Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 200th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 3, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
The following were present at the 200th Meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
. . . . . . .
4. The Situation With Respect to Indochina (NSC Action No. 1054–b)2
Admiral Radford stated that General Valluy, who was now in Washington, informed him that the French expect an all-out Vietminh attack on the Tonkin Delta within the next ten days.3 They are not optimistic about withstanding such an attack. The morale of the whole French Expeditionary Corps is low, and they are tired. The Vietminh, on the other hand, had been enthused by their victory at Dien Bien Phu. In reply to General Valluy, Admiral Radford had stated that if this was the actual situation in Indochina, it seemed to him time for the French to find a new military leader. General Valluy thought that General Navarre would soon be replaced.
Admiral Radford then pointed out that there were 79 battalions and 11 Groupes Mobiles of French Union forces available for the defense of the Delta. He failed to see how the Vietminh in an open assault, unprotected by jungle terrain, could defeat French Union forces of this size. He added that the point had been reached where [Page 1661] the use of South Korean forces in Indochina might prove useful. There would be very few reinforcements for the French troops from anywhere outside Indochina in the course of the next ten days. General Valluy, said Admiral Radford, was normally an optimist and a strong character, but he was very down-in-the-mouth when he talked to Admiral Radford last night.
Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford if he wished the Council to act on his suggestion with respect to the use of a South Korean division in Indochina. Admiral Radford said he did not, but wished to give the matter further study in the Defense Department before proposing Council action. He indicated that if the South Koreans were used they would be flown down to Indochina by U.S. planes. If nothing more were accomplished, the presence of South Korean forces might add a spark of enthusiasm and spirit which was so desperately needed at the present time in Indochina. The President commented that the issue would not come up until the French requested President Rhee to dispatch South Korean forces. They would then presumably ask the United States to fly these forces in.
As a last point, Admiral Radford stated that General Valluy was convinced that the Vietminh would insist on securing possession of Hanoi as their future capital. They would either do this by negotiation at Geneva or they would seize the city by force.
The National Security Council:4
- a.
- Discussed the situation with respect to Indochina.
- b.
- Agreed that the Department of Defense should reconsider the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina in the light of the present situation, and report to the Council whether the policy in NSC Action No. 1054–b should be changed.
Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.
5. U.S. Policy in the Event of Overt Unprovoked Military Aggression by Communist China5
. . . . . . .
Secretary Wilson inquired as to the effect of the French loss of the Tonkin Delta. Admiral Radford replied that this would mean the loss of all the rest of Indochina to the Communists in very short order. The Communists want all of Southeast Asia, and seem to be in a fair way to get it. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed agreement with this view, and [Page 1662] further predicted the loss of the Delta if extraordinary measures were not promptly taken to save it.
The Vice President then asked Mr. Bowie, who had taken Secretary Dulles’ place at the table, if it was not probable that the French would accept a settlement at Geneva which would be quite unsatisfactory to the United States. Mr. Bowie said that he agreed with the Vice President’s fears, and said that unless the Communists were hopelessly adamant, the French were very likely to accept some kind of partition of Indochina which would be unsatisfactory to the United States. Admiral Radford, however, expressed the opinion that the French would have no choice but to fight to save the Delta, if for no other reason than that they must evacuate approximately a hundred thousand civilians of French nationality or sympathy.
The Vice President then asked Mr. Bowie what official position the United States would take in the event that the French accepted a partition solution from the Communists which the United States regarded as unsuitable. Mr. Bowie replied that theoretically, of course, the United States could initially disassociate itself from any such French agreement, but from a practical point of view we would have to recognize the boundaries established by the partition agreement if the United States proposed to try to defend the rest of Southeast Asia against Communist control. He added that the situation would be further complicated if Bao Dai refused to accept a French settlement at Geneva and asked the United States what it was willing to do if the Vietnamese continued the war.
Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that Hanoi might be the sticking point for the French in their negotiations at Geneva. If the French lose this city the result would be militarily disastrous.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on June 4.↩
- For NSC Action No. 1054, see extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 187th Meeting of the Council, Mar. 4, p. 1093.↩
- Admiral Radford conducted discussions of the military situation in Indochina with Gen. Jean Valluy, head of the French Military Mission to the United States, on June 2, June 3, and June 7. Records of these meetings are in files 751G.00/6–254; 751G.00/6–354; and Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320; respectively.↩
- Points a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 1147, June 3, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩
- For the entire record of the discussion of this agenda item, see volume xii.↩