693.94/1–1752: Telegram

No. 479
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

secret
priority

531. Reur 896 Jan 17,2 fol comments are numbered to correspond numbered paras reftel.

[Page 1094]

Para two. US has consistently taken position that while bilateral treaties between Japan and other powers may be negotiated and even proceed to point of initialing final draft of document, formal signature of treaty cannot take place until multilateral treaty comes into effect. This procedure has been and is being followed in present or recent negotiation between Japan and US–Canada re fisheries, Indonesia and Phils re reparations and fisheries, and India re treaty of peace. This was explained to Amb Koo by Mr. Dulles on Jan 14.

Para three. Yoshida’s wording of sentence re scope of application bilateral treaty is in line with that suggested to you on Sept 27, which was “Present treaty shall, in respect of Republic of China, be applicable in all territories which are now, and which may hereafter be, under control of Govt of Republic of China”. Dept believes that unilateral form of this statement preferable in that otherwise implication might be given that Japan would at some time in the future once again take expansionist measures. It does not, in Depts opinion in any manner imply placing either Govt in inferior position.

Para four. Dept understand Yoshida’s undertaking “Promptly explore this subject with Nationalist Govt” means Jap Govt will on its initiative shortly open negotiations with Nationalist Govt either through head of Jap Govt Overseas office Taipei or through dispatch of special envoy.

Dept trust above explanation will prove satisfactory to Chi Govt. In view of flurry of dissatisfaction evidenced in Brit press over Jap action it would be most helpful if Chi Govt can accept Yoshida letter in spirit written and express publicly no dissatisfaction therewith.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Allison and cleared with Dulles; repeated to Tokyo.
  2. In this telegram, the Embassy passed on to the Department three questions raised by the Republic of China with regard to the Yoshida letter. The questions were: what was meant by the phrase “prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude”?; what was the significance of the Prime Minister’s having worded the sentence on territorial application of a bilateral treaty in a unilateral fashion?; and what did Yoshida mean by his undertaking to “promptly explore this subject with the National Government”? (693.94/1–1752)