Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 375
Memorandum of Discussion at the 221st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 2, 1954 ¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, November 2, 1954

Present at the 221st Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Assistant Secretary Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary Milton for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; General White for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

The Far East (NSC 5429/2; NSC 146/2; NSC 166/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government”, dated September 28 and October 5, 1954; NSC Actions Nos. 1224, 1228, 1233–c, 1234, 1235, and 1258)²

The Acting Director of Central Intelligence first commented on new railroad developments in Communist China, one linking central China with the Trans-Siberian, and the other eventually running from Lauchou to Alma Ata. Thereafter, General Cabell read to the members of the Council a CIA intelligence estimate, prepared without consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on the Communist and non-Communist reactions to the courses of action proposed by the Secretary of State in his report to the Council on October 28 (a UN resolution to maintain the status quo in the Nationalist-held offshore islands and a mutual defense treaty between the Chinese National Government and the Government of the United States). (A copy of this estimate is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)³

Thereafter, Mr. Cutler briefed the Council extensively on the Planning Board discussion of the proposals by the Secretary of State for seeking a UN resolution to maintain the status quo of the Nationalist-held offshore islands and for seeking to negotiate a mutual defense treaty between the Chinese National Government and the United States. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s brief is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Cutler was interrupted by the Secretary of State relative to the possibility that the Attorney General (who was not present at this meeting) might have doubts whether the President could legally act to commit U.S. forces to help repulse a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa without Congressional approval, even though the Senate had previously approved the mutual defense treaty. Secretary Dulles commented that in his opinion the President would have authority to act to commit U.S. forces if such action were necessary in order to preserve the vital interests of the United States. While it was desirable, continued Secretary Dulles, to bring Congress into the act, Congressional approval could not be made the sine qua non for protecting the national security of the United States.

After Mr. Cutler had completed the rest of his briefing, he suggested that the Secretary of State speak with respect to any further developments on the above two courses of action.

Secretary Dulles said that he had had only one additional thought with respect to these two courses of action—namely, that it might be desirable, in the text of the proposed mutual defense treaty with Formosa, to “fuzz up” to some extent the U.S. reaction with regard to a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa as such an attack would affect the Nationalist-held offshore islands. He read a paragraph to illustrate how this fuzzing up might be accomplished. According to this language the U.S. action specified in the treaty would not be specifically and explicitly limited to an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, but would leave open to U.S. determination whether or not to construe an attack on the offshore islands as an attack on Formosa itself. The advantage of this fuzzing up would be to maintain doubt in the minds of the Communists as to how the U.S. would react to an attack on the offshore islands.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Secretary Dulles how he would expect to explain to the Senate what was really involved in the treaty if the issue was thus fuzzed up. Secretary Dulles replied that he could make quite clear to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an executive session precisely what was involved in the fuzzy language. Mr. Cutler then pointed out that in all probability Senator Knowland would try to push the Secretary of State, in such an executive session, to the point of agreeing that the United States should and would defend these offshore islands. On the other hand, the President expressed the opinion that the Senate Committee would probably accept the proposal as made by the Secretary of State relative to the content of the treaty. The President did caution, however, that the text of the treaty should indicate that the United States must act in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Mr. Cutler then inquired of Secretary Dulles whether there was any truth in recent reports that Chiang Kai-shek was showing himself “a little restive” toward the proposal for UN action to maintain the status quo on the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles not only stated that these reports appeared to be accurate, but went on to say that he was no longer sure how the Generalissimo would react to the proposal for the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty covering Formosa when we actually got down to negotiating such a treaty. Up to now, the Generalissimo had favored the idea of such a treaty.

Mr. Cutler said that this was at least understandable, since the proposal for a treaty in effect confronted the Generalissimo with the question whether to withdraw his troops from the offshore islands or to expose them to destruction at the hands of the Chinese Communists without much prospect of U.S. armed support. Secretary Dulles agreed that this, in essence, was the question that Chiang would have to face.

