Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

FE files, lot 55 D 388, “Ikeda Talks”

No. 699
United States Minutes of the Third Session of the Ikeda–Robertson Talks¹

secret

[Washington,] October 12, 1953.

List of Participants

• United States Side
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Robert J.G. McClurkin—NA
• Noel Hemmendinger—NA
• George Newman—S/MSA
• Charles Sullivan—Defense
• Norman Paul—FOA
• William W. Diehl—Tokyo Treasury Attaché
• Japanese Side
• Hayato Ikeda
• Kiichi Aichi²
• Kiichi Miyazawa³
• Takeshi Watanabe⁴
• Gengo Suzuki⁵
• Mr. Murakami⁶

Mr. Robertson referred to the agreement at the last meeting that the Department of Defense would be prepared to discuss its thinking on Japan’s forces in greater detail than the statement made by Mr. Nash.

Mr. Sullivan emphasized that the data he was about to give did not represent a completed study on air and naval forces, that they were preliminary and, as in the case of the ground force, were conceived as the minimum regarded as the minimum regarded as essential. The following air force is under consideration by the Joint Chiefs on recommendations of the Far East Command:

	No. of Planes
9 squadrons jet interceptors	225
3 squadrons all-weather interceptors	75
6 squadrons fighter bombers	150
3 squadrons tactical reconnaissance	54
6 squadrons transports	96
Total	600

Taking into account reserve and maintenance the total amount of planes would be about 800 and the total personnel for such a force about 30,000.

The interceptor types cannot be determined until the actual time of turnover is known. They would probably be F–86. The transports would probably be the CI–19, so-called flying boxcar. We would expect to take three or four years to build up to the nine interceptor squadrons. In the current FY a start could be made on training, including two interceptor squadrons and a training school. The two squadrons would have about 75 aircraft. The type would depend on the availability to the Command at the time. The trainer would presumably be the T–33 jet trainer. It may be that some T–34 primary trainers could be included. Mr. Sullivan emphasized that he was stating planning estimates and that the actual implementation would be the responsibility of the field commander. For this reason it was impossible to be specific about the actual assignment of the equipment as this would depend on the availabilities to the field command at the time of delivery.

For Navy Mr. Sullivan mentioned 18 frigates, 50 landing craft (both of which are already on loan) and 40 mine sweepers. The personnel would be about 13,500. This is not a long-term program and can be handled as fast as the Japanese are ready. Mr. Ikeda said that the Japanese already have 10,300 personnel. He asked for further information on tonnage, crews, etc., and inquired whether any destroyers, destroyer escorts were omitted, as this type had been mentioned by Mr. Nash. Mr. Sullivan said that they were not included because this was an immediate program, that we would be glad to hear the Japanese ideas on a long-range navy program. We had not elaborated one because we felt that the Japanese in time could meet their own requirements.

The ground force, Mr. Sullivan said, is in our judgment the most important because we will have large air and naval forces in the area for some time. But if our current forces in Korea were redeployed we would not be able to keep any large ground forces available since it does not have the mobility of air and naval craft.

He also commented that we would believe it desirable to have a number of anti-aircraft battalions equipped with radar and anti-aircraft weapons. Most of this is presently purely U.S. There had been some discussion in U.S. circles of 19 anti-aircraft battalions.

Our thought on the buildup of the 10 divisions of 325,000–man ground force was 6 divisions by July 1, 1954, 8 divisions by July 1, 1955 and 10 divisions by July 1, 1956. On organization the U.S. division slice⁷ is 20,000 plus. We are thinking of 17,000 plus for the Japanese. Mr. Ikeda referred to a division slice of 32,500 as resulting from figures previously mentioned on the U.S. side and said that the understanding that the Japanese had reached in Tokyo was that the NATO forces division slice ran around 18,000, some as low as 12,000. The National Safety Force people have reached the conclusion in their own minds that an appropriate division slice for Japan would be 18,600.

It was agreed that in order that these questions might be pursued further Mr. Robertson would seek to arrange a meeting as soon as possible with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, or such persons as he might want to represent him.⁸ Mr. Ikeda indicated the desire to pursue both at that level and in staff talks at a lower level. It was indicated on the U.S. side that we would not want to go into extensive detail since the U.S. is better prepared to do so in Tokyo.

It was also agreed that Mr. Ikeda would supply a written statement of Japanese views on defense forces before the next meeting, which the U.S. side could reproduce arid study.⁹

1. Drawn up by Hemmendinger on Oct. 15.
2. Parliamentary Vice Minister of Finance.
3. Member, House of Councillors; personal assistant and interpreter for Ikeda.
4. Minister at the Japanese Embassy.
5. Financial Commissioner, Ministry of Finance.
6. Kotaro Murakami, Chief, Legal Section, Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
7. A “slice” is an average logistics planning factor used to estimate requirements for personnel and materiel. It usually consists of the total strength of the basic combatant element plus its share of all supporting and higher headquarters personnel.
8. For a partial summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Ikeda talks, held on Oct. 15, see footnote 2, Document 701.
9. The statement is partially summarized in telegram 892 to Tokyo, Document 701.