Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

693.941/2–752: Telegram

No. 502
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret
priority

Washington, February 8, 1952—7:34 p.m.

579. Reurtel 987, Feb 7.² Dept has through you and talks with Koo considerable insight into point of view Natl Govt and also through Dulles talks with Yoshida considerable insight as to what is in mind of Jap. From this we realize that there are certain differences which in themselves seem to us not to be of major importance but which, in atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, cld be magnified into serious obstacles to carrying out Yoshida letter to Dulles and desired result of harmony between two govts.

We have not however felt that at this stage we shld be intermediary and accordingly have not attempted communicate to Chi Natl Govt, either through Emb here or you, what we know of Jap ideas other than as publicly expressed in Yoshida letter and we have not attempted to give Jap Govt any interpretation of Chi Natl views except that under date of Jan 14 we advised Sebald for info of Yoshida that we believed Natl Govt wld accept formula of his letter to Dulles.³

It is our present view that negots shld be begun directly between the two govts; that they shld not be pressed or allowed to develop into any inflammable stage but that points which two parties cannot agree on shld be laid aside until agreement reached on oher matters and then if both sides desire US wld consider in light of then circumstances using its good offices to endeavor to complete agreement.

What follows is for your info and such informal communications to Natl Govt as you think appropriate.

We were disposed in principle to accept position that formula now in Yoshida–Dulles letter cld be expressed in separate protocol doc rather than in treaty itself. However, we now feel it may not be practical to exclude formula from treaty.

We note Chi draft⁴ repeats provisions of multilateral Treaty giving rights to Natls, products and vessels of the “Republic of China” and then apparently attempts to cut down scope of rights by limiting them to Natls, products and vessels of “Formosa and the Pescadores”. Even this however is not done adequately.

This seems to us unsatis. It fails to reflect important feature of Yoshida–Dulles formula that Treaty shall be applicable to terrs “which may hereafter be under control of Natl Govt”⁵ and in fact limits treaty operation for all time merely to islands mentioned. We wld think it preferable a) that treaty be made between “the Govt of Japan and the Natl Govt of the Republic of China”; b) that treaty be simplified so as to reduce necessity for internal definitions; and c) that final clause of the treaty limit its application to Natls, products or vessels of China in terrs “now or hereafter under control of Natl Govt of the Republic of China.”

We attach, and assume Natl Govt attaches, utmost importance to meticulous avoidance of any treaty provision in favor of China which cld give rights to Commie China other than contemplated by Art 21 of multilateral Treaty or give rights to persons, products, vessels, aircraft or anything else now or hereafter under Commie de facto control. Also we attach importance to the “hereafter” feature of formula both to avoid any possible impairment internatl prestige Natl Govt and also to avoid possible rights to Commies if perchance any single particle of Formosa and Pescadores group shld temporarily fall under de facto Commie control. Therefore, from both standpoints we believe treaty shld be with “Natl Govt of Republic of China” and limited to its de facto control now or hereafter rather than to geographically defined territories.

Further detailed comments may follow.⁶

Acheson

1. Drafted and approved for transmission by Dulles; cleared with Allison in FE; and repeated for information to Tokyo marked “For Sebald.”
2. In telegram 987, Chargé Rankin stated that the Nationalist Government, while not expecting a formal reply, desired clarification on two points before the Japanese Delegation arrived in Taipei to negotiate the proposed bilateral peace treaty. “Chi Govt wants bilateral ‘peace treaty’ in name and in substance.” Also, the government wanted the scope of the treaty’s application to be covered in a document separate from it. The Chinese Government, concluded Rankin, assumed the latter point had been “discussed with Japs when US conveyed to them one of Chi Govt formulas which subsequently incorporated in Yoshida Itr to Dulles.” (693.941/2–752)
3. See Topad 1955 to Tokyo, Document 472.
4. Chinese draft as of this date not found in Department of State files.
5. Quotation is apparently a paraphrase from penultimate sentence of third paragraph of the Yoshida letter.
6. In telegram 999 from Taipei, Feb. 11, Rankin in part stated: “FonMin [George K.C. Yeh] expressed appreciation Dept’s comments re scope application (Deptel 579 February 8) and is reexamining Chi Govt draft with these considerations in mind. Ref to ‘Nationalist’ Govt in treaty presumably not feasible since this is not official name but same result may be obtained other ways.” (693.941/2–1152)