Turning to Admiral Radford, Secretary Dulles said he wished to put the following question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Would it be desirable for the United States, in connection with the proposed defensive treaty, to stipulate that the Generalissimo must maintain a certain proportion of his existing military forces on the island of Formosa? If we did not so stipulate, Chiang could “gut” his strength on Formosa by sending the bulk of his troops now stationed on Formosa to the offshore islands. As he understood it, said Secretary Dulles, approximately one-third of the Nationalist forces were already deployed on the offshore islands. If still more were sent, this would place an undue burden on the United States in its task of defending Formosa against Chinese Communist attack.

Secretary Wilson expressed the opinion that the Generalissimo could not send many more troops to the offshore islands for the simple reason that there wasn’t sufficient room for them. Indeed, he thought that if the proposed UN resolution went through, Chiang was likely to pull back forces from the offshore islands to Formosa.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Admiral Radford whether, in the last analysis, the successful defense of Formosa against Chinese Communist attack would not depend upon air power. With certain qualifications, Admiral Radford replied that in the long run air power would be decisive. On the other hand, if the United States guaranteed to defend Formosa in this mutual defense treaty, Chiang would be free to make use of a larger number of his own Nationalist troops to defend the off-shore islands. This he would tend to wish to do, despite the fact that he realizes in the long run that he would not be able to hold these off-shore islands without armed U.S. support. He would simply insist on putting up a good fight.

Secretary Dulles said that he had another document to supplement the intelligence estimate which General Cabell had read at the beginning of the meeting. This was a report which had been sent him yesterday from the British Embassy in Washington, giving the views of the British Chargé d’Affaires at Peiping, Mr. Trevelyan, with regard to the consequences for British relations with Communist China of British support for the two U.S. courses of action mentioned above.⁵ In substance, Trevelyan warned against the danger for Sino-British relations of British support for these two proposed U.S. courses of action.

Secretary Wilson inquired whether we had put our resolution before the UN as yet. Secretary Dulles replied in the negative, but pointed out that the text of the resolution which would be presented had been agreed to by our friends in the UN. Sir Anthony Eden was not, however, willing to commit himself to the actual introduction of the resolution, and receipt of this estimate from Trevelyan would probably serve to cause the British to drag their feet still more.

Secretary Wilson then inquired what the United States would do if, once this resolution had been introduced into the UN, the Soviets countered it with a suggestion that the United Nations be given authority to make a disposition of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Would the United States go along with this?

Secretary Dulles replied that we would not go along with such a proposal, and that we were making every effort to limit the area comprised in the resolution.

Secretary Wilson went on to point out his view that the danger in this proceeding was that somehow Formosa would slip back into the possession of mainland China. If this could be done without a loss of U.S. face, it would be all right, since this is the solution we would have ultimately to acquiesce in.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the basic fact with respect to the situation in the Nationalist-held offshore islands was that these islands could not be held against an all-out Chinese Communist assault short of involving the United States in general war with Communist China. The President observed that when we talk of general war with Communist China, what we mean is general war with the USSR also. Once this is made clear, the next question is, where does the U.S. want to launch an attack upon such an enemy coalition? The President said he was not sure, but almost certainly not in the area of the offshore islands. In any event, if the Soviets did not abide by their treaty with Communist China and go to war in support of their Chinese ally, the Soviet empire would quickly fall to pieces.

Secretary Dulles admitted the President’s point, but said that on the other hand, the American experience in Korea plainly demonstrated the great difficulties inherent in limited war. Mr. Cutler pointed out that he had in mind something a little different from limited war along the Korean lines. It was rather the courses of action proposed by General Bradley when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on how best for the U.S. to meet a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea. Secretary Dulles replied that that was all very well, but that one thing leads to another, and after all, as General MacArthur had so emphatically stated, victory is the only proper objective in war. Nevertheless, said Mr. Cutler, he questioned whether all-out war and victory was the right answer to armed aggression in the kind of world we lived in at this moment.

Secretary Wilson added that he was at least sure of one thing, and that was that there was no sense in going to general war over these small islands.

