Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–2054

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret

Washington, 20 May 1954.

Subject:

• U.S. Military Participation in Indochina²

1. In recent discussions between the French and the Department of State relating to U.S. military intervention in Indochina, the U.S. Government specified certain conditions which would have to obtain if U.S. military intervention were to be undertaken. Among these conditions were:

a. That France would undertake not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during period of united action so that forces from U.S. principally air and sea and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

b. That agreement would have to be reached on training of native troops and on command structure for united action.

2. On the assumption that United States armed forces intervene in the conflict in Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that a Department of Defense position should be formulated as to the size and composition of U.S. force contributions to be made and the command structure to be established. In formulating these views the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by several factors, among which are:

a. The limited availability of U.S. forces for military action in Indochina.

b. The current numerical advantage of the French Union forces over the enemy, i.e., approximately 5 to 3.

c. The undesirability of basing large numbers of U.S. forces in Indochina.

d. The primary need for an expanded and intensified training program as being the current greatest need.

e. The lack of required facilities for superimposing U.S. Air Force forces on existing facilities in Indochina.

f. The implications of a reaction of the Chinese Communists in the event of U.S. participation.

g. Atomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the basic principle underlying any command structure for operations in Indochina which is acceptable to the United States must enable the U.S. to influence future strategy in Indochina. In addition, they believe that some new means to furnish the military guidance which heretofore has come from Paris must be found. A possible solution for over-all strategic guidance is a Military Representatives Committee with membership from those nations contributing the principal forces of the coalition with a steering or standing group along the lines of NATO. This group would be served by a staff organized along the lines of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of³ Staff composed primarily of U.S. and French officers.

4. Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a U.S. Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operations. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Commander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best military course for eventual victory in Indochina is the development of effective native armed forces. Thus far the French have been unsuccessful in their efforts to develop such forces. A firm commitment by the French and firm requests from the respective governments of the Associated States for the training and development of native forces by the United States should be a prerequisite of U.S. participation. It is estimated that an augmentation of MAAG Indochina on the order of 2250, with an appropriate logistic support force, would be required to initiate this program. The size of this force and security arrangements therefor will be determined in light of recommendations requested from CINCPAC and Chief, MAAG Indochina.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. participation be limited primarily to Naval and Air Forces. The composition of these forces should be on the order of the following:

a. Naval Forces. A fast carrier Task Force and supporting forces as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation.

b. Air Forces. U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside Indochina as may be required. The order of magnitude of this effort cannot now be estimated since it will depend on developments in the situation.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina. The destruction or neutralization of those outside sources supporting the Viet Minh would materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that committing to the Indochina conflict Naval forces in excess of the above or basing substantial air forces therein will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East. From the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The source text is accompanied by the following note from Morris Draper of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State to Counselor MacArthur: “The original of the attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which you have seen, has gone to the Secretary. This attached copy and one other, which has been sent to Mr. Bowie, are the only two which Defense has authorized us to have.”

   Acting Secretary of Defense Anderson sent an additional copy of this memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles on June 5. Anderson’s letter of transmittal indicated that he concurred in the views of the JCS. (751G.5/6–554) On the same day, Anderson also sent a copy of the memorandum to the President’s Special Assistant. (JCS files)

2. A separate memorandum on this subject was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense on May 19 by Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Army; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 475–476.
3. The words “Chiefs of” were deleted by a JCS corrigendum on May 24, 1954. (JCS files)