PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- JCS memorandum of May 20 concerning U.S. participation in Indochina
I. Introduction
1. Subject memorandum describes U.S. participation as involving primarily limited U.S. air and naval forces, with the French agreeing not to withdraw their forces from Indochina, the U.S. assuming responsibility for training indigenous forces, a command structure for united action being established, atomic weapons being used where this was militarily advantageous, and attacks possibly to be mounted on Viet Minh sources of supply in Communist China.
II. Force Requirements
2. It is doubted that a U.S. participation which was of the limited character described above could achieve its objective.
- a.
- The expanded Vietnamese armies could not be raised without a change in the present Vietnamese political atmosphere, which will require measures likely to induce the French progressively to curtail their ground forces in Indochina, regardless of commitments they might have made in seeking U.S. participation in the Indochina war. This curtailment would probably proceed more rapidly than the expansion of effective Vietnamese armies.*
- b.
- Even if satisfactory political conditions could be established at this late date, it is doubtful that the Vietnamese would contribute greatly increased effective manpower until they saw greater hope of [Page 1625] eventual victory against Viet Minh than at present. Such hope would have to be based on evident and significant Viet Minh defeats. The present balance of military power in Indochina is such that French Union forces are unable to prevent Viet Minh victories, let alone inflict evident and significant Viet Minh defeats. The introduction of limited US air and naval forces into Indochina would not so reverse the military balance of power as to cause the Viet Minh to suffer such defeats. This would require the introduction of increased ground forces which, under the assumed circumstances, could only come—in any large measure—from the US.
3. The use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would hardly reduce the ground force requirement in this area. Major targets would only be presented in Viet Minh areas if Communist troops and supplies were massed for an operation like the assault on Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Minh, in waging war against the French with growing effectiveness for eight years, mounted only one other operation which might be remotely compared to that against Dien Bien Phu. The use of nuclear weapons would also cause an adverse Vietnamese reaction, which might inhibit the formation of indigenous armies, and seriously adverse reactions in Asian neutral nations.
4. The JCS paper appears to assume that the commitment of United States forces would inevitably be countered by Chinese Communist retaliation. This is probable but not certain. If this should not be the case, the possibility of securing Indochina would be enhanced and would warrant the commitment of something more than token forces, in view of the vital importance of Southeast Asia to “the security interests of the United States.”
5. While ground force requirements in Indochina might be reduced by attacks on supply sources in Communist China, this would, of course, increase still further the probability of Chinese Communist intervention which would totally transform the character of the war. In the event of such intervention, the US would have to deploy very much greater forces to wage the war; it is unclear whether a non-Communist position in the Indochinese peninsula could then be maintained or re-established without military pressure on mainland China which would so endanger the security of the Peiping regime as to bring the Sino-Soviet alliance into play.
III. Training
6. As to the US training responsibilities, we believe that US methods evolved in Korea and elsewhere could eventually be advantageously employed, provided that the political foundations for our intervention and subsequent action were sound. If this political preparation had not had a beneficial impact upon the outlook and esprit of officer candidates, we believe that assembly line techniques might only [Page 1626] produce less reliable company officers more rapidly. The mere appearance in the field of a US training mission would not automatically produce Vietnamese political confidence in the US and in independence, unless it were part of a generally new approach in all fields—political, economic and military.
7. As we understand the JCS paper, the ground fighting would be chiefly done by French Union forces with only a token US contribution. If this is correct, it raises a question about the efficacy of the training mission. Tactics and organization are now on French models; we would either have to continue to teach in the French manner through French intermediaries or revise the system in mid-campaign to fit the practices of an American army which, under the JCS plan, would not be present in the theater.
IV. Command Relationship
We believe that the command relationship between any US naval and air force contributions should be carefully spelled out with respect to the command relationship to the Allied Commander in Chief. There would appear to us to be significant advantages to be gained in having command of US naval and air forces remaining with the US. If the JCS assumption of token US land contributions should prove unsound, then the suggestion that US forces remain under French command would have to be reviewed, not only because the ground forces would no longer be so predominantly French Union, but also because our intervention would have a better chance politically in Asia and the United States under US rather than French command.