Mr. Cutler then asked whether we could not now hear the views of Admiral Radford and the Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford asked what views Mr. Cutler wanted to hear, and pointed out that it was quite difficult to know where to start. Admiral Radford then said that the Chiefs had been in complete agreement throughout the course of the whole last year on at least one major point—namely, that if you look at our position in the Far East on a piecemeal basis, you don’t get very far towards a profitable discussion. The Chiefs unanimously believed that our first task was to decide on the best over-all position for the United States vis-à-vis the Far East. They were very much concerned that our total military position in the Far East not be weakened. This chiefly meant that we should retain Japan and the off-shore island chain, of which, of course, Formosa was a part. Admiral Radford went on to emphasize that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on retaining Formosa was not altruistic, but based solidly on the security interests of the United States. The two new moves proposed by the Secretary of State, he continued, involved intangibles the impact of which was very difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, the Chiefs continued to be split on the question of committing U.S. armed forces to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Moreover, the Chiefs had not discussed the proposed mutual defense treaty with Formosa until last Friday morning (October 29), and they had therefore had no time to send forward a formal paper containing their views. At the Council meeting on the prior Thursday (October 28) the other Chiefs of Staff (who actually knew less about developments than he himself) had realized for the first time that the President had authorized the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with Formosa if necessary. So, in a sense, concluded Admiral Radford, the Chiefs found themselves discussing something which had already been agreed upon. Nevertheless, there was still great concern in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff that the two policies originally proposed by the Secretary of State may eventuate in the total disintegration of the Chinese National Government on Formosa. From the military point of view such a development would jeopardize the entire U.S. military position in the Far East.

When he finished his comments, Admiral Radford suggested that the individual Chiefs of Staff be called upon to offer their own comments. He asked General Ridgway to speak first.

General Ridgway said that he had no specific comments to make at the present time, since a longer interval was needed to study the problem. However, he did agree, he said, with the remarks just made by Admiral Radford.

Admiral Carney said likewise that Admiral Radford had summed up his own views, except that he would like to stress the usefulness of these offshore islands in the cold war. Perhaps these islands were not vital to our national security, but they are none the less important. To relinquish them would have a profoundly adverse effect on our military position.

The President said that he was inclined to agree with the position taken by Admiral Radford and the other Chiefs with respect to the loss of Formosa. The word “jeopardize” was correct in describing the effect of its loss. The President observed that certain people, back in 1952, had argued that to lose Formosa would be disastrous and decisive for the U.S. position in the Pacific. Indeed, they said it would be only a little less serious than the loss of Japan, and might force us to run out of the Pacific. The President disagreed with these statements. While the loss of Formosa would certainly be serious, it would not be so serious as the loss of Japan or the Philippines.

Asked for his opinion, General White said he merely wished to add, from the point of view of the Air Force, that these offshore islands were important adjuncts to air defense.

General Shepherd said he just wanted to point out that the loss of these offshore islands would represent one more step in giving in to the Communists.

Mr. Cutler summed up the foregoing recital of the views of the individual Chiefs of Staff by saying that they amounted to a JCS position that the offshore islands should be included within the cover to be provided by the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Chinese National Government. However, Mr. Cutler said he presumed that the President had decided this particular issue at the Denver meeting when he had indicated that the United States would not use its armed forces to defend these islands against Chinese Communist attack.

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Cutler that the decision reached at the Denver meeting was still valid. Secretary Dulles pointed out that public opinion throughout the free world would be against the United States if we went to war with Communist China over these offshore islands. The effect in Japan would be extremely bad. In short, if one paid any attention to the repercussions outside the immediate area concerned, it was plain that the price we would have to pay to defend the islands was too high. The Chinese Communists would win the sympathy of all our allies, and there would be devastating repercussions both in Europe and in Japan. On the other hand, continued Secretary Dulles, as far as holding Formosa and the Pescadores (as opposed to the offshore islands) was concerned, he had no reservations whatsoever. Moreover, he believed Formosa and the Pescadores could be securely held by such a treaty of mutual defense as he was advocating. Essentially we were facing the same predicament in Formosa as we were facing in South Korea. Both Rhee and Chiang want to take the offensive against Communist China. The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister, George Yeh, had informed him repeatedly that there was no real hope for the future of the Chinese National Government in the absence of general war. Moreover, what was going to hold and save Formosa was not any local military power in and around the island, but rather the deterrent power represented by the massive retaliatory capacity of the United States.

