611.94/2–652: Telegram

No. 498
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret

1631. CX 62996. This is Sebald’s 1631. No. 12 from Rusk. Progress negotiations now such as to disclose nature Jap position important points and to permit preliminary assessment further course negotiations.

Obvious from discussions thus far that while Japs are friendly and appear anxious to reach satisfactory agreement, they are nevertheless determined to press Japan’s interests with great vigor and to insist upon arrangements broadly similar to those we have with other important friends, about which they are fully informed. Their attitude is underscored by pressures sensitive domestic politics and wide public interest in and wariness about admin agreement. Clear intimation in fisheries negotiation that Japan is coming into post-treaty period as major independent and self centered factor world affairs, with important implications for US foreign policy formulation, is entirely confirmed by present talks.

Fol articles tentatively agreed on basis texts already furnished Dept: Preamble, 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, and new article on vehicles.

Fol articles still under technical consideration, with fair chance of satisfactory solution at technical level: 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 24, 25 and 26.

Fol articles being considered either at technical level or by Okazaki, Rusk and Johnson but involve points which still require closing of gap between two dels: 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 22 and 23. Since this category contain heart of our proposals brief analysis each now fols:

Re: Article 1, Japs most reluctant include contractors, stateless persons and nationals third states within definition civilian component. Here they are using NATO precedents strongly. Also in background is bad reputation Jap contractors, many of whom evaded taxes and escaped obligations to other Japs by claiming special contractual [Page 1136] relationship to occupation. Japs appear willing to deal with problem contractors in special articles in such way as to protect US-appropriated funds from taxation, but do not appear impressed with our desire include contractors and contractors of contractors in broad privileges and exemptions given by inclusion definition civilian component. Stateless persons not important, but Japs object inclusion nations third state within civilian component, probably because they do not see clearly its necessity, because such are explicitly excluded in NATO formula, and there are vague fears about possible abuses this privilege by US in some way offensive to Japs. No change in my instruction this article desired.

Re: Article 2, issue still revolves about third sentence para 1. Since Japs appear willing to agree substance policy that we should not be left in position possible trespasser, we are trying find alternative language which will mean same thing as our original text. Any such language will be furnished Dept for approval before agreement in view importance this point. Japs consider our original language implies continuation occupation and seem to fear foot dragging on our part in reaching agreement on facilities and areas. They want assurance (a) that occupation ends completely in every respect upon effective date peace treaty, (b) that facilities and areas are held by our forces by agreement, (c) that we will make urgent and fair effort to get agreement facilities and areas, before effective date peace treaty if possible. Machinery for latter would be informal working group working in advance of formal joint committee which would reach provisional agreements facilities and areas to be confirmed promptly by joint committee. Gen Ridgway is prepared set up US section such informal working group at once and I consider it must be done just as soon as we can agree on text Article 2. In exchange for assurances (a), (b) and (c), Japs appear willing to give us assurance that we can remain in facilities and areas not yet agreed or provided for, pending further consultation, which is essence our present third sentence, para 1. No change instruction this art now desired, pending submission new language.

Re: Art 3, Japs have continued raise tremendous objection inclusion of para 2 in body agreement. They say they do not object substance and would include this para in formal agreed minutes of negotiations as agreed interpretation para 1. Our wording para 2 indicates its function is to explain para 1. Jap objection is based upon fact that para 2 would be obnoxious their public opinion because it is taken bodily from base agreements and even includes items not listed in Phil base agreement. They are unwilling use Phil as precedent, but where our proposals are even more severe on them than on Phil, Jap reaction is strong. “Bases” is bad word in Japan since it connotes extra territoriality, unequal treaties, and suggestion [Page 1137] we are digging in for long stay, such as 99 years. We have pointed out admin agreement inevitably includes features normal both to status of forces and base agreements, that failure to be specific in other agreements has produced misunderstanding and that public should have broad idea of meaning of para 1 so as not to be upset when we act in sense of our para 2. Firm Jap reaction continues to be that insertion para 2 “itself most regrettable and displeasing to the Jap people”. My own view is that, on this issue, we should take the substance and give on the form, perhaps trying to strengthen para 1 by specific reference to alterations in facilities and areas. My recommendation is that I be authorized to accept, if it becomes necessary, deletion para 2 from Art III, subject to its being recorded in formal agreed minutes as agreed interpretation para 1. Johnson concurs. Dept now has instruction on this.

Re: Art 15, Japs have been trying hard to get modification interim arrangement which would place them “in at least as favorable a position as the Phils” prior to application NATO formula. Crux of issue is Jap desire insert new para reading as fols: “Jap courts and authorities shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over any offense against the laws of Japan which is committed outside the facilities and areas by members of the US Armed Forces, the civilian component and their independents and the offended party of which is a Jap national.” Insertion such para would require insertion words “subject to para 3 of this art” after words “US service courts and authorities” in para 1. Battery of arguments both sides are those well known Dept and we have held firm line. Japs may be trying to make strongest possible record effort in negotiation prior to final acceptance our formula. They recognize importance application NATO formula at early stage but are worried about ability opposition parties exploit interim arrangement involving exclusive jurisdiction. No new instructions desired.

Re: Art 16, Japs are pressing for US share of 75 percent in para 3 (D) as in Art 8, para 5 (e) of NATO agreement. They claim no reason why Jap should be different from NATO, no connection between settlement arrangements for general expenses and no real reason why US should not pay all of valid claims arising by our acts. Request instructions degree importance we should attach to 50–50 formula. Also, Japs wish to include Art 16 new para to cover ex gratia payments as in para 6, Art 8, NATO agreement. Request instructions. Dept has action both points Art 15.

Further tel will come on Arts 22 and 23.

Sebald