793.00/10–954
No. 334
Memorandum Prepared in the
Department of State1
We have learned of a proposal to be brought before the United Nations by New Zealand relative to the offshore islands now in the possession of your Government’s forces. We have studied this proposal and have concluded that it is the right course to pursue.
We greatly desire that these positions should be retained under the control of your Government. On the other hand, we see no way to assure this under present circumstances. Our intelligence is that an all-out assault is likely to occur against one or more of the islands. Our military advisers hold the view that if this does occur no amount of skill and bravery on the part of Nationalist forces on [Page 722] these islands would suffice against the massive assault which could, and probably would, be mounted. We realize that this loss would be a serious blow to the prestige of Nationalist China.
We have thoroughly considered the possibility of United States military intervention to assist your forces to hold these islands. We have been careful to keep the Communists in uncertainty as to our probable course of action. However, we must say to you in the utmost confidence that it is highly doubtful that the President could now, without Congressional authorization, thus enlarge the mission of the Seventh Fleet, authorized in 1950 in connection with the Korean War, and engage in what might become in fact a major war with Communist China. The President also feels that the fate of these offshore islands, while very important, would not justify him in calling on the American nation to engage in what might become a war of indeterminate scope, intensity and duration. It is uncertain that if the Congress were asked for such authority it would be readily granted.
Under these circumstances, we have considered whether United Nations procedures as proposed might perhaps be invoked in a way which would either deter Communist military attacks against these islands, or put the Communists in a position to be condemned further by world opinion.
The current and threatened attacks are avowedly part of a program directed against Formosa and the Pescadores, which the United States is committed to help defend. Thus the situation involves a threat to international peace and security. It is one which, by the U.N. Charter, both of our govs as members are obligated to seek to settle by peaceful means. We think it probable that the Security Council, if asked, would be disposed to recommend a suspension of assaults against these off-shore islands without prejudice. This would [probably]2 also involve suspending counter-attacks in defense of these islands.
Such an attitude on the part of the Security Council would then confront the Soviet Union with the necessity either of approving or vetoing such action. If the Soviet Union exercised its veto on behalf of the Chinese Communists, this would be a further evidence to the world of their aggressive attitude and their contempt for the purposes and principles of peace, law and order enunciated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. It would create a further reason why the Chinese Communist regime and its claim to a position in the United Nations would be further discredited. It is possible that on the foundation thus created the existing embargo provisions against Communist China would get new vitality and support.
[Page 723]If, which seems unlikely, the Soviet Union approved the proposal and the Chinese Communists complied, then at least the island positions would be provisionally secured and the grave consequences of their loss, above referred to, would be avoided.
We have had confidential discussions of this situation with the New Zealand Government, which is much concerned [and sympathetic]3 and which now plans to take an initiative in this matter. It is one of the governments now represented on the Security Council, and we have with it, as you know, the treaty relationship represented by ANZUS.
We realize that unfriendly powers represented on the Security Council will doubtless try to turn the situation to the disadvantage of your Government and attempt to couple with this matter new and unacceptable proposals. However, after a thorough canvass of the situation, we feel confident that the matter can be kept confined to the matter of hostilities on, or immediately related to, the offshore islands and that larger political questions can be, and will be, kept divorced from the contemplated proceedings.
At the time of any United Nations proceedings, the United States would want to reaffirm, perhaps more formally, its firm intention to associate itself with the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.
It is not clear to us that it would be necessary or advisable for your Government actually to support the move planned by New Zealand. It might be that an attitude of reserve would be advisable until the Communists show their hand.
We did not, however, want this action to get under way which closely involves your interests without your knowing that the action is contemplated. In our opinion it can serve to advance and protect your interests and to avoid an alternative which would almost surely be very unhappy from the standpoint of what we both want.
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The source text, headed “Talking Paper” and initialed by Dulles, bears no indication of the drafter. A covering memorandum of Oct. 9 from Dulles to Robertson states that the first two sentences were suggested by the President and that paragraph 9, relating to confining the UN proceedings, and the phrase “perhaps more formally” in the following paragraph had been added at Dulles’ suggestion.
A draft dated Oct. 6, with a covering memorandum of Oct. 7 from Cutler to Dulles, is similar to this paper except that it lacks the first two sentences and the Dulles additions. Cutler’s memorandum states that the President had approved the paper to be used as a “talking paper” but had suggested the addition of two sentences (in substance, the first two sentences in the source text) in introducing the subject. (FE files, lot 64 D 230, “Offshore Islands”)
The text printed here includes a number of handwritten revisions which are on the source text, most of them probably made by Robertson.
↩ - The brackets were inserted by hand on the source text.↩
- The brackets were inserted by hand on the source text.↩