As a result of your concern with a proposed Civil Affairs Directive which
was submitted to you under cover of a memorandum of November 16,
1953,2 you transmitted the Directive to
sources outside the Department of State3 for comment. On December 23, Mr.
Hines gave to Mr. McClurkin, of NA, the
comments you had received and asked him to have the Directive
reconsidered in the light of the comments. I have now prepared a letter
to the Secretary of Defense (Tab A),4
which would request his agreement to a proposed revision of the
directive (Tab B)5 and to a proposal that the Bureau of
the Budget be asked to draft promptly an Executive Order to be issued
simultaneously with the Directive. The proposed revision reflects
chiefly our reconsideration of the directive in light of the comments,
but also includes some additional changes that now appear desirable.
There is attached as Tab C a summary of our reconsideration of the
directive in the light of the comments and an explanation of our
proposals other than these prompted by the comments. Also attached, as
Tab D, are the comments received from outside sources.
[Tab D]
Comments on Directive for U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu
Islands
1. The Underlying Political
Decision
The directive itself does not deal with the basic political decision
involved in setting up a U.S. civil administration of the Ryukyu
Islands for an indeterminate future. These comments are made without
reference to any National Security Council paper presenting that
problem.
The directive is apparently based upon the political assumption either that the anticipated arrangement will
be reasonably satisfactory to the Japanese and the Ryukyuans or that the arrangements must be carried
through despite their opposition.
If the proposed arrangement is not considered to be reasonably
satisfactory to the Japanese and the Ryukyuans, the gravity of the
political decision should not be minimized. So far as our relations
with the Japanese are concerned, the rapid rise of an irredentist
issue over the Ryukyus could seriously entangle U.S.-Japanese
relations and undermine the security position of the United States
in Japan itself. In the longer run, the attitude of Japan would
appear to be infinitely more important to us than our position in
Okinawa. As for the Ryukyuans, serious opposition to the arrangement
would throw an issue of self determination before the American
people and before the rest of the world in which the United States
would be cast in the role of imposing its rule upon several hundred
thousand unwilling subjects of another race and culture. Such a
situation would cut across the conscience and long tradition of our
people and would greatly weaken our influence and relationship with
the peoples of Asia, the Middle East and even Latin America. It
would provide an issue easily exploitable by the Communists and
deepen the impression that the Soviet Union is the principal great
power ally of anti-colonial peoples. That the issue would be a false
one does not remove its dangers.
Can the above issues be met without endangering the military position
which the United States desires in the Ryukyus? They can be, at the
cost of some inconvenience and by accepting risks of a lesser order
of magnitude than those posed above.
First, it is not clear why a joint U.S.-Japanese Trusteeship of the
Ryukyus should not be submitted for approval to the United Nations.
While there is no obligation to do so under the terms of the
Japanese Peace Treaty, there is a strong implication that such a
step would be taken in the absence of the most compelling reasons.
Such a Trusteeship need not be “strategic” in type, subject to a
[Page 1582]
veto in the Security
Council; it can be of the general type, subject to General Assembly
approval. There is no provision which could be written in one type
of Trust Agreement which could not be written in the other; security
matters can be effectively dealt with. A joint U.S.-Japanese
Trusteeship could make the Japanese responsible for non-security
matters and the U.S. responsible for security. While the drawing of
a line between the two functions might be difficult, it can be done
unless the United States wishes to exercise its “security”
responsibility in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, far beyond
the arrangements we are willing to accept in such places as Hawaii,
Alaska and other Pacific islands.
If a joint Trusteeship is believed unacceptable because we are
fearful of the longer-run attitude of the Japanese, it is suggested
that Japan’s attitude become our principal concern and that we
deliberately move to tie Japan to us with even stronger ties, one of
which would be partnership in the Ryukyus.
A joint Trusteeship would be the surest safeguard against an issue of
self-determination being raised against us in the United Nations,
for the United Nations itself would have approved the
arrangement.
Second, if Trusteeship is unacceptable by the United States, it is
believed that certain steps could be taken to minimize the dangers
involved in the proposed arrangement. For example, the real position
of the United States under the arrangement is more favorable (in
terms of U.S., Japanese, Ryukyuan and world opinion) than the
position which is to be made public. This rests upon the
understanding that the concept of eventual return to Japan is not to
be a part of the directive to be made public. Can this be kept
secret in any event? Will not political pressures smoke out this
concept? If so, why not make this clear at the beginning?
Third, the arrangement in the Ryukyus might be linked more
specifically to other events in such a way as to explain U.S. desire
for continued control and to place a share of responsibility where
it belongs, namely, upon Communist aggression. For example, the
United States might declare that it is prepared to return the
Ryukyus to Japan conditioned upon the return of the Kuriles. Or we
might declare that we will consider the future of the Ryukyus after
a satisfactory settlement in Korea, Indo-China, and with respect to
the general peace and security of the Pacific area.
