Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

140. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, April 27, 1955—6:10 p.m.

3828. For Ambassador.

1. FYI only: After full consultations here with General Collins it appears that some change in political arrangements in Viet-Nam may be inevitable. However, our general position remains that we continue support legal government under Prime Minister Diem until Vietnamese nationalist elements evolve another formula warranting continued U.S. assistance and support. If this becomes impossible, U.S. will have to reconsider its policy in Viet-Nam.

2. Immediate and urgent next step is to determine fundamental French policies, and if possible develop U.S.-French concert of views before approaching Bao Dai and Vietnamese in Saigon. Essential purpose is to obtain unequivocal French assurances for full backing any new political arrangements in Saigon. Therefore we wish you would immediately see Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to give them orally the points outlined in paragraph 7 and obtain their views and oral assurances of concurrence.

3. We feel very strongly we should obtain adequate French assurances because of evident past lack of coordination between Ely’s view in Saigon and French view in Paris, and because of Congressional anxiety and concern revealed in Collins’ consultations with leaders this week. They will be perturbed over possible replacement of Diem, repercussions in Viet-Nam, and implications of French policy in North and South Viet-Nam. Unless we can give Congressional leaders some assurances on French intentions, there is bound to be difficulty in getting Congressional support for continued aid for FEC and Viet-Nam.

4. Part of the cause for failure of Diem has been absence of whole-hearted French action to carry out paragraph 4 of September 29, 1954, minute of understanding.² Ambiguities of French policy vis-à-vis north and south have impeded effective political development in Free Viet-Nam. Unless these are removed and basic French intentions toward support for Viet-Nam are clear, any Vietnamese Government will not be successful and U.S. support will have to be reexamined. We desire Embassy make these views clear to French and make every attempt to secure frank and full statement of French intentions in Viet-Nam, north and south.

5. In presenting the points contained below you should point out orally to the French that, with respect to the continuation of the delegation general in Hanoi, we would hope that Sainteny would not return to Hanoi following the final evacuation of French forces from Haiphong in May. Sainteny, rightly or wrongly, has become symbol of “double-dealing”. Any residual French delegation in Hanoi should be proportionate to the remaining French interests there and perhaps serve in a consular capacity.

6. We prefer you receive acceptable French reactions to paragraph seven before giving them our views on questions regarding the character and procedures of a new government. They are transmitted in subsequent telegram. End FYI.

7. We have carefully studied the French aide-mémoire of April 17, 1955, containing the French response to the questions posed by the United States Government with respect to the political situation in Free Viet-Nam.³ Before proceeding to take up specific questions of procedure and personalities, we would appreciate clarification of certain aspects of French policy toward Indochina. This is of fundamental importance, since it now appears that it may be difficult to secure continued Congressional support for large-scale financial assistance to the French Expeditionary Corps and Viet-Nam unless certain apparent ambiguities are removed.

A. Accordingly, we believe the following are basic desiderata and we would appreciate Faure’s agreement to them:

1) The desirability of continuing to assist in developing and strengthening Free Viet-Nam following the principles of the Franco-American Minute of Understanding of September 29, 1954. The question of personalities is to be dealt with separately;

2) The desirability of giving full moral and political support to the established and recognized Government of Viet-Nam in maintaining its authority and exercising legitimate functions of upholding law and order; and

3) The desirability of limiting French representation in North Viet-Nam to the extent necessary to represent residual French interests following the withdrawal of French forces from the Haiphong area in May 1955.

B. If the French agree to the above, we are prepared to discuss possible steps to seek to resolve the political crises in Free Viet-Nam. In our view the establishment of any new Vietnamese government should be subject to the following considerations:

1) It should have recognized administrative and political capabilities and unquestionable nationalist orientation.

2) Any new Vietnamese government would be provisional in character until a fully elected national assembly is constituted.

3) It should so far as practicable result from a genuinely Vietnamese nationalist initiative not bearing the stamp “made in Cannes, Paris or Washington”.

4) Police power must be transferred to the central government and the allegiance of the sects to the new cabinet assured.

5) Bao Dai should participate in the establishment of any new government to the extent of bringing the Binh Xuyen into line, designating a generally-accepted person as Prime Minister with full powers.

6) The seven-point reform program developed by the Diem government with the assistance of Ely and Collins must be energetically carried out.

7) Full support must be given to a program for the integration of the sects and the Binh Xuyen into the modern life of Viet-Nam.

8) An effort must be made to find some important and useful role for Diem in order to utilize his political assets and good qualities, and both Governments should urge him to accept some new participation to further the cause of Free Viet-Nam. His refusal however would not hold up subsequent procedures.

We would appreciate confirmation French authorities accept the points in this understanding.

8. Embassy Saigon inform General Ely of full paragraph 7 above.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2755. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Young; cleared by Bowie, Tyler, Collins, Murphy, Sebald, and MacArthur; and signed by Dulles. Repeated for information priority to Saigon.

2. Paragraph 4 of the minute of understanding agreed to during conversations between Acting Secretary Walter Bedell Smith, Guy La Chambre, then Minister of Associated States, and Edgar Faure, then Finance Minister, September 27–29, 1954, reads as follows:

   “With respect to Vietnam, representatives of France and United States agree their respective governments support M. Ngo Dinh Diem in establishment and maintenance of a strong, anti-Communist and nationalist government. To this end France and the United States will urge all anti-Communist elements in Vietnam cooperate fully with Government of Ngo Dinh Diem in order counter vigorously the Viet Minh and build a strong free Vietnam.”

   For complete text of the minute, see Tosec 8, September 30, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2100.

3. See Documents 117 and 122.