751G.11/6–1454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2765. Repeated information Paris 984, Geneva 231. Last night I was considerably startled when General Alessandri, who for some years has been military advisor to Bao Dai, told me with great vehemence that he should not return to Vietnam. He said, “Bao Dai has missed every opportunity. It would do more harm than good for him to come back at this late hour.” General de Langlade who was present during this conversation expressed opinion that for Bao Dai to return to Vietnam now and claim western support would merely be repetition of story in China when US backed corrupt members of Kuomintang against triumphant and, by comparison, relatively honest Communists.
The two generals and I later spoke to Colonel Le Roy of Vietnamese National Army who is famed throughout Cochin-China for brilliant work for pacification which he accomplished and which has now practically been undone since he was relieved of responsibilities in southern command. Le Roy, who is devout Catholic, said he could still raise fifty thousand men from Catholic peasants in south Vietnam. However, he said with great passion “we want neither the Communists nor the return of the Mandarins. We do not want Bao Dai“.
I saw my British colleague this morning who volunteered comment that it has for some time been too late for Bao Dai to return and “it would do more harm than good if he should come back”.
[Page 1691]All of these opinions were volunteered and not solicited by me. I feel there is no great risk of Bao Dai’s surviving the rigors of heroism irrespective of what representations might be made to him by General Smith at Evian or Ambassador Heath in Laos [Cannes]. However, I am glad to see from recent telegrams both from Department and Geneva that caution will be exercised in not implying any promises to His Majesty. Despite previous telegrams reporting belief of Vietnamese leaders that Bao Dai should come back, I now feel that hour has passed when his return would make any difference to fate of Vietnam except possibly further to complicate our task. We might be stuck with a champion we would not wish to champion.