Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Extract]

top secret

[Washington,] May 19, 1954.

Memorandum of Conversation With the President

. . . . . . .

Indochina

With respect to Indochina, I reviewed with the President the recent cables. I said that matters were somewhat in suspense pending the return of General Ely from Indochina. I referred to the French position, as indicated in Dillon’s 4416,¹ particularly on Marines. The President said he would not necessarily exclude sending some Marines if we went in. He was, however, very emphatic that we must adhere to the position of not going in alone. There would have to be some regional association. I said that this was the position that we were closely adhering to, as indicated in the basic cable of conditions which had been sent to Dillon.² I reminded him that this did not make U.K. active participation a necessary condition, which the President agreed to. He emphasized, however, the indispensability also of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand, and of course, the Associated States.

I mentioned to the President the cable from Bedell Smith (Dulte 84)³ with reference to five-power military talks at Washington. The President concurred in Smith’s suggestion that the British could report informally to the Colombo powers as they proposed leaving us to inform Thailand and the Philippines as we deemed best.

I told the President that I felt grave concern at the results of the dilatory tactics being pursued by the U.K., and particularly their unwillingness to have political talks with the countries of the area or to reach any decisions on area defense until after the results of Geneva were known. I said that this enabled the Communists by delaying tactics at Geneva to prevent any action on our part until they had in effect consolidated their position throughout Indochina. I mentioned in this connection that Eden’s influence at Geneva as at Berlin had been to undermine the relatively stronger position which Bidault seemed disposed to take. The President said it was incomprehensible to him that the British should be acting as they were. He suggested that possibly in a further letter to Churchill dealing with the latter’s prospective visit some strong note might be injected implying that the Churchill Government was really promoting a second Munich. He indicated that Churchill was very proud to keep his record, by which history would judge him, one of strength and wisdom, and that if Churchill felt that history would not judge well his present conduct, he might conceivably change. I said I would try my hand at drafting some further communication. The President recalled that we had taken out of his earlier message to Churchill of April 4⁴ the reference to Japan and Manchuria, but perhaps that theme might be reintroduced.

I expressed the thought that it might well be that the situation in Indochina itself would soon have deteriorated to a point where nothing effectual could be done to stop the tide of Chinese Communists overrunning Southeast Asia except perhaps diversionary activities along the China coast, which would be conducted primarily by the Nationalist forces, but would require sea and air support from the United States. The President agreed that this matter might very well prove to be the case. I mentioned, however, that we were hamstrung by the constitutional situation and the apparent reluctance of Congress to give the President discretionary authority. I showed the President a copy of a rough draft of a Congressional resolution⁵ which I had discussed with Knowland on Monday,⁶ and against which Senator Knowland had reacted strongly in opposition, saying it would amount to giving the President a blank check to commit the country to war. The President suggested that possibly the proposal might be redrafted to define the area of operation more closely as being in and about the island and coastal areas of the Western Pacific.

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[Annex]

Draft Congressional Resolution

[Washington,] May 17, 1954.

The President is authorized to employ Naval and Air forces of the United States to assist friendly governments of Asia to maintain their authority as against subversive and revolutionary efforts fomented by Communist regimes, provided such aid is requested by the governments concerned. This shall not be deemed to be a declaration of war and the authority hereby given shall be terminated on June 30, 1955, unless extended.

1. See footnote 2, p. 1580.
2. See telegram 4023 to Paris, May 11, p. 1534.
3. For text of telegram Dulte 84 from Geneva, May 18, containing British draft terms of reference for five-power military staff talks, see volume xii.
4. See telegram 5179 to London, Apr. 4, p. 1238.
5. Reference is presumably to the draft attached to the source text; for text, see annex.
6. According to the log of the Secretary’s daily appointments, the visit by Dulles to Capitol Hill on Monday, May 17, included a meeting with Senator Knowland at 10:15 a.m. (Princeton University, Dulles papers, “Daily Appointments”) No record of the discussion has been found.