Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–1154

Memorandum by Fisher Howe, Acting Special Assistant for Intelligence, to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] June 11, 1954.

Subject:

• SNIE–63–2–54: The Effects of Certain Possible Developments on the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and Cambodia Through 1954¹

1. If a negotiated settlement placed the Communists in a position which would enable them eventually, but not immediately, to dominate Vietnam, the Laotian and Cambodian Governments could probably maintain control for some time.

2. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries), native forces could probably not for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased outside support.

3. If outside support took the form of a security system involving multinational guarantees for the security of Laos and Cambodia and could be implemented in time, that would probably permit Laos and Cambodia to maintain their security. The requirements of such a security system would be: (a) adequate MDAP-type aid; (b) effective protective forces appropriately located in the area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the event of internal subversion as well as external attack.

4. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, probably nothing but military occupation of those countries would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.

By agreement of the IAC this estimate will be released to the governments of the UK and Australia.

Fisher Howe

1. SNIE 63–2–54, summarized here, was dated June 9. The copy of the report which was transmitted to the Acting Secretary with this memorandum is not filed with it. A copy of SNIE 63–2–54 is in INR–NIE files.