Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, June 9, 1954—noon.

4766. Repeated information Geneva 370. Department limit distribution. Geneva eyes only Under Secretary. Reference: Deptel 4421¹ and Dulte 156.² I saw Schumann yesterday afternoon and endeavored to explain to him our need for a French statement as to how they proposed to handle their actions as described in second paragraph of reference Department telegram. Schumann had difficulty understanding just what it was we wanted at this time as he considers that the basis for an agreement in principle has been reached and that it was impossible to go further until the Geneva conference had definitely failed. He pointed out that since the basic US requirement was that any French request for military assistance must be approved by the French Parliament, such a request could not be made while there was any hope for progress at Geneva because of the strong feeling in the Parliament that everything possible should be done to reach an agreement at Geneva.

He then told me that Under Secretary apparently agreed that agreement had been reached in principle and he read me a telegram from Bidault reporting same conversation as that reported in Dulte 156. Bidault reported that Under Secretary had expressed pleasure that agreement in principle had now been reached. Regarding numbered paragraphs of Dulte 156 Bidault’s report had following items of interest:

• Paragraph 1. Bidault reported that Under Secretary agreed with him that this problem was over-complicated and should be simplified.
• Paragraph 2. Bidault stated that he felt that the Thai resolution took care of this problem and he stated that the Under Secretary agreed with him that this problem had now been solved.
• Paragraph 3. No difference.
• Paragraph 4. No difference. Schumann however pointed out the great importance of this change of wording as “the end of hostilities” could well be interpreted to mean a state of armistice, whereas what was really meant was that troops should only be withdrawn after peace had been established. The whole Viet Minh effort has been to reach some sort of armistice that would force the withdrawal of the French troops and leave the country to them.
• Paragraph 5. No difference. However, Schumann stated that he had told Bidault prior to his interview with Under Secretary that he felt that new language suggested by French was too broad and that US would require more specific pledge. Bidault reported that Schumann had guessed wrong as Under Secretary had seen no difficulties in proposed language pointing out that conditions named in new draft were inherent in sovereignty of any great power. Bidault also reported Under Secretary had said he would refer this language to Department for final decision.
• Paragraph 6. No difference.

Schumann then stated that in view of meeting of minds between Bidault and Under Secretary he was sure that with the possible exception of new wording suggested in paragraph 5, of Dulte 156, there were no political differences between us. He then said that he had just received a very disturbing cable from Bonnet. Before he could read it to me a call came through on the telephone from Bonnet in which they talked further about the same subject.

Subject is Valluy’s negotiations regarding use of US Marines. Valluy has reported to Pleven and Bonnet that it is very doubtful if US would agree in any circumstances to sending a Marine division to Indochina. I pointed out to Schumann that US response on this subject had never been blanket pledge to use Marines but had only stated that their use would not be excluded provided an agreed upon war plan required their presence. I further said that it would depend upon the war plan which Valluy submitted as to whether or not our JCS would be convinced that Marines should be committed. Schumann said he fully understood this and would explain it further to Pleven, but he emphasized crucial importance this matter.

Comment: As I pointed out in Embtel 4503³ French military have assumed that any war plan which was satisfactory to our JCS would show necessity for the use of at least one Marine division. While from our point of view this problem quite properly should be judged on its military merits, we must realize that it also has strong political aspects here and that French Parliament in my opinion will not in any circumstances vote to ask for US assistance in Indochina unless government can at least make strong inference that Marines will be sent to Indochina.

Thus, most crucial part of present Franco–US negotiations from both military and political point of view would seem to be conversations Valluy is carrying on at Pentagon.

If our JCS takes position that US has not the military power to be able to afford the commitment of even one Marine division to Tonkin delta, French will draw the obvious conclusion that arguments which force JCS to such a conclusion apply with approximately five-fold effect to France. This will push them irresistibly toward abandonment of Indochina. Thus if we want French military assistance in showdown with Communists in Southeast Asia it is in my opinion vital that JCS find it possible to approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines.

Dillon

1. Regarding telegram 4421 to Paris, June 4, see footnote 3, p. 1659.
2. For text of telegram Dulte 156 from Geneva, June 6, summarizing a discussion between Under Secretary Smith and Foreign Minister Bidault concerning U.S. conditions for the internationalization of the conflict in Indochina, see vol. xvi, p. 1039.
3. Dated May 24, p. 1603.