Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Memoranda of Conversation”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Conversation With Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations
After an exchange of courtesies, etc., Mr. Hammarskjold mentioned the pending Thai application.2 He said he was afraid the result of this might be to reduce the chance of success at Geneva. He said that while the Thai application did not necessarily involve any agreement about the Indochina matter being discussed at the UN, the Russians probably would feel called upon to cover the entire territory, and that this might precipitate a chain of events which might end up with a certain duplication of the Geneva talks.
I said that “success” at Geneva seemed to me to involve something more than merely getting an agreement but involved getting the right kind of agreement. That, I thought, would be impossible unless the [Page 1659] French had some alternative to complete surrender and the United States was trying to provide that. One of the preconditions to any contingent United States action would be some participation in the area by the United Nations. Also it was important from the standpoint of getting MSA appropriations. We had followed the course which seemed to us least likely to involve Geneva. I did not see how the Russians could very well make this a reason for breaking off at Geneva if the only reason why the UN talks covered Indochina was because the Russians themselves brought that element in.
Hammarskjold then spoke of possible UN Assembly action following a prospective Soviet veto in the Security Council. He said he doubted whether we could get a two-thirds vote, or certainly not more than a bare two-thirds vote, if the matter came up while Geneva was still offering some hope. I said I thought we could decide on what to do about the Assembly after the Security Council dealt with the matter, and that we did not need to make any firm decision at this time.