Mr. Cutler said that he judged that Secretary Dulles did not share Admiral Radford’s feeling that the UN resolution and the mutual defense treaty would have a serious effect on the morale of the Chinese Nationalists and might result in the dissolution of the Formosa government. Secretary Dulles replied that the carrying out of these two policies might indeed result in a loss of Chinese Nationalist morale; but that such a loss would not be fatal to the United States because the true defense of Formosa really depended on the United States rather than on the Nationalist forces.

In support of the position taken by Secretary Dulles with regard to the effect on world opinion if the United States went to war with Communist China over the offshore islands, the President warned the members of the Council not for one minute to overlook the effect of such a move on U.S. public opinion. The people of the United States won’t go to war for “captious reasons”, and the Council would do well to remember this.

The President then speculated on the type of war we might have to undertake if the Chinese Communists did attack Formosa itself. It might so happen that they would concentrate their forces in such a way that the United States would be in a position to deliver a massive attack on the Communist forces with such effect that we could sit back for a couple of years without necessarily following up our blow.

Governor Stassen pointed out that if the objective we sought was simply to stabilize the situation in this sore-point area and to avoid general war with Communist China, would not this objective be better served by avoiding all fuzziness and making our position vis-à-vis the offshore islands perfectly clear? Such a clarification would also better serve the President with respect to his relations with the Congress. Such a clarification of our attitude might prove worthwhile even if it were to cause Chiang Kai-shek to remove some of his troops from the offshore islands where they were now based. After all, we should not permit Chiang to station his forces where we know we do not propose to assist him if his troops in these exposed spots are attacked. In fact, said Governor Stassen, we should examine the possibility of extending this clarification policy to include a range of other matters over and above the offshore islands, such as the embargo on trade between the West and Communist China, et cetera. Dr. Flemming asked Governor Stassen if he would exclude the offshore islands from the U.S. defense perimeter. Governor Stassen replied in the affirmative, provided the UN so desired and determined.

In reply to Governor Stassen’s proposal for extending the clarification process, Secretary Dulles pointed out the extreme delicacy of the negotiations which would be undertaken on behalf of the defensive treaty and the UN resolution. If, in addition to trying to settle these two difficult matters, we added a number of other issues to be settled with the Chinese Nationalists all at once, the effect on the morale of the Nationalist Government might well prove shattering. Secretary Dulles said he much preferred to deal with these issues, therefore, one at a time.

Secretary Wilson said that it didn’t seem to him to make much difference, because where else could Chiang go other than Formosa? The President quickly pointed out that the Generalissimo could quit us cold and renounce Formosa itself if pushed too far.

Secretary Dulles then summarized his position by stating that his main objection to “getting sucked into the offshore islands” was the isolated position into which this would put the United States. Our enemies would have the backing of world opinion, and there would even be a serious division in domestic U.S. opinion. On the other hand, the situation could of course change, and if it should come to pass that the rest of the free world came to regard the defense of these offshore islands as right and proper, then the United States might decide to take a different position regarding them. We needed flexibility in our policies in order to be ready to meet such eventualities. Meanwhile, continued Secretary Dulles, going back to an earlier point, he hoped that in our discussion with the Chinese Nationalists on the defense treaty, we could include something which would prevent the Chinese Nationalists from sending more troops and more matériel to these offshore islands. He asked Admiral Radford if the United States were in a position to prevent Chiang from increasing the garrisons on these islands.

