794.00/11–553
No. 702
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First
Secretary of the Embassy in Japan
(Leonhart)1
confidential
[Tokyo,] October
15, 1953.
Participants:
- Foreign Office
- Mr. Iseki
- Mr. Seki
- Mr. Yasukawa
- Embassy
- Mr. Berger
- Mr. Finn
- Mr. Leonhart
- 1.
- Last evening the group, above, met for dinner and an evening’s conversation at Mr. Berger’s2 home. The evening had been arranged as an opportunity for a frank and informal exchange of ideas in a non-negotiating, non-transactional atmosphere. The talk was relaxed, speculative, and largely uninhibited. Ideas seemed to get through the veil of official restraint and politeness that most of us encounter most of the time with our Japanese counterparts. As for the Japanese side, they ordered their car for 9:30 and left at 11:45. They appeared to enjoy the evening and would like it repeated.
- 2.
- The following seemed the pivotal ideas expressed by the Japanese
officers:
- a.
- There is a tradition of, and an increasing awareness of the need for, strong government in Japan. The country is too poor, beset by too many problems, to afford the luxury of weakness and indecision in its political direction. The logic of events thus tends toward strong government. The question is whether a strong government comes from the right or from the left.
- b.
- The left in Japan can come to power, short of war, only as a function of economic depression, but if a serious depression should occur, the left would almost certainly win a parliamentary victory. That it could hold power by parliamentary means—in the face of a right counter-attack and its own weaknesses—is doubtful. How long a left government in office would continue to respect constitutional guarantees in this power situation is equally uncertain.
- c.
- There are reserves of strength in Japanese conservatism which at present are not fully tapped or organized but which provide at least a potential solidity for the right. The Japanese left can be shattered; the Japanese right probably cannot. Thus far, the concept of class consciousness has not proceeded far in Japan. The awareness of “being Japanese” is still far more pervasive and unifying [Page 1533] than the consciousness of separate and division membership in capital or labor. Over a longer run, this sense of “Japanese-ness” will work to the benefit of the right.
- d.
- The Imperial institution still provides an ultimate source of allegiance and intervention. The Emperor’s influence must be sparingly used, but in an extreme situation his role could again be decisive. This influence is to be measured in extra-constitutional terms, but it is a power factor.
- e.
- The course of Japanese foreign policy is firmly and unshakeably set for cooperation with the United States “over the next three or four years.” After that, Japan will want to think things out for itself.
- f.
- American economic assistance, while making possible the tremendous post-war recovery of Japan, is today a mixture of help and hindrance. It has removed incentive to take the corrective actions needed if Japan is to live within its own means. The U.S. should accordingly reduce its dollar expenditures in Japan, but “it should do so gently.”
- g.
- U.S. policy toward Japan has fluctuated too widely. During the Occupation the U.S. intervened too much. Since the Occupation, the U.S. has not intervened enough. The U.S. should not hestitate to attach conditions to its aid, but, in doing so, it should make it clear that decision is up to Japan: “If you want x, you must do y, but whether you want x is for you to decide.” Similarly, there need to be more joint institutions (both official and informal). The model of the Administrative Agreement’s Joint Committee is useful; it should be extended to other fields—defense, information, policy. At the top, liaison between the two governments is cordial and close, but it should be extended to the staff levels. The working levels of the Japanese Government need and would welcome greater association with American officials.