751G.5/5–2154: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
4194. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. ReEmbtel 4416 rptd Geneva 251.2
- 1.
Marines.
Within context of coherent and realistic overall plan for conduct of collective military operations in Indochina, we would not exclude sending some marines, if this made military sense. Until Ely returns from Paris and reports, we assume French will not be able to discuss seriously such overall plan. On other hand we are definitely not prepared to make commitments of marines or other contingents on piecemeal basis and for merely psychological reasons. When French are able to discuss specific plan for collective operations in practical terms we will be ready to discuss what other countries including US should contribute.
- 2.
Timing.
We are concerned about when decision can be taken re internationalizing conflict. It seems quite clear that military measures, which if taken in next few weeks could enable holding of Indochina, might be hopelessly inadequate two months from now if military and political situation Indochina continues to deteriorate. We are not clear as to when French envisage really coming to grips with problem and how this is related to progress or lack thereof at Geneva. Would appreciate your best estimate as to:
- a.
- Whether French view present talks with us as anything more than a device to strengthen their hand at Geneva;
- b.
- If Communists drag out Geneva talks will French in meantime be unable to take any decision re internationalizing conflict;
- c.
- When will French really get down to cases with us re conditions;
- d.
- If Laniel agrees to our conditions, when would he be likely to submit them to Cabinet and Parliament.
- 3.
Independence.
Your several telegrams ably set forth French point of view on independence for Associated States. Our concern is to clarify status of Associated States in manner which will mobilize local support in Vietnam and SEA, minimize other Asian opposition, and satisfy US and free world opinion. While suggestions in your 44023 may be useful for this purpose, we do not believe they would meet problem fully. Main difficulty is that even if Associated States enjoyed real independence [Page 1595] today, as fully as French assert, French have stated this so often in past that it is hard now to obtain credence. Moreover, fact that treaty of independence and treaty of association are inextricably tied together by French cannot fail to give impression that Vietnamese decision to remain in French Union was not freely arrived at but was extorted as price for independence. I would appreciate your considering this further and sending me a specific formula to meet this problem.
- Drafted by Bowie, Bonbright, and MacArthur. Repeated to Geneva as Tedul 101, from the Secretary eyes only for the Under Secretary.↩
- See footnote 2, p. 1580.↩
- Dated May 17, p. 1574.↩