Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

493.949/8–1753: Telegram

No. 681
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret

Washington, August 28, 1953—8:24 p.m.

523. Excon. Reference: Tokyo’s 437.² Recent re-examination US economic defense policy vis-à-vis Communist China³ led to decision to maintain present level US controls and to continue intensified efforts persuade our allies refrain from relaxing their controls. In light Japanese representations concerning necessity resume nonstrategic exports to Communist China and concerning relationship Japanese trade with China to general Japanese political-economic situation, decision reached here that readjustment items possible in US-Japanese bilateral agreement of 1952.

Accordingly Embassy should inform Japanese Government that as result foregoing considerations and review undertaken by US in connection US-Jap bilateral, we believe we can accept some of new proposals made by Japs and in addition suggest other items for liberalized treatment or deletion from embargo lists. This should go far toward meeting needs of Jap Government caused by internal Jap political and economic situation.

Specifically US prepared do following:

1. Make immediate review Jap list 20 items.

2. Give priority to review additional 80 items suggested by Japs.

3. On basis review already underway, all items on list of 400 found to be non-strategic will be communicated promptly to Japs even though item not submitted for review by Japs.

4. If Japs consider any items on US security lists but not accepted by CHINCOM are non-strategic, US willing undertake reexamination.

5. Support Jap recommendation to CHINCOM or other governments as appropriate to include on China Embargo list adequately documented strategic items. US of course will seek multilateral embargo in CHINCOM over any remaining strategic items respecting which it is possible to present strong documentation.

In view statements already made by Japanese Government officials re “negotiations with US re relaxation controls,” we realize difficult avoid impression relaxation dependent on US consent. Also realize Japanese public would react favorably to indication US willingness cooperate Japanese needs re Communist China trade. In view risk misinterpretation in other countries of US attitude, however, essential minimize impression US involved in Japanese Government decision or that Japanese trade controls being drastically altered or abandoned. Embassy should ask Japanese Government refrain from statements re US-Japanese negotiations.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Paris, London, and Hong Kong; drafted in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, the Economic Defense Staff, and the Department of Commerce; cleared in the Office of Chinese Affairs, the Foreign Operations Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Treasury Department. Dulles’ name is typed in the approval line, but is not initialed.
2. See footnote 2, Document 674.
3. Reference is to the adoption of NSC 152/2. For text, see vol. i, Part 2, p. 1009.