No. 464
Editorial Note
On January 5, 1952, officials of the United States and the United Kingdom, led by the President and the Prime Minister, held a dinner meeting aboard the S.S. Williamsburg. The full text of Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume VI. An excerpt relating to Japan follows:
“At this point, I said that I wished to raise a related matter which had to do with bringing our policies vis-à-vis Japan’s relation to Formosa in line. I pointed out the trouble which existed in Tokyo, saying that the Japanese Government wished to make an arrangement with the Nationalist Government relating to the establishment of peaceful, political, and trade relations between Nationalist-held areas and Japan, but that they did not propose to recognize the Nationalist Government as the Government in control of the mainland, or at this time to take any steps regarding Japan’s relations with the mainland of China.
“Mr. Churchill said that he had gone along with the Labor Government’s recognition of China, since he was under the impression that we were withdrawing from China and he saw no other practical course. However, he thought that the Labor Government’s policy, as they had later pursued it was wrong.
“Mr. Eden spoke rather strongly against our view that the Japanese Government could or should enter into relations with Formosa, because he believed that this would prejudice any future relations with the mainland and would inevitably give rise to the view in Japan that we were forcing this attitude and would thereby have a bad reaction against us. He also thought that this violated the agreement with Mr. Morrison.
“I pointed out what the nature of the Dulles-Morrison agreement was: that it related to Japan’s long-run relations with the mainland, with which we were not now dealing, and, in effect, said that these should be left for action after the occupation had ended. I pointed out that at the present time SCAP had withdrawn all control over most of Japan’s foreign affairs and that, with the knowledge and approval of the British, the Japanese were now engaged in making treaties with New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. All of these negotiations were for the purpose [Page 1070] of easing ratification of the Japanese peace treaty by the Parliaments of those countries. I saw no reason why the Japanese should not be free to enter into the same sort of arrangements with the Nationalist Government which were quite essential for the purpose of getting ratification by our Senate. Mr. Churchill thought that this was more of a point than Mr. Eden appeared to. However, the President and Mr. Churchill instructed Mr. Eden and me to work this thing out and reach a satisfactory solution of it. This we said we would do.”(Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100)
The term “Dulles-Morrison agreement” refers to the statement “Chinese Participation and Formosa”, June 19, 1951; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, volume VI, Part 1, page 1134.
Herbert Morrison had been Foreign Secretary in the previous (Labor) British Cabinet.