Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, July 14, 1953—6:45 p.m.

CX 63690. My CX 63671 (HNC 1823).¹

1. Harrison has reptd as fols on todays meeting, ref msg:

“Perusal of the transcript of todays meeting will show that the meetings in their present stage are farcical. The Communists obviously are merely delaying act while they try to embarrass us with ques intended for propaganda and to stir up trouble with the ROK. It may be that they are waitng to see what happens to their offensive.² This morning they seemed to be enjoying their advantage. Replies to their statements are worse than wasteful since they only prov basis for further repetition of Communists propaganda. After any statement is made by me, the Communists have staff offs who immediately prepare frivolous ques apparently designed solely for delay. In the absence of discretion in negotiation the del furn both opportunity and audience for the Communists.”

I concur in Harrison’s comments.

2. The Communists present tactics of challenging the sincerity of the UNC, as expressed in our assurances to comply with the terms of the armistice, has impugned the good faith and impaired the dignity of the US and the UNC. We cannot afford to permit the Communists to cont these humiliating tactics. It should be apparent to all who have negotiated with the Communists that little progress can be anticipated unless we are prepared to take a firm and positive stand. A course of act which might convince the Communists of the firmness of our psn is contained in folg para.

3. Harrison at tomorrow’s meeting (1100I 15 Jul)³ would review the UNC assurances for implementing the armistice, and the UNC psn, in regards to the recovery of the escapees and again in positive terms, would inform them that it is time for them to realize the armistice which we seek, is a mil one between mil comd, and includes the mil forces of both comd. Should the Communists cont their curs tactics of ques the good faith of the UNC and insisting that the UNC recover the 27000 escapees, Harrison would then suggest, and take unilaterally if nec, a recess up to three or four days at his discretion, suggesting the Communists utilize this period to reexamine our repeated assurances to comply with the armistice and our psn on recapture of the escapees. Harrison would further state that the UNC is prepared to have the staff offs or liaison offs meet at any time, with a view to resolving the few admin matters remaining before an armistice can be sgd.

Comment: Except for unilateral recess of indefinite duration, I believe this course of act would, as result of its prey use by the UNC, help convince the Communists that we were firm in our psn. It might be nec to rpt the same procedure, but it does put the decision dir up to the Communists as to whether or not they will sign an armistice, and acpt the loss of the 27000 escapees. This course of act might unduly delay an armistice, resulting in additional UN cas, and afford Rhee an opportunity to take other act within his capabilities designed to obstruct an armistice. I consider, however, that this course of act offers, under the present conditions, the best possibility of securing Communist concurrence to an armistice in a reasonable period of time.

4. I recm that I be auth to adopt immediately the course of act outlined in para three above and rqst reply⁴ ASAP in order to permit Harrison to implement this act at meeting scd for 151100I July.

5. We, of course, must have in mind the next step, should the act outlined in para three above fail to produce the desired results. This matter is under consideration and suitable recm will be submitted at an aprop time.

1. In this telegram Clark transmitted to the JCS and Briggs Harrison’s report on the July 14 plenary session in which the Communists pressed for further clarification of the specific answers Harrison had given to most of their questions during the plenary session the day before. Both the reference message and telegram CX 63652, Clark to JCS and Briggs, July 13, 1953, which reported on the plenary meeting on July 13, are located in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.
2. The reference was to the major Communist offensive, aimed at the ROK Capital Division and three other ROK divisions, which began on the night of July 13 and continued for a week.
3. A summary of this meeting, in which Harrison did not choose to call for an extended recess, can be found in telegram CX 63702, Clark to JCS, July 15, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
4. In telegram JCS 943836 to Clark, a joint State–Defense message, July 14, the JCS approved this course of action. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)