Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, June 10, 1954, 10:30 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, June 10, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of those present (15).]

1. U.S.-French Bilateral Military Talks

Admiral Radford referred to a message dated June 9 from General Ely in Saigon (1) inquiring about U.S. intentions in Indochina and (2) expressing a desire to discuss the question as soon as possible with a qualified representative of Admiral Radford either in Paris on June 19, or in Saigon at another time (copy of message attached).²

Admiral Radford expressed a desire to review the whole question of the exact status of any U.S. commitments regarding Indochina, the exact status of French fulfillment of conditions which are prerequisite to any U.S. commitment, and the value of continued U.S.-French bilateral military talks in Paris.

Mr. Murphy reviewed Ambassador Bonnet’s conversation with Mr. Dulles on June 9th.³ He also read, as an example of our present position on intervention, excerpts from the Secretary’s scheduled speech in Los Angeles on June 11th (copy attached).⁴ Mr. Murphy emphasized that the U.S. position was clear, that we would not make a commitment at this time purely for French political purposes, and that the conditions which we had set down must definitely be fulfilled before these commitments are carried out.

Mr. Murphy added that in Ambassador Bonnet’s conversation with the Secretary, the Ambassador had expressed surprise that we had not already made up our minds on intervening in the war.

Further discussion revealed agreement (1) that by playing fulfillment of French conditions against U.S. commitment, the French were practicing a form of blackmail, holding a sword of Damocles over our heads; (2) that the repercussions in France and in NATO of U.S. action in Indochina were incalculable but obviously serious; (3) that the French pretended to assume that the President of the U.S. had not entirely precluded the use of Marines in Indochina, and had begun talking in terms of half a dozen divisions; (4) that many French actions could be diagnosed as frantic, last minute careening in all directions to place responsibility for developments in Indochina on the U.S.; and (5) that the idea of using Korean troops in Indochina should be considered only on the invitation of the Vietnamese, and not the French.

Admiral Radford inquired what reply should be made to General Ely. The Admiral indicated that he was prepared to send a representative to Paris in accordance with General Ely’s request, but that it was the Admiral’s view that U.S. intervention could not be a piece-meal operation. For example, he added, we could not maintain a training mission of some 3,000 men in Indochina—unless the French made a definite commitment not to conclude an unfavorable armistice which would leave such a mission in an equivocal position.

Referring further to the question of a training mission, reference was made to General Valluy’s conversations on the subject with Admiral Radford, and to General O’Daniel’s despatches from Saigon, which indicated a mistaken concept of the status of this question.

It was obvious to Admiral Radford that the French were under the erroneous impression that American intervention had been agreed upon at a high level, while on the contrary, we had informed the French that only if the French Government fulfilled certain specified conditions, the President of the U.S. would then ask Congress for authority to use armed forces in Indochina.

It was the consensus of the group that collateral talks, such as those going on simultaneously between the French and ourselves in Paris on the one hand, and the Geneva conference talks on the other, were dangerous and would create further confusion.

The Meeting Agreed:

(1) To suspend the talks regarding training until the basic question of conditions versus commitments was clarified; and

(2) To reply to General Ely in the sense that until there is a Government decision on the part of France, there will be no talks with General Ely in Paris or elsewhere on any implementation of intervention.

Admiral Radford undertook to inform General Valluy in this sense, and Mr. Murphy undertook to inform Ambassador Dillon in Paris.

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

4. Assistance to French in Evacuation of Tonkin Delta

Mr. MacArthur said he would like to touch very briefly and informally on the question of U.S. assistance to the French in the evacuation of the Tonkin Delta. He was apprehensive that if the situation deteriorated further the French would “call on us at one minute to midnight” for all-out aid in evacuation. Admiral Radford indicated that the plan was ready, except for decision as to Command arrangements. The Admiral asked the State Department to review the situation as to any U.S. commitment to the French to help them in this exercise.

Mr. MacArthur indicated that the State Department does not consider that the Truman–Pleven talks in 1951 constituted a binding commitment.

In referring to the magnitude of this problem Admiral Radford indicated that it might involve something in the order of 100,000 French civilians, plus roughly 100,000 French military around Haiphong.

1. This Department of State draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. For text of the message, see telegram 4508 to Paris, June 10, infra.
3. The discussion between Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Bonnet on June 9 is summarized in telegram Tedul 178 to Geneva of the same day; for text, see vol. xvi. p. 1100.
4. The attachment does not accompany the source text. On June 11, Secretary Dulles delivered an address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the subject of security in the Pacific. In the course of the address, he listed the following conditions which would have to be met before the President and Congress would be justified in asking the American people to agree to intervention in Indochina: “(1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.” The Secretary also stressed that the United States would consider overt Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia or the Pacific as a deliberate threat to its own security. For the text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 971–973.