Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–954

No. 332
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)

top secret

[Washington,] October 9, 1954.

Subject:

• China Item; Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
• Mr. Niles W. Bond, UNP
• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
• Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
• Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. Foss Shanahan, New Zealand Delegation to the UN General Assembly
• Mr. M.J.C. Templeton, New Zealand Delegation to Un General Assembly

The persons listed above met in the Secretary’s office at noon today to continue discussion of the subject item.

Ambassador Munro began by saying that he wished to introduce a revision of the proposed draft resolution (Tab A).¹ The Secretary said that we would wish to examine this new draft, but that his initial impression was that it seemed to be generally helpful. In reply to the Secretary’s question as to the British reaction to this draft, Sir Robert Scott said that while he believed the redraft would undoubtedly be helpful, the Embassy was under instructions from Mr. Eden to suspend all further activities on the item until Mr. Eden’s return to London tomorrow.

Ambassador Munro then stated that the draft Minute which had been under consideration raised certain problems for his Government, particularly with respect to the question of just what the purpose of this whole exercise was to be. He remarked that the draft Minute as it now stood, and particularly the final paragraph thereof, reflected a defensive and essentially negative attitude which he felt it would be difficult to maintain. He went on to say that it was his understanding that the Secretary, in his September 30 meeting in London with Mr. Eden and the New Zealand Acting High Commissioner, had expressed the hope that a satisfactory settlement of the Quemoy situaton might be the prelude to a more general pacification; he added that his Government did not believe that this hope was adequately reflected in the draft Minute. He thereupon tabled for consideration a New Zealand revision of the draft Minute.² The Ambassador said that despite any restrictive understanding which we might reach in the Minute, our proposal would undoubtedly become the subject of public debate, and that he believed that in order to meet that debate we would be obliged to arrive at a consensus less restrictive than that set forth in the earlier drafts of the Minute.

The Secretary said that the thought which he had tried to express to Mr. Eden and Mr. Campbell on the occasion referred to would be more accurately reflected by the following language: that a settlement of the limited problem with which the resolution dealt “would, as a practical matter increase the possibility of peaceful rather than violent adjustment of the other problems of the area, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N.” He said that, in other words, the successful consummation of our present initiative would make peaceful settlement more likely and violent change less likely. The Secretary went on to say that he had never intended to suggest that if this particular situation were settled we would move right on from there to a general settlement of the Formosa problem. He said he was convinced that the limited solution which we envisaged would set up a trend toward resort to peaceful rather than violent means of settlement, but that the U.S. could not by this single step commit itself to take further steps in the direction of a broader settlement or even take any action which would be interpreted as constituting such a commitment.

Ambassador Munro said that he was concerned over what reply to make to the question as to exactly what the proposed limited step envisaged. He said that his Government believed that it must be in a position to answer the Chinese Communists and Soviets, as well as New Zealand public opinion, on this point.

Continuing his previous remarks, the Secretary said that as a practical matter, if we can succeed in our present limited objective, he would be satisfied that we had eliminated a serious threat of major and perhaps world war and substantially increased the chances of peaceful as opposed to violent change. He stated, however, that the United States would be unable to take this first step if it were to be represented as being a first step in a longer-range program, leading perhaps to recognition of Communist China and its admission to the UN. He said that he realized that “our medicine may be another’s poison”, and that for that reason it might be that the whole effort was impractical. He expressed the earnest hope, however, that it would be possible to go through with it since the present situation was so fraught with perilous possibilities. He pointed out that should a serious battle for Quemoy develop, the U.S. would inevitably be involved, at least to the extent of providing logistical support. He said that if such fighting were to become intensified and other Americans were to be killed, he could not predict what the effect of such developments would be on U.S. public opinion. (In this connection he referred to the presence of members of our Military Assistance Advisory group in those islands, and to the fact that two of our officers had already been killed.) The Secretary said that the limited settlement which we were proposing would therefore be a tremendous contribution to peace, and would render less likely the outbreak of fighting in other areas. He believed that this would begin a real trend toward the elimination of the threat of a general war in that area. He then reiterated that this would be a difficult matter to carry through and that we could do it only if we were able to avoid a commitment to a long-range settlement.

Reverting to Ambassador Munro’s earlier question as to what reply should be given to the question of the implications of our proposed action, he said that in his view it should be along the line that we are taking one step at a time, and that if we can lay this particular threat, peace will be brought that much closer. Peace like war, he said, is contagious, and it is up to us to determine which contagion we encourage. He added that we are trying to set up a trend toward peace and away from war, taking advantage of the historic yearning of all peoples toward peace.

Ambassador Munro said that he much appreciated the Secretary’s paraphrase of the thought which he had intended to convey to Mr. Eden and Mr. Campbell, and that he believed its inclusion in the draft Minute might be regarded by his Government as very helpful. Sir Robert expressed the view that it would be helpful with his Government as well.

Mr. Key raised the question of whether the New Zealand revision of the resolution (Tab A) sufficiently preserved the restrictive idea which had been expressed in the “close proximity” language of our previous draft. Ambassador Munro and Sir Robert both expressed the view that it did, and Ambassador Munro suggested that if our language were used, an attempt might very well be made in the debate to delete the phrase “in close proximity”.

There ensued a detailed discussion of the language of the New Zealand revision of the draft Minute, as a result of which an amended text embodying the above-quoted language of the Secretary, was agreed upon as a basis for consideration (Tab B).³

Ambassador Munro stated that his Government, in speaking in favor of an invitation to the Chinese Communists as it proposed to do, would very much like to have U.S. support. The Secretary recalled that during consideration of the Korean case in 1950 the United States had voted in favor of inviting the Chinese Communists to be present at the debate, and said he assumed we would take the same position in this case.

Ambassador Munro then raised the question of what if anything he could tell the Australians concerning the proposed item. He pointed out that there was an ANZUS meeting on Monday and that Mr. Casey might well raise the question of Quemoy. Sir Robert said that the U.K. would only reluctantly agree to saying anything to the Australians on this subject and only so long as it were to be made clear that final agreement had not been reached among our respective Governments. The Secretary said that he could understand the point of Ambassador Munro’s inquiry but questioned whether this subject need come up in connection with the ANZUS meeting and whether in any event we were far enough along in our own deliberations to permit anything to be said.

1. The operational portion of the New Zealand revision of the draft resolution called upon the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China to terminate hostilities in the area of the offshore islands, particularly in the Quemoy area; recommended “resort to peaceful methods in order to prevent the recurrence of such hostilities”; and declared that the Security Council remained seized of the question.
2. Not attached to the source text.

3. The revised draft minute stated that the three governments agreed to the following:

   “It is the clear understanding of the three Governments that the scope of discussions arising as a result of the submission of the New Zealand item to the Security Council should be strictly limited to the immediate subject with which that item deals, namely, the recent and current armed hostilities between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China, and, in particular, in the area of Quemoy (Chinmen), and efforts to terminate those hostilities and prevent their recurrence or extension to other such islands; and that the three Governments will, unless otherwise agreed, vote against any amendment of substance to the draft resolution and make every effort in the handling of this item in the United Nations to confine discussion to this subject and to avoid and prevent its enlargement to the discussion of broader issues, in particular the question of representation in the United Nations, the respective claims of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China to domestic sovereignty and international status, and the status of Formosa and the Pescadores. At the same time the three Governments will be at liberty to make it clear that if the step proposed, namely termination of hostilities in the Quemoy area, can be carried out satisfactorily, that would, as a practical matter, increase the possibility of peaceful rather than violent adjustment of the other problems of the area, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”