Admiral Radford explained once again, as he had at an earlier Council meeting, our military assistance to the garrisons on the offshore islands and how, lately at any rate, the Chinese Nationalists had not indicated a desire to reinforce their offshore island garrisons except in the case of the Tachens. Secretary Wilson asked whether this strengthening of the Tachens had not been done at the request of the United States. Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative.

Dr. Flemming quoted paragraph 1–a of the U.S. courses of action vis-à-vis Communist China contained in NSC 5429/2, which read in part: “Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of but without deliberately provoking war, etc.”. Dr. Flemming said that this still seemed to him the best position for the United States to take toward Communist China, and he assumed that it was still valid policy. Mr. Cutler reminded Dr. Flemming that when the Council adopted NSC 5429/2 the section on Communist China from which Dr. Flemming had quoted had not been given final approval. The Secretary of State had not expressed his agreement to this section of the paper, and still had the question of our policy toward Communist China under review. Dr. Flemming said that he understood this, but was sure that at the Denver meeting there had been a general consensus in favor of the policy outlined in this paragraph.

Mr. Cutler said he thought this too strong a way to state the case, and that our actual policy was more accurately expressed in NSC 166/1, paragraph 4, which read in part: “In the absence of further Chinese Communist aggression or a basic change in the situation, the policy of the United States toward Communist China should currently be to seek, by means short of war, to reduce the relative power position of Communist China in Asia, etc.”. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with Mr. Cutler’s contention.

Secretary Wilson said that as far as this business of the UN resolution was concerned, he could not conceive of the United Nations bothering itself with the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Indeed, it would be very difficult to expect the UN to do other than offer the U.S. a face-saver to cover the return of these islands to the Chinese Communists.

The President agreed that it was pretty hard to see any other way out, what with these islands being so small and so very close to the Chinese mainland. Enlarging on his argument, the President said that what we were at present doing was watching a situation develop day by day in Communist China. The latest development was the huge Chinese population revealed by the publication yesterday of the census figures for China.⁶ The world would be hard put to it to defend these islands against so huge a country. At the present moment we might be able to use the situation in these islands to better our power position in the Far East; but over the long haul our great problem in defending these islands would be presented by our own American Constitution. Accordingly, about all we could do in this matter of the islands was to keep talking about the situation in the National Security Council as we were doing today, and trust to our negotiator (Secretary Dulles) to do the best he could. Certainly the Council could not lay down a hard and fast course for him to follow. The President said that of course he was willing to go to any lengths to defend the vital interests of the United States. But as soon as you attempted to define what these vital interests were, you got into an argument. By and large, it was better to accept some loss of face in the world than to go to general war in the defense of these small islands.

Secretary Dulles then warned that the odds were in fact less than even that the United States would be able to carry to a successful conclusion the two policies that he had outlined, viz., the UN resolution and the mutual defense treaty with Formosa, in view of the growing British attitude of doubt, and in view of the likelihood that the Chinese Nationalists would oppose these two policies. This left no other recourse than for the United States to “probe and probe” in order to discover the best way out. Somehow or other we must make clear to the United States and to the whole world that we are not going to permit Formosa and the Pescadores to fall into hostile hands even if we must risk war to prevent this. Furthermore, we must tidy up our constitutional position at home so that the President can go promptly to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores if they are attacked. The situation there simply did not lend itself at the moment to a comprehensive and clearcut solution. The only recourse, therefore, was to probe and explore this situation.

The President commented that if he saw a massive Chinese Communist attack developing, he would act at once and thereafter put his actions up to Congress for its judgment, even if this were to risk his impeachment.

Secretary Wilson said that if the UN resolution for the islands became too difficult, we should seek other alternatives. The Director of the Budget⁷ expressed the strong conviction that U.S. public opinion would never in the world support a decision by the United Nations that the offshore islands should be defended against Communist attack by use of U.S. armed forces. The President commented that to judge from the flow of letters and communications to the White House, all the pressure was on the side of peace, peace, peace.