2. The Directive as
Drafted
The following comments are offered on the draft directive, accepting
the underlying political assumption upon which it appears to rest:
- a.
-
The Legal Structure
[Page 1583]
Certain questions arise as to the legal position. It is
clear that, as a matter of international law, the United
States is entitled to exercise executive, legislative
and judicial authority in the Ryukyus. It is not clear,
as a matter of American law, how this authority is to be
exercised. What law governs the American military
establishment in the Ryukyus? Under what laws will U.S.
and foreign civilians be governed? Are we planning to
exercise residual governmental authority over several
hundred thousand people by, in effect, military fiat
established by an executive order? There is no
indication that it is proposed to ask Congress for an
organic act for the temporary government of the Ryukyus:
would such be desirable? Will the laws and Constitution
of the United States be applicable at least to U.S. and
non-Ryukyuan aliens in the islands? Are all non-Ryukyuan
personnel in the islands to become subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice? Is this code adequate
to cover the vast range of situations which might
develop in governing the islands?
It would seem to be completely fundamental that the
exercise of American power over a population be on the
basis of law, and that law be adequate and well known to
all who come under it. The directive appears enlightened
and satisfactory insofar as the law applicable to
Ryukyuans is concerned. But except for U.S. military
personnel under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
what recourse is there for any individual who feels
himself the victim of an arbitrary act of military
power? If the answer is “there is none”, the proposed
arrangement would be intolerable.
- b.
-
The “Military Governor”
The directive purports to establish a “Civil
Administration”; why not call the chief officer a
“Governor” rather than a “Military Governor”, even if it
is anticipated that he shall always be a military
person? It is not easy to defend the governing of large
numbers of people by a “Military Governor” in peace
time; the term raises a false issue for our enemies.
Further, it is strongly recommended that the Governor and
the Deputy Governor (who will be the actual Governor in
residence on the islands) be appointed in each instance
by the President of the United States. The procedure is
simple; it would emphasize that it is the government of
the United States which is responsible for the
Government of the Ryukyus and would serve to remind the
individuals concerned that they are carrying a very
heavy responsibility which goes far beyond a routine
military assignment.
- c.
-
The “Primary Mission”.
It is offensive to American responsibility to state the
“primary mission” of the Civil Administration in
strictly military terms. We are asserting responsibility
for the government of several hundred thousand
people—human beings. Their safety, well being and good
government are a first charge upon us and rate at least
equally with our own national security interests. This
could easily be handled by redrafting the first two
paragraphs under B, page 2. In redrafting, it should be
kept in mind that the directive will become public, even
though it is now planned not to make it public
initially. It might remain secret for as long as six
months.
- d.
-
Exercise of a “security” veto over
Ryukyuan Government
[Page 1584]
The directive makes clear the general spirit of
self-government which the Ryukyuans are to enjoy. It
does not, and probably cannot, contain detailed
instructions as to circumstances in which it would be
permissible for the Governor to exercise his ultimate
authority to override action by Ryukyuan authorities. It
would greatly strengthen the political foundations of
the directive if it were provided that, except in
emergency, the Governor would ask for instructions from
the United States Government before exercising his
veto.
- e.
-
Maintaining close contact with
Ryukyuans
Paragraph C. 2, on page 3 contains wholesome advice to
the Governor in the direction of using his influence to
insure developments in the islands which will not force
him to use his residual authority. It is suggested that
some of this material be dealt with in a supplementary
instruction rather than in the directive itself. The
publication of the present text would cast Ryukyuan
authorities in the role of “puppets” and would arouse
unnecessary cynicism about the nature of the self
government which the directive tries to
extend.
- f.
-
Public Health
In section H, page 7, it is suggested that reasonable
standards of public health might be one thing for the
Ryukyuans and something quite different for Americans.
This section is unnecessarily tactless and could provoke
the deepest resentment in many parts of the world. We do
not need to suggest that disease and filth are all right
for some people, unless they get close enough to
Americans to infect us. This is not a matter of
substance, but of more skillful wording.
- g.
-
Fair and Prompt Compensation
Section L, page 9, in providing for fair and prompt
compensation “to the extent appropriated funds are
available” for Ryukyuan land, labor or other Ryukyuan
resources by U.S. agencies, suggests the possibility
that the Civil Administration may require private land,
private labor and private resources for which it can not
pay for lack of U.S. appropriated funds. This loophole
should be plugged, at least for circumstances short of
an actual operational military emergency. If the need is
important enough to levy upon the Ryukyuans, it is
important for Washington to bestir itself to find the
necessary funds.
3. Conclusion
While the above comments have been largely confined to adverse
criticism, they have been directed toward suggestions for
improvement of a directive which, given its assumptions, is to be
commended for its breadth of spirit and its obvious attempt to
remove some of the adverse consequences of the underlying political
decision. Had time been taken to do so, specific compliments would
have been directed to most of its provisions. The primary questions
are whether the United States Government feels that it is fully
satisfied with the basic political decision and the legal framework
within which the Civil Administration would operate.
