Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.95B/9–1953: Telegram

No. 689
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret
priority

Washington, September 19, 1953—12:29 p.m.

697. Limit distribution. Re Seoul’s 236² repeated Tokyo 110 and Tokyo’s 721³ repeated Seoul 35. As Department sees it following factors must be taken into account in settlement fisheries issue between Japan and ROK:

1. Relationship to other matters pending between two countries and desirability persuading them reach settlement all these matters.

2. Undesirability US serving as mediator or honest broker in dispute. Therefore agree line suggested numbered paragraph (4) Tokyo’s 721.⁴

3. Domestic political heat engendered in Japan by fisheries question and problem posed for US-Japanese relations.

4. Relationship to general policy re fisheries and territorial waters. Neither Japanese nor we can admit principle of demarcation line in international waters not based on conservation and mutual agreement. Possibility Japan and ROK reaching agreement fishing issue predicated upon hope Japanese would make sufficient concessions in direction conservation measures so Koreans would believe their fisheries interests adequately protected and would therefore no longer insist upon concept Rhee line. Believe further catalyst this direction would be more broad-minded approach by Japanese toward other pending issues.

5. Relationship to Korean political conference.⁵ Defense was with difficulty persuaded not authorize CINCUNC withdraw logistic support ROK Navy. Defense also urged discontinuing relief and other economic activities if ROK remained intransigent. Department did not and does not believe it useful have “showdown” with Rhee on this issue. Such action might jeopardize both continued ROK performance on promise to cooperate with us until after first 90 days political conference and any prospect of securing satisfactory political settlement as result conference. These questions appear at moment outweigh any assessing rights and wrongs of positions re fisheries issue.

Our prime aims therefore are to buy time for political conference and at same time attempt move ROK and Japan toward resolution all outstanding issues while avoiding clashes over immediate sore point.

Robertson away when Deptel 678 to Tokyo and 182 to Seoul sent, agrees completely with Embassies Seoul and Tokyo re undesirability any mention to Japanese of influence Korean attitude toward Japan may have on extent procurement in Japan of items for economic rehabilitation Korea. Korean economic program first and foremost for rebuilding ROK and developing its industry and agriculture. Procurement will take place in Japan only to extent it is most economical and efficient way accomplishing this purpose. Japanese therefore should not be led rely US procurement in Japan connection Korean economic program as major portion answer their economic problem.

Suggest on basis foregoing explanation factors taken into account and aims to be achieved Embassies Tokyo and Seoul coordinate General Clark upon his return September 21 and then approach Japanese and ROK Governments urging upon them immediate negotiation settle fisheries issue and if possible other outstanding issues.⁶

Smith

1. Drafted in NA cleared in substance with U/FW: approved for transmission by Robertson; and repeated priority to Seoul as 190.
2. Dated Sept. 18. A portion reads: “While we recognize legitimate Japanese interest in sharing procurement, nevertheless danger of leak seems to us so great, and effect of such leak on Rhee clearly so explosive, that we question desirability raising issue with Japanese.” (694.95B/9–1853)
3. Dated Sept. 18. In this telegram the Embassy in Japan had stated that the Koreans were “clearly the aggressors” in the fishing dispute and that the representation proposed in telegram 678 (supra) was inappropriate because it amounted to an implied threat to Japan, while the Koreans were merely being urged to negotiate. According to the Embassy, Japan was aware that the United States had effective control over U.S. funds for Korean rehabilitation. “If impression should be created US exercising economic pressure on Japan to appease ROK, reaction here could be serious.” (694.95B/9–1853)
4. In paragraph 4 the Embassy suggested that in reply to a request from the Japanese Foreign Ministry for U.S. assistance in the current dispute, the Embassy might state that a Korean request for restoration of the Sea Defense Zone, with joint U.S. Korean enforcement, had been rejected by the United States, and that the United States was urging Rhee to seek a settlement.
5. For documentation concerning preliminary negotiations during 1953 in anticipation of the conference proposed on the Korean armistice agreement, see volume xv.
6. Documents in file 694.95B for September and October 1953 indicate that, at least partly as a result of representations by the United States, negotiations between Japan and the Republic of Korea got under way in the first week of October. The talks were broken off on Oct. 21 when the Korean Government asked for, and did not receive, a formal apology for certain remarks made by a Japanese negotiator on Oct. 15.