751G.5/6–854
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)1
Dear Mr. Anderson: I have had several conversations with Admiral Radford about the furnishing of United States equipment for three additional French divisions which would be formed from existing cadres and sent to Indochina, and I understand that this matter is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I understand that the details of the French request have been communicated by MAAG France to the Department of Defense.
In connection with the feasibility of carrying out this operation, the interested people in the Department of State would be glad to cooperate to the fullest extent useful with the Department of Defense, in order to see if ways and means of implementing this request can be found.
Insofar as the political aspects of the question are concerned, I would like to make certain observations for your consideration, indicating the extreme importance which we attribute to our being able to assist the French in this undertaking:
- 1.
- In order to maintain the French will to continue the struggle in Indochina, it is most important to be able to tell them promptly that in principle we will do whatever may be necessary to obtain the equipment for these divisions.
- 2.
- We should not object to the weakening of French NATO divisions for this purpose. This point is especially important in connection with the EDC debate in France, as the creation of these new divisions will provide an example of the flexibility in the European situation and demonstrate the ability of France to withdraw troops as necessary to cope with an urgent situation elsewhere in the French Union.
- 3.
- The French have proposed that the reinforcements sent from the NATO area to Indochina take with them their present equipment, and that the United States furnish additional equipment necessary to bring the French NATO forces back up to their present standards. It seems [Page 1670] to me that a more expeditious as well as desirable way of dealing with this problem might be to provide additional equipment directly from United States stocks to the reinforcements arriving in Indochina. This would also avoid any difficulties in removing MDAP equipment from the NATO area, or in programming additional equipment to French NATO forces in the context of present legislative restrictions. Should it however prove that certain items of equipment are not available for such French reinforcements other than what is now in their hands, we should then be in a position to agree to the transfer of such items to Indochina and to indicate clearly our willingness to replace such equipment in the NATO area. This would be very important from the EDC viewpoint since it will demonstrate to the French that there will be no weakening of their European situation or of their military position vis-à-vis Germany.
Finally I need hardly mention the urgency of this matter and I would hope that we would be in a position to inform the French in a few days of our willingness in principle to furnish the equipment required for the three additional divisions to be sent to Indochina, after which the necessary mechanics which will be, I fully realize, complex can be worked out here.
Sincerely yours,
Deputy Under Secretary
- Drafted by McBride and Beigel of WE.↩