Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–1554: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, June 15, 1954—7 p.m.
[Received 9:55 p.m.]

2786. Sent Paris 989, Geneva 235. I saw Ely this afternoon. De Jean after consideration felt he would drop out of interview but I talked with him before I met the General and had long conversation afterward. Ely made following points:

1. Military situation in delta is precarious. French Union and Vietnamese troops are “very, very tired”. Furthermore enemy holds approximately two-thirds of all villages in delta and, although French air power can use “bulldozer tactics” in annihilating populated areas, this really affords no strategic solution. I asked Ely if he did not think his defense perimeter was too close in, but he said he had not sufficient force to extend it farther and desired to take advantage of shorter lines and concentration of force. Ely clearly indicated his personal doubt that delta could be held unless outside reinforcements of between two and three divisions were forthcoming.

2. I asked Ely if he was forced to evacuate the Haiphong perimeter where his troops would go. Would they be brought back to France or Africa, or would they, as I hoped, continue to fight in Indochina? Ely said so long as he was Commander in Chief they would continue to fight. He dwelt with great earnestness on need to build dam against Communism in Southeast Asia. He had not decided militarily what line might best be defended, but he intended, as long as he was responsible, to prevent any further encroachment of Communism in Indochina and specifically Vietnam, even if he lost Tonkin.

3. Ely said if he were to accomplish his mission he would have clearly to know where US stood. I replied in light of recent parliamentary developments in Paris he must be himself keenly aware of disabilities under which democracies operated. I said I could not imagine a President of the United States who would in his own senses appeal to Congress for permission to send troops to Indochina if it were to support a government in France which had been voted into office by 99 Communist votes. I then went over painstakingly the conditions precedent before our President could even undertake to present request to Congress for military intervention: (a) signature of treaties of independence; (b) satisfactory assurances of united action by other interested powers including UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Philippines plus France; and, finally approval of Congress. I said what might help most of all to speed up course of these events would be establishment of worthy government in France determined to back up Ely’s policy in Indochina.

4. Ely said he had sent a message to General Valluy declining Admiral Radford’s suggestion that three Korean divisions be sent here forthwith. He said this would merely be falling into trap set by Singhman Rhee for enlarging war against China, and that he was not prepared to consider suggestion as a militarily serious one so far as Indochina was concerned.

5. Ely concurred in my estimate of present low estate Vietnamese Government, expressed feeling that Ngo Dinh Diem would probably prove ineffectual in rallying elements here. I told him De Jean’s suggestion for a government of national union comprised of Buu Loc, Tam and Huu was good one and said on my own hook I had more than a month before recommended abdication of Bao Dai and establishment of a council of regency made up of these same men with Tri and [or?] Quat as Prime Minister. I said, however, I thought both French and we had been much too nice to our Vietnamese clients and if they were to be made independent they should be made to act like independent people. The time had come to sever the umbilical cord and to make the baby grow up. I thought we should have to put frank and friendly pressure on Vietnamese to pull themselves together if there was going to be a government on this side comparable to that on the other side.

6. General Ely asked if I thought he should call on Bao Dai when he returns to France. I said many people had called on His Majesty with equivocal results. Personally I was becoming fearful that in view of Bao Dai’s increasing unpopularity in France, he might come back here and be a greater headache locally than he was on the Riviera. I said what was more important for General Ely was to get in immediate contact with General Smith and Ambassador Dillon who were two Americans in Europe most au courant with rapidly shifting political situation, in Geneva, Paris and Washington, so far as it bore on Indochina.

7. Ely confirmed that he leaves for Paris June 17, said despite absence of responsible Ministers he thought he could make his views known in influential circles, and that he would insist on his basic theme which was that France itself could be lost if Indochina were lost.

McClintock