives” and “sick” remaining 500 of National Police reported to have rallied to newly appointed chief, Colonel Le.⁵

Kidder

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055. Secret; Niact.
2. In this telegram, sent niact to Saigon at 6:39 p.m. Washington time, April 29, the Department requested an “Embassy and Country Team evaluation situation soonest to arrive Washington Sunday morning [May 1] at latest our time if possible. Comment on a) composition purported new Cabinet b) loyalty army to government and effect of Bao Dai’s naming Vy c) military situation Saigon–Cholon and countryside d) Binh Xuyen forces whereabouts strength and supplies e) Government political position, f) supply position National Army g) any rallying or defections either side.” (Ibid., 751G.00/4–2955)
3. Dated April 30, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–3055)
4. Dated April 30, not printed. (Ibid.)
5. Telegram 4832 to Saigon, May 1, reads in part: “Department much appreciates useful timely country team analysis.” (Ibid.)