Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–1354: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Saigon, June 13, 1954—2 p.m.

2756. Repeated information priority Paris 978, priority Geneva 224. Last night Buu Loc told me that he had been instructed by Bao Dai to present his resignation as Prime Minister. He will be replaced by Ngo Dinh Diem. Buu Loc said that his resignation would be presented next week and Diem would probably fly out here at same time. Buu Loc hoped he would receive another diplomatic assignment and seemed to be thinking in terms of regaining his old job in Paris or possibly of replacing Tran Van Kha in Washington.

This morning Dejean asked me to call at the Palace. He is profoundly disturbed at change in Vietnamese Government at this particular time coincidental with collapse of Government in France.¹ Dejean feels that Diem is too narrow, too rigid, too unworldly, and too pure to have any chance of creating an effective government in Vietnam.

Dejean is telegraphing Bidault that upon his arrival in France next week he desires Bidault’s agreement that he, Dejean, call on Bao Dai and urge necessity of creating a government here of national unity. Oddly enough Dejean’s slate corresponds almost exactly with my proposal for a Council of Regency. He would have a triumvirate of Buu Loc, Tam and Tran Van Huu. Dejean would advocate that Tam with his terrier-like energy and competence as a policeman be given combined portfolio of Defense and Interior. Huu would have Finance and National Economy, while Buu Loc would have Foreign Affairs, with possibly Dinh as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who would be able to carry on either here or in Geneva as occasion might require. Tri would remain as Governor of North where his presence was vitally needed.

I told Dejean that I concurred in his recommendations and that I would for my part urge that if Under Secretary Smith sees Bao Dai similar representations be made from our side. Likewise I told Dejean that the Under Secretary had made some pointed remarks to Foreign Minister Dinh as to Bao Dai’s absence from his country at this critical time.

Dejean said “If I were Bao Dai I would go to Hanoi and stay there until the bitter end.” He pointed to example of aged King of Laos who had steadfastly refused to vacate Luang Prabang and had instead organized local defense there. Dejean emphatically agrees with my judgment that to give up Hanoi will mean end of war and will be political catastrophe far greater than any Dien Bien Phu. However, he is apprehensive that the generals for narrow military reasons will counsel falling back on their cozy Haiphong perimeter.

I remarked to Dejean that, speaking of generals, it seemed a fairly empty trip for General Ely to fly all the way to Paris to consult with a non-existent government. I added that from the point of view of our joint policy it would seem highly unfortunate that at very moment after French Government had fallen and Vietnamese Government was on point of being placed into hands of a religious mystic there should be no top Frenchman left in Indochina to seek to guide the course of events.

Dejean leaves Tuesday morning,² Ely on Thursday. Sole remaining political officer will be Bordaz who is a cipher so far as influence on the Vietnamese is concerned.

Dejean said that he would suggest to General Ely that in view of turn of events it might be wise for him to remain here. Dejean said he had every confidence in Ely’s selflessness and in his correct strategic appreciation. However, Ely is ignorant of Indochinese affairs and he may be tempted to rely unduly on Salan whose intentions and counsel Dejean deeply distrusts.

Dejean said most privately that Navarre will not be permitted to carry out his intention of making a holiday trip to Japan for fear that he may say too much to the press. Navarre will likewise return to France next week but not in same airplane with Dejean. Latter said this morning, “I have no intention of getting off the same plane with General Navarre. I did not create Dien Bien Phu. He did.”

Dejean asked if I would send a word to Ambassador Dillon indicating that he would very much like to call on him. I said I thought it of the highest importance that Dejean get in touch with Dillon as soon as possible and likewise on his arrival in Geneva that he have a long talk with the Under Secretary.

McClintock

1. On June 12, the government of Joseph Laniel was defeated in the National Assembly on the issue of Indochina by a vote of 306 to 293. The government resigned the following day. In despatch 3373 from Paris, June 30, the Embassy transmitted a detailed analysis of the debates leading to the fall of the Laniel government. (751G.00/6–3054) For the record of the discussions and voting on Indochina of June 12, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, pp. 2972–2983.
2. June 15.