Secretary Dulles thought it worth while to point out that the present Administration is trying to do something that had never been tried by any prior Administration. We are trying to get the American public to realize that you do not always actually secure peace by simply being a pacifist and talking peace. In the past, after the conclusion of wars in which we were involved, we have destroyed the military establishment we built up in the course of the war and then turned round and called for peace and disarmament. Secretary Dulles cited examples from past history. Now we were trying to educate people to face the fact that we need a strong military establishment if we hope to maintain the peace. It was a difficult and novel thing to most people to realize that the will and ability to fight for vital things is really indispensable to the maintenance of peace.

Secretary Wilson commented that the other side of the medal was that we ought not to rattle the saber. The President asked the Council if they realized that no further back than June 1933—not so terribly long ago—the United States of America had an army of 118,750 men, including the Air Force. We now had armed forces of about 3,500,000.

Mr. Cutler said that he failed to detect from the Council’s discussion any disposition to depart from the course of action with respect to the UN resolution and the mutual defense treaty agreed to at the previous meeting of the NSC. Accordingly, he presumed that these policies were reaffirmed. Nevertheless, he went on to point out that he was disturbed by the several conflicts in our existing policy papers on the Far East, and asked Secretary Dulles if it would not be desirable for the Planning Board to undertake a new paper which would sketch the broad principles and policy of the United States vis-à-vis the Far East. Secretary Dulles replied that he thought this would be a very desirable job for the Planning Board, although it would be a very tough one, and the Planning Board would have his sympathy. It was hard to find any element of fixity in such a fluid situation as confronted us in the Far East. Nevertheless, it was one of the great advantages of a democratic government that our policies could have flexibility, whereas the totalitarian government of the Soviet Union required fixity of position.

Noting that the Japanese Prime Minister would be coming to Washington next week,⁸ Secretary Dulles said that the new Planning Board paper should take account of Japan, that great prize in the Far East, and that the paper should also take account of the impact on Europe of policies of the United States in the Far East. Governor Stassen recommended that the new paper also include the problem of U.S. trade policies toward Communist China. Secretary Dulles said we need not worry about that, for trade policies with Communist China would certainly be raised by Prime Minister Yoshida when he reached Washington. The Japanese were currently expecting more from a revival of trade with Communist China than they would actually ever get.

The President spoke with some warmth on the necessity of our doing something to improve Japan’s trading position in the Far East. We cannot, he insisted, expect the Japanese to go on the way they are now going.

[Here follows a brief discussion pertaining to Indochina.]

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence with respect to new railroad construction in Communist China.

b. Continued discussion of further aspects of the subject, including views of the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, as orally expressed at the meeting, on the report by the Secretary of State on U.S. policies and relations to China (Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists) distributed at the 220th meeting of the Council.

c. Reaffirmed NSC Action No. 1258-c, after consideration of the above-mentioned views of the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence.

d. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare, for early Council consideration, a broad restatement of U.S. policy toward the Far East, including controls on trade with Communist China, in the light of the above discussion, recent decisions, and the existing situation.

e. Noted that the President is appointing General J. Lawton Collins as the Special Representative of the United States in charge of all U.S. activities in Free Vietnam.

Note: The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Nov. 2.
2. Regarding Lay’s memoranda of Sept. 28 and Oct. 5, see footnote 5, Document 303, and footnote 1, Document 321, respectively. For NSC Action No. 1224, see footnote 9, Document 293. For NSC Action Nos. 1233, 1234, and 1235, see footnotes 7, 10, and 12, Document 322. For NSC Action No. 1258, see footnote 10, Document 364. For NSC Action No. 1228, see footnote 4, Document 302.
3. Infra . Not attached to the source text.
4. Not attached to the source text; a copy, headed “Briefing Notes,” and dated Nov. 1, is filed with Document 365. The brief summarized a number of questions which members of the Planning Board had raised with regard to Dulles’ proposals. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “China”)
5. See footnote 2, Document 373.
6. The Nov. 2 New York Times reported that the National Bureau of Statistics in Peking had announced the previous day that the population of the Chinese mainland was 582,603,417.
7. Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
8. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida visited Washington Nov. 8–13.
9. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1259. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)