Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–1554

Memorandum for the Record¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 15, 1954.

Secretary’s Meeting, Tuesday, June 15, 1954, 11:45–1:30.

Participants:

• Messrs. Murphy, MacArthur, Merchant, Bowie, Key, Popper, Mcllvaine,² Galloway, Tyler, Gullion, Sturm, Draper.

I. Mr. MacArthur mentioned that the Under Secretary planned to delay his departure, that he was planning a visit to Bern this Friday and that Bidault will not be available in Geneva until Saturday. The Secretary drafted Tedul 201 as a reply.³

II. UN Appeal by Laos and Cambodia⁴—Mr. Key said that before we could do much moving on the UK idea of an UN appeal by Laos and Cambodia, we would have to see specifically what the UK has in mind. The Secretary said that he would discuss this with Churchill and Eden but wondered what difficulty existed in moving under Article VII of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”. The Secretary thought this article envisaged something less than military measures i.e., economic, social sanctions. Mr. Popper pointed out that it could be used to meet military threats with military measures and that therefore it was important to see what the UK actually had in mind for such a contingency. The Secretary concluded that until we see clearly what will happen in Vietnam in the way of a settlement at Geneva, there is no use in embarking on some Laos–Cambodia adventure. The Secretary asked parenthetically what issues, in this connection, had been more clearly defined since the onset of the Geneva Conference. The list was enumerated: 1) a coalition government is unacceptable to both sides; 2) the UK has admitted failure of their partition plan; 3) disarming of the irregular troops is still in abeyance; 4) the discussions have broken down into a question of establishing groupements for the respective sides which might then be swapped back and forth in the negotiating process; 5) etc. The Secretary asked if we had in any way prevented the French from obtaining an agreement acceptable at least to them, if not to the US and UK. The answer was “no” although it was admitted that our position could be construed as rather rigid.

III. Dillon’s latest cable (4841)⁵ quite naturally flowed into the discussion at this point. The Secretary said that the French confusion over the issue of US intervention was being reflected in the somewhat fuzzy reporting of General Smith and Dillon on the subject. For example, he could not understand all the inferences in General Smith’s Dulte 179.⁶ Mr. Murphy said that Dillon “listened and reported” but did little in the way of affirmative action. He thought that a delicately handled USIA project or some public relations activities on the part of Embassy Paris might be useful. The Secretary said that he might drop a useful hint in his off-the-record dinner meeting with some news correspondents tonight.

The Secretary explained that he wished to meet this problem by having the President send a letter to President Coty of France which would reaffirm our confidence in France while gently lifting the erratic French locomotive back on the rails, phrased somewhat as follows: “We have confidence in France, we are standing by her side, but it should be clear that the decision to intervene will be made under the circumstances of the moment”. Mr. Merchant has action.

Mr. Bowie at this time presented his idea that it was time to look at the problem of Indochina from another direction in order to prevent a complete collapse of free world morale, even in the US, if we permitted Vietnam to fall through the present train of events. He said that the dilemma for the US was created by our withdrawing from Geneva because the Communist proposals are unacceptable and yet at the same time will not do anything to bolster militarily the French position.

He said this meant in effect that the Viet Minh would wipe out the French in Hanoi and surge on down the peninsula and thus obtain even more than they had asked for at Geneva. He could not envisage the totality of this Communist victory upon free world and neutralist opinion, except that it would be tremendous and thus probably disastrous. He considered this not only in terms of Nehru and other Asiatics swinging to the Communist side, but also in its demoralizing effect on NATO and probably even on US public opinion, when the facts finally soak in. His simile was that this may be the straw which breaks the camel’s back of resistance throughout the free world to Communist aggression.

He suggested presenting the French with an affirmative proposal to defend South Vietnam and define in specifics what we have in mind. We could make the French an offer of four divisions, drawn from various sources including the US, to hold the so-called “Line B” or “Line of stabilization” which the French explained in the five-power military talks could be held with forces of such magnitude, leaving the present French security forces in the South to manage Viet Minh terrorist activities. Assuming this five-power talk presentation to be reliable, Mr. Bowie said that we could make this offer with several trump cards in our hand.

We would make clear this would be a “holding operation” and would not turn into a war of liberation for the North. This would help with Asian public opinion, as well as elsewhere. The French would find the offer difficult to turn down because it would serve to protect the security of the French Expeditionary Corps even in Hanoi. The fact that the British had proposed a partition along practically the identical line would provide a lever to force the volunteering of commonwealth troops to help hold this line. In back of this line, we could perhaps build up a truly nationalist Vietnamese Government and a suitable national army. (“At least, it’s worth trying”.) The effect of this sort of US intervention might provide the stimulus to overcome the Vietnamese lethargic and jaundiced view toward solo French activities to protect their colonial power status.

While admitting that this might bring on overt Chinese intervention he thought it worth the chance. If the Chinese intervene, he said he was in complete agreement with the JCS views, that is, to pull out of Indochina and clobber the Chinese at the heart of their power, wherever that might be, and in spite of the consequences.

Mr. Merchant also agreed with this last point and said he thought that by obtaining two divisions of the four from our forces in Korea, we would tend to decrease the possibility of Rhee precipitating a conflict unilaterally. The Secretary interjected that it would also increase the chances of Rhee opening a war because the time involved in a logistic operation of this magnitude might make Rhee act ugly and decide to do something while we were still in strength in Korea. Mr. Merchant disagreed, thinking the chances were still greater that Rhee would not take unilateral action.

Mr. Bowie concluded that in view of the stakes we should, if necessary, consider full mobilization to obtain these four divisions. He said he saw no reason on earth why the free world couldn’t scrape up four divisions some place.

The Secretary said this proposal in effect meant that we were telling the French that Indochina could only be saved if French troops were not doing the fighting. Mr. Bowie and Mr. Merchant agreed that this indeed was the case.

1. The identity of the drafting officer is not indicated on the source text.
2. Robinson Mcllvaine, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
3. Telegram Tedul 201 to Geneva, June 15, concerned the departure of Under Secretary Smith from Geneva. (396.1 GE/6–1554) See footnote 2 to telegram Dulte 181, vol. xvi, p. 1148.
4. For documentation on this subject, see ibid., p. 1083 ff.
5. Dated June 14, p. 1687.
6. For text of telegram Dulte 179 from Geneva, June 14, reporting on a Smith–Eden–Chauvel meeting, see vol. xvi, p. 1132.