751G.00/6–454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2656. Repeated information Paris 943, Geneva 193. Department telegram 4272 sent Paris repeated Geneva Tosec 269, Saigon 24181 was delayed in receipt due to extensive servicing. This accounts for our tardy comment.
I am in full agreement with general tenor of reference telegram and have only minor observations to make. Those are:
Re numbered paragraph 3–c, it might make French declaration more palatable both in France and in Asia generally were we likewise to announce intention to withdraw US technical and military assistance as soon as practicable. It must not be forgotten that in Communist and neutralist Asian eyes US is principal threat in Eastern Asia and not what is generally regarded to be a decadent France. Since Communist propaganda has already overstressed alleged unduly large role of FOA Mission here and Peking radio daily proclaims that US is sending military equipment to slaughter Asiatics, such a declaration might be useful from psychological warfare point of view.
Reference paragraph 4–a, it is essential that we commence forthwith to review terms of reference which now limit MAAG to purely logistical function. Under present set of rules, General O’Daniel is being asked to train Vietnamese troops with ever present French veto hanging [Page 1665] over his head. In my opinion, we should approach French Government on terms of September 29, 1953 agreement, point out that Navarre plan no longer exists, that conditions have changed, and that new terms of reference for MAAG should be drafted forthwith.
Implicit in paragraph 3–a but not specifically touched upon is problem of ancillary agreements which will spell out turn-over by France to Vietnam of sovereignty in specific fields as, for example, control of currency, Custom Union, Civil Aviation, and Mixed Courts. French, whether through incapacity of government to move in present Parliamentary crisis or by deliberate design, have not moved at all in completing these agreements although telegrams from Embassy Paris have indicated that so far as experts were concerned, these accords were almost ready for signature. Likewise Vietnamese experts, feeding at the flesh pots, have shown no alacrity in pressing for final action. It is not enough to broadcast a fine-sounding treaty of independence without knowing exactly where Vietnamese will find themselves in respect of control of their finances, their courts, and their right to request technical assistance from any quarter, and not exclusively from France.
As for question of elections to which Department quite rightly attaches importance, it is now of less significance in Vietnam than before owing to general feeling of panic and anxiety lest entire country be lost through unfortunate armistice terms. Press has announced that decrees will presently be signed by Bao Dai providing for municipal elections and, with exception of Saigon–Cholon, for direct election of mayors. This should to some extent meet Department’s requirement in this regard although it is far less than national elections or preparations for National Constituent Assembly.
Upon DeJean’s return from north today, I plan to discuss with him measures which should be taken locally as suggested numbered paragraph 6. I intend to suggest to DeJean necessity of providing Vietnamese administrators and technical experts with know-how derived from actual participation in the affairs of government. Likewise, Department heads and Ministers should be given greater opportunity to participate in forward planning as this will result in sense of responsibility to the nation which has heretofore been lacking. Another suggestion which has frequently been advanced is that French, by turning over Norodom Palace to Vietnamese, would give graphic evidence of their intention to retire from this country and to confirm Vietnamese independence. Main question, however, would be whether Chief of State would return to occupy Palace.