Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/2–252: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

Tokyo, February 25, 1952—6:40 p.m.

CX 64241. References (passed separately to JCS):

A. AmEmb Korea 140545Z July 50.¹

B. AmEmb Pusan 121129Z Feb 52.²

C. AmEmb Pusan 150500Z.³

D. AmEmb Pusan 150740Z.⁴

E. AmEmb Pusan 160930Z.⁵

F. HNC 937, 170901Z.⁶

G. AmEmb Pusan 191523Z.⁷

H. AmEmb Pusan 200555Z.⁸

Part 1. Pursuant to part 7 of reference F believe earliest consideration necessary at highest governmental levels of measures for promptly counteracting effects of increasingly frequent ROK Governmental attacks against armistice agreements, cite references B, C, E, F, and G. Unless ROK Government activities are promptly reversed, believe they may gravely endanger attainment of armistice, or seriously handicap subsequent political discussions, if armistice concluded, cite reference B. President Rhee’s threat to withdraw ROK military forces from the operational command of CINCUNC, as implied in references B and G gives me serious concern, especially since reference A assigns command authority over ROK forces, in the name of ROK President Rhee, only “during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities.” A firm agreement with the ROK Government regarding continued control of ROK forces during the armistice period is considered essential.

Part 2. Ambassador Muccio has at all times given me his full cooperation in our joint efforts to deal with the ROK anti-armistice campaign. Reference D constitutes his report of recommended courses of action to moderate ROK attitudes and reactions, agreed upon by himself and representatives of CINCUNC, UNC Del, and Commanding General Eighth Army. Recommenations for local action are being carried out, but reference H reports State Department unable to concur in recommendations 5, 6, and 7 of reference D, and considering as an alternative, a letter from President Truman to President Rhee. It seems questionable that such action will accomplish the desired result unless it can reach a sufficient number of high ROK officials in addition to President Rhee, or be publicized. ROK reaction to hysteria of leaders could precipitate a crisis in Korea. Therefore consider the situation demands immediate consideration followed by prompt and vigorous action on the government to government level.

1. This telegram reported that President Rhee assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950.
2. In this reference telegram, originally sent as 799 from Pusan, Feb. 12, 1952, and then relayed to Ridgway, the Embassy warned that as the realization dawned that an armistice “may soon be signed, hysteria sparked by President [Rhee] himself will continue crescendo.” Muccio suggested consideration of a campaign to counter ROK opposition to an armistice (795.00/2–1252).
3. In this telegram, originally sent as 806 from Pusan, Feb. 15, 1952, the Embassy reported that “moderate and responsible elements of ROK Govt” seemed to be joining Rhee’s current anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2–1552).
4. Originally sent as 807 from Pusan, Feb. 15, 1952, this telegram contained the recommendations of Muccio and representatives from CINCUNC, CINCUNC Advance, and EUSAK for a plan of action to moderate the ROK anti-armistice campaign (795.00/21552).
5. In this reference telegram, originally sent as 813 from Pusan, Feb. 16, 1952, the Embassy reported that South Korean concern that the United Nations would withdraw from Korea too early after an armistice and leave Korea unprotected was a principal cause of ROK opposition to an armistice (320/2–1652).
6. In this telegram, dated Feb. 17, 1952, Joy reported the contents of a personal statement by the South Korean member of the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom, Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, opposing the armistice and concessions to the Communists (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 13).
7. In this reference telegram, originally sent as 819 from Pusan, Feb. 19, 1952, the Embassy summarized efforts among high-ranking South Korean officials to moderate the anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2–1952).
8. The reference telegram, originally sent as 615 to Pusan, Feb. 18, 1952, contained the Department of State approval of the general idea of a campaign to moderate the ROK anti-armistice movement, although the Department favored a confidential strong letter from President Truman, rather than letters from Secretary-General Trygve Lie and Acheson with appropriate publicity, as the Embassy in Korea had suggested (795.00/2–1552).